Williamson v. Prasciunas

• Decision Date: 20 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. CX-02-1830.,CX-02-1830.
• Citation: 661 N.W.2d 645
• Parties: Patricia Rogers WILLIAMSON, a/k/a Patricia Rogers, Respondent, v. Robert PRASCIUNAS, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

661 N.W.2d 645

Patricia Rogers WILLIAMSON, a/k/a Patricia Rogers, Respondent, v. Robert PRASCIUNAS, et al., Appellants.

No. CX-02-1830.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

May 20, 2003.

Robert E. Lieske, Wagner, Falconer & Judd, Ltd., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.

Jon Breyer, Kathleen M. Loucks, Gislason & Hunter, LLP, Minnetonka, MN, for appellants.

Considered and decided by MINGE, Presiding Judge, KALITOWSKI, Judge, and PORITSKY, Judge.

OPINION

PORITSKY, Judge.¹

Appellants Robert and Rebecca Prasciunas challenge (1) the district court's decision to award respondent Patricia Rogers Williamson damages for civil conversion and (2) the court's valuation of the property at issue. Respondent notes review of the district court's denial of her motion to amend the complaint to seek punitive damages. Because we conclude that the district court: (1) properly ruled that appellants' fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations, (2) correctly valued the property, and (3) acted within its discretion when it denied punitive damages, we affirm in all respects.

FACTS

On June 29, 1987, respondent Patricia Rogers Williamson, then known as Patricia Rogers, sold her Edina home to appellants Robert and Rebecca Prasciunas. Due to complications with Williamson's new home, she arranged a rental agreement with the Prasciunases until July 6, 1987. According to Williamson, the moving van that she had scheduled to arrive for 8:00 a.m. that day did not arrive until 1:00 p.m., causing her moving-out to overlap with the Prasciunases' moving-in. Apparently, appellant Robert Prasciunas was very upset over this turn of events.

The home contained a small wall safe in the basement. In the safe Williamson had two pieces of diamond jewelry: a diamond solitaire ring from a previous marriage and an heirloom diamond-encrusted watch that Williamson had inherited from her mother. Before leaving, Williamson tried to remove her jewelry from the safe but could not open it. Her son assisted her, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Williamson asked Mr. Prasciunas to help, but he, too, could not open the safe. Before Williamson left, she entrusted the Prasciunases with the safe's combination and told them that she was leaving some jewelry in the safe.

According to the Praciunases, Williamson called them the next day to see if they had opened the safe. They denied opening the safe. Williamson claimed that she called three times over the next two weeks to arrange a time for a locksmith to open the safe, but could not arrange a convenient time to do so. Two years passed before she sought return of her jewelry. In July 1989, Mr. Prasciunas admitted to Williamson that he had opened the safe but claimed there was no jewelry in it. He told Williamson, "It's not like there were diamonds or anything in there." Williamson sought legal advice. Her attorney advised Williamson that her only recourse was to file a criminal complaint with local authorities. On July 17, 1989, Williamson filed a complaint with the Edina Police Department in an attempt to get her jewelry back. In this complaint, Williamson listed the total value of the jewelry at $12,000. When the Edina police questioned the Prasciunases, they denied knowledge or possession of the jewelry. Unable to substantiate Williamson's claims, the investigating officer told her there was nothing else they could do. After the Edina police completed their investigation, Mr. Praciunas called Williamson and threatened her with a lawsuit for harassment. In the call, he was abusive and screamed at her never to contact him or his wife again.²

Nearly twelve years passed. On March 1, 2001, Ms. Prasciunas's sister contacted Williamson with news that the Prasciunases did, in fact, have possession of the jewelry. Williamson reported this to the Edina Police Department. When confronted with this knowledge, the Prasciunases turned over the jewelry to the police. The Edina police returned the jewelry to Williamson and, at their request, she had the jewelry appraised at a total value of $12,000.

Williamson initiated the present proceeding in July 2001, claiming conversion, theft, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and defamation.³ The Prasciunases did not file an answer, but responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations barred Williamson's claims. The district court denied the Prasciunases' motion to dismiss.

