Williamson v. Fontain
| Decision Date | 30 April 1874 |
| Citation | 66 Tenn. 212 |
| Parties | M. E. WILLIAMSON v. N. FONTAIN, Ex'r, etc. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM SHELBY.
Appeal from the Chancery Court. W. L. SCOTT, Chancellor.
KORTRECHT & CRAFT for complainant.
STEPHENS & SMITH for defendant.
Complainant is the widow of Samuel B. Williamson, who died in Shelby county in 1869, leaving complainant and defendant, Samuel B. Williamson, an infant son, his only child, surviving him. He was a member of the mercantile firm of Williamson, Hill & Co., which firm owned, at the time of the death of S. B. Williamson, valuable real estate, received by them in satisfaction of debts due the firm. He left a will, which was duly proven, and of which his widow and partner, N. Fontain, were qualified as executrix and executor. The widow dissented from the will, and now claims that she is entitled to her distributive share of the real estate of the firm as personal property. It is conceded that the real estate of the firm is not needed for payment of its debts, and the question thus presented is, whether the interest of S. B. Williamson in the partnership real estate descends to his heir, or continues to be personalty and subject to the laws of distribution.
It is not denied in the argument that the current of decisions in Tennessee is that so much of the real estate of a partnership as is not needed for the payment of its debts, descends as realty to the heirs; but it is said that these decisions have been made accompanied with such intimations of doubt as to their correctness, that the question may now be properly revived and reconsidered.
It is true that in the case of McAlister v. Montgomery, 3 Hay., 9 [4] in which the construction of the act of 1784 was given, the direct question now presented was not necessarily involved. It is also true that in the case of Woods v. Yeatman, 6 Yer., 20, the court saw no reason to depart from the principle of the case of McAlister v. Montgomery, and adopted the opinion given in the Chancery Court by Chancellor Reese, who only followed the case of McAlister v. Montgomery because he felt himself bound by the holding of the superior court.
The question was again presented in the case of Piper v. Smith, 1 Head, 97, where the court was urged on to review and correct the former decisions. To this the court said: ...
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Brown v. Brown
...as personalty for the purposes of the partnership, but when not needed for such purposes it descends, as other real estate.' Williamson v. Fontain, 66 Tenn. 212. This theory of the partial conversion of partnership realty received acceptance because it was in accord with the existing laws o......
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Cultra v. Cultra
...not consider this case as an authority upon the question here presented. It is true that in the Marks case, the court there cited Williamson v. Fontain, supra, but citing it, the court merely said this was the established law in this State. Courts of other states, in construing the Uniform ......