Williamson v. Clarke Cnty. Dep't of Human Res.

• Decision Date: 08 July 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–0181–WS–N.
• Citation: 834 F.Supp.2d 1310,43 NDLR P 161
• Parties: Eric WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff, v. CLARKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

834 F.Supp.2d 1310

43 NDLR P 161

Eric WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff,

v.CLARKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10–0181–WS–N.

United States District Court,

S.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

July 8, 2011.

Steven L. Terry, Mobile, AL, for Plaintiff.

Joel C. Marsh, State of Alabama, Department of Human Resources Legal Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

ORDER

WILLIAM H. STEELE, Chief Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 17). The Motion has been briefed and is ripe for disposition.

I. Nature of the Case.

Plaintiff, Eric Williamson, brought this action against defendants, the Clarke County Department of Human Resources (“CCDHR”) and the State of Alabama, asserting causes of action for employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791 et seq. The Complaint (doc. 1) alleges that plaintiff repeatedly requested reasonable accommodations for his disability, and that such accommodations would have permitted him to perform the essential functions of his job. According to the Complaint, however, CCDHR refused to provide such accommodations, and instead terminated his employment because of his disability. Plaintiff's claims sound in theories of failure to provide reasonable accommodation, as well as discriminatory discharge. Williamson seeks an award of monetary damages, declaratory relief, and reinstatement, plus attorney's fees and costs.

II. Relevant Background.¹A. Plaintiff's Employment at CCDHR.

Williamson was hired by defendant CCDHR as a social service case worker in the Child Welfare Unit, effective September 18, 2006. (Boykin Aff. (doc. 17, Exh. 1), at 1.) In this capacity, Williamson's job involved working with foster children in CCDHR's custody, including duties such as monitoring their cases, providing or arranging for services for foster children and foster parents, maintaining case files, and documenting case information. ( Id. at 2.) Williamson's “most important function” was to make sure that those children were kept safe and were protected from abuse and neglect. ( Id. at 1–2.)

From November 2006 through 2008, Williamson's direct supervisor was Kimberly Guidroz–Oputa. (Guidroz–Oputa Aff. (doc. 19), at 1–2.) During 2008, Williamson was supervised by Iola Williams. ( Id.) Following Williams' retirement in 2009, however, Guidroz–Oputa resumed her direct supervision of Williamson, and continued in that capacity until plaintiff's dismissal in July 2009. ( Id.) During all relevant times, Lou Boykin was the director of the CCDHR. (Boykin Aff., at 1.) As the appointing authority for the CCDHR, Boykin made all hiring and firing decisions for that agency. ( Id. at 4.)

B. Plaintiff's Medical Condition.

As early as 1996, Williamson was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity (“ADHD”). (Williamson Aff. (doc. 30–2), at 1.) Plaintiff testified that he has intermittently been under physicians' care for this condition, for which he has sometimes been prescribed Adderall or other medications. (Williamson Dep. (doc. 21), at 58–65.) ² According to plaintiff, his ADHD condition affected his performance at CCDHR by interfering with his ability to concentrate and causing him to be easily distracted. ( Id. at 68–69.) As Williamson put it, if he “got constant traffic in and out, I will lose track with what I'm doing. I will move on to something different and leave something undone.” ( Id. at 69.)

As of early 2009, Williamson was not under a physician's care for his ADHD. At that time, he received a “supervisory referral” to the agency's Employee Assistance Program (“EAP”) by his then-supervisor, Iola Williams, for ongoing performance issues. (Williamson Dep., at 63–64.) ³ Pursuant to that EAP referral, Williamson was seen by David D. Harwood, M.D., who began treating Williamson in February 2009 for ADHD, via routine office visits and prescribed medication. ( Id. at 65–66; doc. 30–5.)

Plaintiff's evidence is that on one occasion, he notified his immediate supervisor, Guidroz–Oputa, on a driving trip to Mobile that he suffered from ADHD and that he had issues with being able to concentrate. (Williamson Dep., at 69.) ⁴ On other occasions, Williamson testified, he told both Guidroz–Oputa and Williams that he was “overwhelmed” and said that he “needed time to do” his main duties, such that he was requesting additional time. ( Id. at 70–71.) In his words, Williamson “said I was overwhelmed and needed time to do—too many job duties.” ( Id. at 72.) When asked whether he related these for requests for modification of his job back to his ADHD in conversations with CCDHR officials, however, Williamson responded, “Not directly.” ( Id. at 72.) Thus, Williamson admits that he did not tell his supervisors that he was requesting adjustment of his job duties as an accommodation for a disability.