Subsequently, the Prasciunases filed a summary judgment motion, again asserting, inter alia, that Williamson's claim for conversion was barred by the statute of limitations. Williamson filed a responsive motion seeking summary judgment on her conversion claim and permission to amend her complaint to ask for punitive damages. The district court rejected the Prasciunases' statute of limitations defense and granted summary judgment for Williamson on her conversion claim. Specifically, the district court reasoned that, because the Prasciunases steadfastly denied possession of Williamson's jewelry, they fraudulently concealed any cause of action she may have had. The district court explained that, had Williamson filed suit in 1989, any conversion claim would likely have been dismissed. As to the parties' other claims, the district court granted summary judgment for the Prasciunases on Williamson's claims for IIED because it found that she had failed to meet the high evidentiary threshold required to submit that claim to a fact-finder. The court also granted summary judgment for the Prasciunases on Williamson's claim for defamation because the two-year statute of limitations on her defamation claim had expired. Finally, the court denied Williamson's motion seeking to add a claim for punitive damages. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Did the district court properly rule that appellants' fraudulent concealment of the theft tolled the statute of limitations?

II. Did the district court properly set the value of the jewelry at $12,000?

III. Did the district court act within its discretion when it denied respondent's motion for permission to seek punitive damages?

ANALYSIS

I

When reviewing a summary judgment ruling, this court examines the record to determine if genuine issues of material fact remain for trial and if the district court properly applied the law. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn.1990). We consider evidence in a light most favorable to the responding party and resolve any factual doubts in its favor. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn.2001).

The supreme court has defined conversion as

an act of willful interference with [the personal property of another], done, without lawful justification, by which any person entitled thereto is deprived of use and possession, and the exercise of dominion and control over goods inconsistent with, and in repudiation of, the owner's rights in those goods.

Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn.2003) (quotations omitted).

Conversion occurs where one willfully interferes with the personal property of another "without lawful justification," depriving the lawful possessor of "use and possession." DLH, Inc., v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn.1997) (quotation and citation omitted). "Wrongfully refusing to deliver property on demand by the owner constitutes conversion." Molenaar v. United Cattle Co., 553 N.W.2d 424, 430-31 (Minn.App.1996), review denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 1996) (citation omitted). The elements of common law conversion are: (1) plaintiff holds a property interest; and (2) defendant deprives plaintiff of that interest. Olson v. Moorhead Country Club, 568 N.W.2d 871, 872 (Minn.App.1997), review denied (Minn. Oct. 31, 1997). Good faith is not a defense to a claim of conversion. Dairy Farm Leasing Co. v. Haas Livestock Selling Agency, 458 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.App.1990).

The Prasciunases do not dispute that they converted Williamson's jewelry. Indeed, their brief contains numerous references describing their conduct as "conversion." Their sole defense to the conversion claim is that it is barred by the statute of limitations. The district court rejected this argument, concluding that the Praciunases' fraudulent concealment tolled the statute of limitations. We agree and affirm the district court on this issue.

We begin our analysis of when the statute of limitations began to run in this case by noting that there is a marked difference between cases where fraudulent concealment is present and cases where it is not. In Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641 (Minn.1999), the Minnesota Supreme Court noted the difference. First, the court stated the general rule:

A cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Id. at 643 (footnote omitted). But in the same paragraph, the court says that cases of fraudulent concealment are an exception to the rule. "Thus, in the absence of fraudulent concealment, the running of the statute is not tolled by [the plaintiff's] ignorance of the cause of action." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

In Haberle v. Buchwald, 480 N.W.2d 351 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. Aug. 4, 1992), this court made a careful analysis of the two different rules. First, we stated the general rule, which is that in analyzing when the statute of limitations starts to run, the inquiry centers solely on the plaintiff's knowledge — what the plaintiff knew or should have known:

Ignorance of a cause of action not involving continuing negligence or fraud does not toll accrual of a cause of action. When determining whether a plaintiff was "actually aware" of the facts upon which a claim is based, the question is whether the plaintiff actually knew or should have known.

Id. at 356 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). We then noted that in cases of fraudulent concealment, the...