Williamson v. New Times, Inc.
| Decision Date | 06 August 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-97-178-CV,2-97-178-CV |
| Parties | 27 Media L. Rep. 1408 Deen T. WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. NEW TIMES, INC., d/b/a Dallas Observer, and Laura Miller, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Deen T. Williamson, Arlington, for Appellant.
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Thomas J. Williams, Melissa A. Smith, Fort Worth, for Appellee.
Before CAYCE, C.J., and DAUPHINOT and BRIGHAM, JJ.
Appellant, Deen T. Williamson ("Williamson"), appeals an order granting appellees, New Times, Inc., d/b/a Dallas Observer, and Laura Miller ("Miller"), summary judgment. In eleven points, Williamson contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because it improperly applied the "single publication rule"; in refusing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law; in granting summary judgment based upon improper summary judgment evidence; and in failing to compel appellees to complete discovery requests. We will affirm.
In its November 16-22, 1995 issue, the Dallas Observer contained an article written by Miller entitled "They Wanted to Destroy Me." In this article, Miller chided the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) for hiring Williamson, a DISD school teacher, who was suspended from her job for allegedly telling her African-American fifth graders to "Go back to Africa." Specifically, the article discussed Williamson's capabilities as a teacher and interactions with her students in the DISD:
This longtime Dallas school teacher is a sad, troubled soul--who has no business being in a classroom....
....
... [T]his 51-year-old career teacher can't spell or craft a proper sentence....
....
Interviews with school district employees, parents, and students--plus a review of Dallas Police Department incident reports--present a picture of a woman in a rage about race....
....
According to the DISD witnesses ... [Williamson] declared that blacks don't do well on state achievement tests; that her own sons couldn't get school scholarships because blacks got them instead; and that "black people will always find a way to act a fool."
....
Sergeant Fred Rich in [the Dallas Police Department's] child-abuse division [said] that police are considering filing misdemeanor assault charges against Williamson for alleged actions involving three students.
In addition to an admission by Williamson that she lied on her job application with the DISD, the article revealed personal and confidential information contained in Williamson's psychiatric files. Miller obtained the information from documents Williamson filed in federal court to support allegations in her lawsuit against her previous employer, the Abilene Independent School District, for terminating her employment. These records allegedly showed that Williamson was diagnosed as having a bipolar disorder--"meaning she was manic-depressive, exhibiting a condition marked by extreme emotional highs and equally extreme lows." The article concluded:
Deen Williamson is a sad, troubled soul. But what happened isn't really her fault. She's wrestling with private demons.
It's up to DISD to protect children from such folks--to hire teachers who can help kids, not those who are so much in need of help themselves.
The Deen Williamson episode, in short, is tragic--and DISD officials have no one but themselves to blame.
On November 15, 1995, Miller participated in a program on Dallas-based radio station, KRLD. In this program, Miller discussed appellant and the contents of her article published in the Dallas Observer.
On November 19, 1996, Williamson filed a lawsuit against appellees seeking redress for libel and slander resulting from the article published in the Dallas Observer and Miller's statements on KRLD. Williamson alleged that the article was meant to hold her up to ridicule, contempt, shame, and disgrace in the community. On February 3, 1997, appellees filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Williamson's cause of action is time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations for libel and slander actions. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.002(a) (Vernon Supp.1998). 1 On February 28, 1997, the trial court granted appellees' motion and dismissed Williamson's claims.
When reviewing a summary judgment, we follow these well-established rules: (1) The movant has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (2) in deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will be taken as true; and (3) every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts must be resolved in favor of the nonmovant. See Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). Summary judgment is proper if the defendant disproves at least one element of each of the plaintiff's claims, see Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 476-77 (Tex.1995), or establishes all elements of an affirmative defense to each claim. See Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984).
In her first three points, Williamson contends that the trial court erred in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment because the court misapplied the "single publication rule." Specifically, Williamson argues that the trial court erred in finding that her causes of action were time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations as provided in section 16.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. She asserts that "publication" in this case ceased on November 22, 1995, when the left-over copies of the Dallas Observer were retrieved and replaced with the next issue. Consequently, on November 19, 1996, the date she filed her original petition, limitations had not expired. We disagree.
Texas has adopted the "single publication rule" in cases alleging libel through the mass media. See Stephenson v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 104 F.Supp. 215, 218 (S.D.Tex.1952); Holloway v. Butler, 662 S.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Under this rule, a libel or slander action accrues, for statute of limitations purposes, upon "publication." See Holloway, 662 S.W.2d at 692. Publication is complete on "the last day of the mass distribution of copies of the printed matter " because that is the day when the publishers, editors, and authors have done all they can to relinquish all right of control, title, and interest in the printed matter. See id. (emphasis supplied). Thus, in determining whether Williamson's lawsuit was time-barred on November 19, 1996, we must decide when the last day of mass distribution was for the printed matter. The cover dates for circulation purposes are irrelevant to our determination on this matter. See id.
The Dallas Observer is a weekly newspaper printed by an independent printing company. Each issue of the newspaper bears a cover date identifying the issue's seven-day publication period--beginning on Thursday and ending on the Wednesday of the following week. Because the Dallas Observer is a free newspaper, it is not distributed by paid circulation; rather it is placed in news racks and readers obtain copies from the various news racks located throughout the paper's distribution areas in North Texas. Representatives from the Dallas Observer deliver the copy for the next week's issue to the printer by Tuesday of the prior week. The actual printed newspapers are thereafter placed in the various distribution points by an independent distributor on the following Wednesday. During the distribution process, all remaining copies of the prior week's publication are collected and replaced with the current edition.
The uncontroverted summary judgment evidence shows that, in keeping with its usual schedule of operations, the Dallas Observer bearing the cover date of November 16-22, 1995, was delivered to the printer on Tuesday, November 14, 1995, and was made available for distribution to the public on Wednesday, November 15, 1995. We find, therefore, as a matter of law, that the November 16-22, 1995 issue of the Dallas Observer was "published," for purposes of triggering the running of the statute of limitations, on November 15, 1995. On this day, the newspapers were distributed en mass to the public and placed in the distribution racks in the various localities--that was the last day of mass distribution. Because this suit was filed on November 19, 1996, we hold that the trial court properly granted appellees' motion for summary judgment because the statute of limitations time-barred Williamson's causes of action. We overrule Williamson's first through third points.
In her sixth point, Williamson contends that the trial court erred by not applying the two-year statute of limitations as stated in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon Supp.1998) 2 to her claims. Appellees contend that, because the primary gravamen of Williamson's cause of action is libel and slander, section 16.003 is inapplicable. We agree.
Williamson cannot avoid the application of the one-year statute of limitations simply by alleging that her cause of action is one controlled by the two-year statute of limitations if "the primary gravamen of the tort [alleged] is an injury to [her] personal reputation." Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurlbut, 696 S.W.2d 83, 97, 98 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 749 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.1987). In determining the nature of Williamson's complaints, we must review the factual allegations contained within her pleadings, the evidence adduced in support of those allegations, and the type of damages alleged and proved. See id. at 97. If the damages alleged are primarily personal and general--e.g., injury to personal reputation, humiliation, or mental anguish--then the cause of action is one for libel or slander, even though incidental...
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