Nonetheless, Williamson's evidence is that he notified Williams in January 2009 that a reduction in workload (and, specifically, intake responsibilities) would enable him to complete his primary duties. (Williamson Aff., at 2.) ⁵ According to plaintiff, “All I wanted from CCDHR was a reduction in my duties which could be a limit on intake duties which include having others to input information into the Department system.... Reduction in duties would have allowed me to complete the duties of a social service caseworker satisfactorily.” ( Id. at 3.) The summary judgment record reflects that CCHDR reduced his caseload, but not his intake responsibilities. (Boykin Dep., at 35–38.) Plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim in this action turns on his contention that defendants wrongfully refused to reduce his intake duties as an accommodation for his disability.

Williamson admits that he never discussed his ADHD condition with Lou Boykin, the CCDHR's director and the decisionmaker for the challenged termination decision. (Williamson Dep., at 70.) It is uncontroverted that plaintiff never informed Boykin that he had a disability and never requested an accommodation from her directly. (Boykin Aff., at 5.)

That said, plaintiff concedes in his summary judgment brief that he met with his immediate supervisor (Guidroz–Oputa) and Boykin after he disclosed his ADHD diagnosis to Guidroz–Oputa. (Doc. 30, at 2, 5.) ⁶ This meeting came about because, when plaintiff notified Guidroz–Oputa during a work-related drive to Mobile that he had ADHD, Guidroz–Oputa promptly informed Boykin of that conversation upon their return to CCDHR. (Guidroz–Oputa Aff. (doc. 19), at 2.) Upon receiving this second-hand report, Boykin called Williamson and Guidroz–Oputa into her office to discuss the matter. (Boykin Aff., at 5; Guidroz–Oputa Aff., at 2.) During this meeting, Boykin questioned Williamson “as to whether or not he made that statement or whether or not he had that condition.” (Boykin Dep. (doc. 30–3), at 26.) In response, Williamson said nothing, but “just looked at [Boykin] really, really funny.” ( Id.) Boykin characterized plaintiff's response as “a facial appearance as if he really didn't know what [Boykin] was talking about.” ( Id. at 30.) So Boykin advised Williamson that if he wished to request an accommodation, he must provide medical information to Boykin, who in turn would pass it along to the state DHR office for consideration. (Boykin Aff., at 5; Boykin Dep., at 26, 30, 39.) ⁷

It is undisputed that Williamson never submitted any medical documentation or completed a written form to request reasonable accommodation. (Williamson Dep., at 72–73; Boykin Aff., at 5; Jackson Aff. (doc. 20), at 2.) ⁸ Moreover, Williamson never said anything to Boykin thereafter about having a disability or desiring a reasonable accommodation. (Boykin Aff., at 5; Boykin Dep., at 26.) ⁹ Boykin never heard of Williamson making an accommodation request to anyone else at CCDHR. (Boykin Dep., at 30.) Boykin did not follow up with Williamson about this matter because, she explained, “[i]t's the responsibility of the worker requesting the accommodation to make a formal request.” ( Id. at 31–32.) Plaintiff admits that he never provided defendants with any documentation from any doctor concerning his ADHD. (Williamson Dep., at 73.) He further admits that the lone document that anyone submitted to CCDHR regarding his condition was the March 2009 Behavioral Health Systems letter, which said nothing about Williamson having a disability or requiring reasonable accommodation. ( Id. at 66, 73.) Therefore, as far as Boykin and CCDHR were concerned, that was the end of that.

C. Termination of Plaintiff's Employment.

Williamson experienced a series of documented performance problems and disciplinary actions during his employment at CCDHR. For example, in October 2007, Guidroz–Oputa issued a written reprimand to him for various shortcomings, including “delinquent case dictation, failure to complete ISP's timely, failure to mail out ISP's, failure to make home and school visits, providing false information about case work, lack of ACWIS data entry, falling asleep in meetings, failure to return phone calls, [and] failure to obey supervisor's requests.” (Def. Exh. 3, at 107.) In April 2008, Boykin suspended plaintiff for two weeks without pay, citing “failure to comply with agency rules and the expectations of [his] position.” (Def. Exh. 3, at 184.) ¹⁰

In May 2009, Boykin issued a charge letter advising Williamson that a disciplinary hearing had been scheduled based on allegations that his work performance was unsatisfactory. (Def. Exh. 3, at 32–35.) This charge letter recited a lengthy laundry list of alleged policy violations by plaintiff, including failure properly to conduct investigations in child abuse/neglect cases, failure to implement safety plans to protect children, accumulation of pending cases in excess of 90 days, failure to document case activity, authorization of services and case activity...