Williamson v. Eckhoff

• Decision Date: 03 November 1914
• Docket Number: No. 13675.,13675.
• Parties: WILLIAMSON v. ECKHOFF.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

170 S.W. 322

185 Mo. A. 234

WILLIAMSON v. ECKHOFF.

No. 13675.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

November 3, 1914.

1. LIBEL AND SLANDER (§ 110)—EVIDENCE—REPUTATION.

In a civil action for slander in speaking to plaintiff in the hearing of others in slanderous words imputing unchastity to her, evidence of her reputation for morality and chastity was admissible, though defendant had not first attacked such reputation.

2. LIBEL AND SLANDER (§ 121)—VERDICT — AMOUNT—EXCESSIVENESS:

Where defendant, admittedly worth $200,000, slandered plaintiff in the hearing of others,

by charging that she was a prostitute, a verdict for plaintiff of $5,000 was not excessive.

3. LIBEL AND SLANDER (§ 107)—EVIDENCE—PARTIES—CONDITION IN LIFE.

In an action for slander, evidence of the condition in life of both plaintiff and defendant was admissible on the question of damages.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Geo. C. Hitchcock, Judge.

Action by Annie Williamson against Clemens Eckhoff. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. W. Lubke and Geo. W. Lubke, Jr., both of St. Louis, for appellant. Emerson E. Schnepp and Horatio P. Belt, both of St. Louis, for respondent.

ALLEN, J.

This is an action for slander. The petition charges that the defendant contriving wickedly, maliciously and falsely, to ruin and defame the plaintiff in her good name and reputation, and to bring her into disgrace and infamy, did, on the 26th day of July, 1911, in the city of St. Louis, state of Missouri, in the presence and hearing of Jesse Burke, and various other good people of the city of St. Louis, state of Missouri, while directly facing the plaintiff and shaking his finger at her, then and there, falsely and maliciously speak and publish of and concerning the plaintiff and of and concerning a charge of whoredom, the following false, scandalous, and defamatory words; that is to say:

"Whose children are those? Where is your husband? Where is your husband? You have no husband; you are a big fat whore; you are a big fat whore; you are a big fat whore!"

The answer is a general denial. The cause was tried before the court and a jury, resulting in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, and the defendant appeals.

The evidence is overwhelming in proof of the uttering by defendant of the slanderous and defamatory words alleged in the petition. It appears that defendant is the owner of a factory in the city of St. Louis, as well as of some nearby residence property, certain windows of the factory building overlooking the front yards of the houses in question. On the day of the alleged slander plaintiff was visiting a Miss Burke, who with her mother and brothers occupied one of defendant's said houses, remaining until evening. It is at the front gate of these premises that the slanderous words are said to have been spoken.

From the evidence adduced in plaintiff's behalf it appears that shortly after 6 o'clock the defendant appeared at a window of his factory and called "Hey! Hey!" to some one, and then addressed a Mrs. Mundt, who was sitting with her children upon a lawn bench in the adjoining yard, also defendant's property, applying to her, it is said, the same opprobrious term later applied to plaintiff, though Mrs. Mundt testifies that she did not understand what he then said; that following this the defendant came out of his factory and walked down the street passing these premises; that at this time plaintiff was standing in the doorway of the house in which she was visiting, and when defendant reached the front gate of the yard to these premises he stopped, and, looking at plaintiff and shaking his finger at her, said: "Strange face; strange face; never seen that face before; never seen that face before"—and then added the slanderous and defamatory words averred in the petition. Plaintiff's version of the matter is thoroughly corroborated by the testimony of her witnesses.

On behalf of defendant one witness, Mr. Mundt, who it is said was called out of his house by his wife when the defendant approached her premises, testified that he did not hear the slanderous words uttered. Another witness for the defendant heard enough thereof to understand the purport and tenor of the same, but stated that he did not know to whom it was addressed.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, denied that he said anything to plaintiff, or to any one standing in Mrs. Burke's doorway, that evening. When asked on cross-examination as to uttering the slanderous words, he said that he did not remember, though he stated, "When I am angry I sometimes say most anything."

There are but two assignments of error before us. One of these pertains to the action of the trial court in admitting, over defendant's objections, testimony tending to establish plaintiff's good character, and particularly her reputation for morality and chastity; the defendant not having attacked plaintiff's character, either by his pleading or at the trial. Appellant insists that such evidence was inadmissible for any purpose, under the circumstances, citing Odgers on Libel & Slander (4th Ed.) p. 366, Townshend on Slander & Libel (4th Ed.) pp. 645, 646, Newell on Libel & Slander, p. 823, Jones on Evidence (2d Ed.), as well as certain decisions of the courts of other states.

It is true that in civil actions, in general, the character of neither party...