Williamson v. Raney
| Decision Date | 31 July 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-2074-D/A.,01-2074-D/A. |
| Citation | 157 F.Supp.2d 880 |
| Parties | Brian Orlando WILLIAMSON, Petitioner, v. Fred RANEY, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Brian Orlandus Williamson, Northwest Correction Center, Tiptonville, TN, pro se.
ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO FILE IN FORMA PAUPERIS AFFIDAVIT OR PAY THE FILING FEE ORDER OF DISMISSAL ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND ORDER CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
Petitioner, Brian Orlando Williamson, Tennessee Department of Corrections ("TDOC") inmate number 239726, an inmate at the Northwest Correctional Complex in Tiptonville, Tennessee, filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 30, 2001. Petitioner did not pay the $5 filing fee, and he did not file an application to proceed in forma pauperis. It is therefore ORDERED that, within ten (10) days of the entry of this order, Petitioner is directed to either pay the filing fee or submit an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Clerk is directed to send a copy of the appropriate affidavit to Petitioner along with this order. Failure to comply with this order may result in the imposition of monetary or other sanctions despite the immediate dismissal of this case.
The Clerk of Court shall docket the case and record the respondent as Fred Raney.
On January 15, 1997, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Petitioner entered guilty pleas in the Shelby County Criminal Court for thirteen offenses1 resulting in an effective sentence of twenty years. Petitioner did not take a direct appeal.
Petitioner filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-30-201 to -222, in the Shelby County Criminal Court on January 16, 19982 alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner and an amended petition was filed in March of 1998. An evidentiary hearing was held on July 23, 1998. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition in an Order dated September 4, 1998, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Williamson v. State, No. 02C01-9810-CR-00305, 1999 WL 1095719 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct.31, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 24, 2000).
In this petition, Williamson raises three issues, to wit: (i) that his convictions were obtained by pleas of guilty which were unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the pleas; (ii) that his convictions were obtained by actions of a grand or petit jury which was unconstitutionally selected and impaneled; and (iii) denial of effective assistance of counsel.
Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 2254(b) states, in pertinent part:
(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that —
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
Thus, a habeas petitioner must first exhaust available state remedies before requesting relief under § 2254. E.g., Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982); Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. A petitioner has failed to exhaust his available state remedies if he has the opportunity to raise his claim by any available state procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).
To exhaust these state remedies, the petitioner must have presented the very issue on which he seeks relief from the federal courts to the courts of the state that he claims is wrongfully confining him. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir.1994). "[A] claim for relief in habeas corpus must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the facts which entitle the petitioner to relief." Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996). "`[T]he substance of a federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented to the state courts.'" Id. at 163, 116 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 278, 92 S.Ct. 509). A habeas petitioner does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) "by presenting the state courts only with the facts necessary to state a claim for relief." Id.
Conversely, "[i]t is not enough to make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the `substance' of such a claim to a state court." Id. When a petitioner raises different factual issues under the same legal theory he is required to present each factual claim to the highest state court in order to exhaust his state remedies. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (); see also Pillette v. Foltz, 824 F.2d 494, 497-98 (6th Cir.1987). He has not exhausted his state remedies if he has merely presented a particular legal theory to the courts without presenting each factual claim. Pillette, 824 F.2d at 497-98. The claims must be presented to the state courts as a matter of federal law. "It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982); see also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) ().
Moreover, the state court decision must rest primarily on federal law. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 734-35, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). If the state court decides a claim on an independent and adequate state ground, such as a procedural rule prohibiting the state court from reaching the merits of the constitutional claim, the petitioner ordinarily is barred by this procedural default from seeking federal habeas review. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). However, the state-court decision need not explicitly address the federal claims; instead, it is enough that the petitioner's brief squarely presents the issue. Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 98 S.Ct. 597, 54 L.Ed.2d 582 (1978) (per curiam).
When a petitioner's claims have never been actually presented to the state courts but a state procedural rule prohibits the state court from extending further consideration to them, the claims are deemed exhausted, but procedurally barred. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87-88, 97 S.Ct. 2497; Rust, 17 F.3d at 160.
A petitioner confronted with either variety of procedural default must show cause and prejudice for the default in order to obtain federal court review of his claim. Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99, 109 S.Ct. 1060; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87-88, 97 S.Ct. 2497. Cause for a procedural default depends on some "objective factor external to the defense" that interfered with the petitioner's efforts to comply with the procedural rule. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752-53, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986).
A petitioner may avoid the procedural bar, and the necessity of showing cause and prejudice, by demonstrating "that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The petitioner must show that "`a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.'" Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639). "To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence." Id.
Tennessee's post-conviction statute specifies types of procedural default that may bar the state court from reviewing the merits of a constitutional claim. The conduct of Petitioner's post-conviction proceedings was governed by Tennessee's Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-201 to -222. A one-year statute of limitations governed the filing of petitions under that statute. Id. at § 40-30-202. The statute also enunciated a standard by which state courts were to determine whether to consider the merits of post-conviction claims:
Upon receipt of a petition in proper form, or upon receipt of an amended petition, the court shall examine the allegations of fact in the petition. If the facts alleged, taken as true, fail to show that the petitioner is entitled to relief or fail to show that the claims for relief have not been waived or previously determined, the...
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