Williamson v. Kirby, 79-296
| Decision Date | 06 February 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-296,79-296 |
| Citation | 379 So.2d 693 |
| Parties | Louise WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. Jean KIRBY, Guardian of person and property of Mae W. Yearwood, a physical andmental incompetent, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert E. Pyle, Lake Alfred, for appellant.
No appearance for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment cancelling a deed executed by Mae Yearwood which conveyed a remainder interest in her home in Ft. Meade to Louise Williamson. The nature of the case and most of the pertinent evidence can be gleaned from a reading of the trial court's findings.
On October 14, 1976, Mae Yearwood, a 90 year old widow, conveyed her home in Fort Meade, to the Defendant, Louise Williamson, reserving a life estate to herself. In October, 1977, Mrs. Yearwood was declared incompetent due to senility and Plaintiff, Jean Kirby, was appointed her guardian. In this capacity, Mrs. Kirby brought this action, alleging that a confidential relationship existed between the parties to the deed; that the deed was without consideration; that Mrs. Yearwood was incapable of understanding the matter, extent and effect of the deed; that the Defendant was guilty of fraud and had exercised undue influence upon the grantor.
Mae Yearwood and Louise Williamson were close friends and neighbors for many years. The older lady could not drive and due to age and infirmity frequently needed assistance with her every day tasks. Mrs. Williamson was very helpful, caring for her when ill and aiding her in many ways, not the least of which was furnishing companionship and friendship.
In the Fall of 1976, Mrs. Yearwood was mentally competent, capable of understanding transactions and the effect of her acts. However, she had become forgetful and was easily confused. She relied upon Mrs. Williamson for aid and advice. She had no regular attorney.
She became angry at and mistrustful of members of her own family, none of whom lived in Florida, when one of them transferred her savings account to an out of State bank. When later she learned that a local real estate broker had shown her home to a potential buyer, she became frightened for her security and decided to convey her home to Mrs. Williamson.
There was no evidence of her receiving outside, independent advice from an attorney or other adviser other than Mrs. Williamson, prior to making her decision.
Although the testimony of Mrs. Williamson was to the contrary, the Court finds that Mrs. Williamson was the one who suggested attorney Edward Flood as he had recently represented her; that she made an appointment for them to see Mr. Flood; that she was present and participated in the conversation with him and that she assisted in concluding the transaction. Mr. Flood visited with Mrs. Yearwood sufficiently to satisfy himself as to her competence but was not consulted as to the advisability of the conveyance or as to alternative ways to prevent sale of her home. Mrs. Williamson then carried Mrs. Yearwood to the Courthouse to record the deed. There was no evidence of efforts by Mrs. Williamson to keep the transaction secret from Mrs. Yearwood's family but neither did she tell them of the gift.
The conveyance was an outright gift with no future obligations by Mrs. Williamson for continued care or obligation to Mrs. Yearwood.
The Court further finds: That a confidential relationship existed between Mrs. Yearwood and Mrs. Williamson; that Mrs. Williamson fostered and encouraged the idea of conveying the property to her; and that she did exert an undue influence upon Mrs. Yearwood.
The same conclusion is reached regardless of whether a presumption of undue influence from the confidential relationship is invoked. Without the presumption the greater weight of the evidence established undue influence in the execution of the deed.
The court's reference to the presumption of undue influence arising from a confidential relationship finds its basis in the legal principles set forth in the case of In re Estate of Carpenter, 253 So.2d 697 (Fla.1971). Carpenter involved the execution of a will but later cases have applied the same principles to Inter vivos gifts. Majorana v. Constantine, 318 So.2d 185 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); Pate v. Mellen, 275 So.2d 562 (Fla.1st DCA 1973) (on rehearing). According to Carpenter, where a person contests a will upon grounds of undue influence, he has the burden throughout the proceedings of proving undue influence. However, because of the difficulty of meeting that burden, the law raises a presumption of undue influence if (a) the contestant is able to establish a confidential relationship between the testator and the beneficiary and (b) the evidence shows that the beneficiary was active in the procurement of the will. If the contestant is successful in raising the presumption, the beneficiary then has the burden of explaining his active involvement in the preparation of the will. He does not have the burden of disproving undue influence. If the explanation is reasonable, the presumption vanishes and it becomes the court's responsibility to determine whether the contestant has established undue influence by the greater weight of the evidence. Such evidence may include not only the evidence initially presented to raise the presumption but any additional evidence which the parties have introduced.
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