Williamson v. State

• Decision Date: 18 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 690,690
• Citation: 25 Md.App. 338,333 A.2d 653
• Parties: James Louis WILLIAMSON v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 338

25 Md.App. 338

333 A.2d 653

James Louis WILLIAMSON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 690.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 18, 1975.

Gerald A. Kroop, Baltimore, with whom was Harry A. E. Taylor, Baltimore, on the brief, for appellant

James I. Keane, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Milton B. Allen, State's Atty., and Cornelius D. Helfrich, Asst. State's Atty., for Baltimore City, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON and LOWE, JJ., and ROBERT F. SWEENEY, Special Judge.

LOWE, Judge.

TRIAL BY COURT OR JURY

In State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 273 A.2d 156 where the record reflected only defense counsel's verbalization of the election of a bench trial, the Court of Appeals decided that a post-conviction proceeding was the most appropriate forum for deciding in the first instance whether the defendant had knowingly foregone his right to jury trial. The Court concluded that a 'preferable practice' in accepting an election of trial by the court was for:

'. . . the trial judge to determine on the record whether this is a knowing election on the part of the accused of a court trial in lieu of a jury trial . . ..' Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 25, 273 A.2d at 164.

Appellant seizes upon that closing paragraph, and asks us to go two steps beyond. He would have us not only elevate the foregoing 'preferred practice' to a compulsory ritual-an alternative this court expressly rejected in Miller v. Warden, 16 Md.App. 614, 624, 299 A.2d 862-but also require that the procedure apply in the opposite situation, viz., where the accused elected a jury trial in lieu of a court trial. He would have the court educate the defendant upon the advantages of trial by judge alone.

We note at the outset that, unlike the facts before the Zimmerman Court, this appellant personally chose to be tried by a jury:

'THE COURT: Trial by Judge Perrott or a jury?

MR. WILLIAMSON: By a jury.'

As in Zimmerman, however, appellant has never indicated that he wanted anything other than the mode of trial he We will, however, decide the penultimate question of the trial court's responsibility when the accused elects a jury trial. Appellant directs our attention to Maryland Rule 741 which provides that he 'may elect to be tried by jury or by the Court.' Pointing out the historical (and somewhat unusual) importance of the court trial in Maryland law, he then warms over dishes we have served to others and serves them back to us morsel by morsel:

selected and made no objection on that basis at the trial. We therefore decline to decide the ultimate question of appellant's voluntary and knowledgeable election. The evidentiary basis for his argument, if there is one, has not as yet been established and thus must await post-conviction proceedings. Md.Rule 1085; Zimmerman, supra, 261 Md. 11, 273 A.2d 156.

'(J)udges are men of discernment . . ..' State v. Babb, 258 Md. 547, 550, 267 A.2d 190.

A judge presides impartially because of his 'professional expertise, experience and judicial temperament . . ..' State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 233, 271 A.2d 641, 644.

The court trial 'is a boon.' Rose v. State, 177 Md. 577, 581, 10 A.2d 617.

Judges have 'wisdom and experience.' Gunther v. State, 4 Md.App. 181, 184, 241 A.2d 907.

Using our pride, like that of Brutus, as the fatal flaw with which he would ensnare us, appellant reasons that, at the very least, he should have been advised of the multitude of admirable qualities he was foregoing by electing trial by jury.

Hoist as we are upon our own petard we dare not grimace lest we show signs of hurt. We are amused, if not bemused, by appellant's argument, but find ourselves none the less unpersuaded. Having decided that the trial judge need not affirmatively inquire into an accused's decision to forego a jury trial, Miller v. Warden, 16 Md.App. at 624, 299 A.2d 862, we are certainly not going to impose that obligation when the defendant chooses to exercise his jury trial right. Trial by

jury is the manner of trial guaranteed a defendant by both the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Articles 5 and 21; and the Federal constitution, 6th and 14th Amendments, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491. The court trial in Maryland has been provided as an alternative to defendant as a matter of governmental largesse; and our self-laudatory remarks, when read in context, were meant simply to point out that the court trial alternative is not necessarily a deprivation, and indeed has some advantages including 'expertise' and 'experience.' In any event, the trial judge need only ask which mode of trial is preferred, and if counsel responds, satisfy himself that the decision was the defendant's. Miller, 16 Md.App. at 624, 299 A.2d 862.

THE FACTS

While hardly so aristocratic as the Montagues and Capulets, nor quite as bloody as the Hatfields and McCoys, an interfamily feud became a bitter reality for appellant, James Louis Williamson, the woman with whom he lived and her children among whom were Denise (Nessie) Short and Calvin (Lee) Matthews. On August 8, 1973, sometime during the day, Lee got into a 'fuss' with a Mrs. Kane. Nessie accompanied Lee to Mrs. Kane's house to talk with her. The discussion degenerated rapidly into an exchange of threats. Lee 'reasoned' with a stick and Mrs. Kane with an iron pipe. From the combat that ensued one of the gladiators, Mrs. Kane, emerged with a bloody nose.

Later that day, Mrs. Kane's daughter, Jacqueline, related these events to her brother-in-law, Charles Kessler. He went to Lee's house, purportedly armed with a shotgun, and threatened Lee. In addition to blaming Lee for bloodying Mrs. Kane's nose, Mr. Kessler accused him of hitting his four year old son.

Upon hearing shots outside, Nessie, who was by then home, called the police. When they arrived, Nessie could no longer see Mr. Kessler from her house and was afraid to leave. After the police departed, appellant Williamson arrived home. Nessie and Lee told him what had happened. Thereafter it is unclear whether Mr. Kessler reappeared and

resumed his threats or whether Mr. Williamson and Lee sought [333 A.2d 656] Mr. Kessler. It is clear that the argument over their families' squabblings resulted in Mr. Kessler's death. The day ended when Mr. Williamson shot and killed Mr. Kessler-in self-defense according to Mr. Williamson. The jury did not agree. He was convicted of second degree murder and the use of a handgun in commission of a crime of violence, following trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, presided over by the Honorable James A. Perrott.

REPUTATION EVIDENCE

Appellant claims that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence of the deceased's reputation which he sought to establish both generally and by testimony of specific acts. Appellant's counsel below somewhat inartfully articulated the purpose or purposes the evidence was to serve. The trial court apparently treated the evidence as offered to prove the appellant's reasonable apprehension of danger and consequent need to defend himself at the time of the killing, and ruled accordingly:

'. . . you have to sufficiently establish a knowledge of the defendant of the propensity of the victim.'

The trial judge was correct with respect to reputation evidence offered to prove the defendant's state of mind. Contrary to the general reputation rule which prohibits evidence of specific acts, a defendant asserting self-defense may offer evidence of specific acts of which he was aware at the time of the killing. Such evidence bears on the reasonableness of his actions:

'It is, of course, generally true that the reputation of the deceased cannot be shown by evidence of specific acts. However, where there is testimony tending to support the theory of self-defense, the presence of such testimony entitles the defendant to the benefit of certain rules of evidence which would not otherwise be available. It is competent for him to prove his knowledge of facts which would have a reasonable tendency to justify his Although counsel had proffered that he could prove specific violent acts of which his client was aware before the killing, after arguments and the trial court's ruling permitting him to do so, he was unable to produce the proffered evidence.

asserted belief as to the existence of a deadly purpose in the overt acts of the deceased. . . . On the issue whether or not the accused had reasonable grounds to believe himself in imminent danger, he may show his knowledge of specific instances of violence on the part of the deceased. Previous acts of violence by the deceased, especially if committed recently, known to the defendant, might have an even stronger influence on his mind than would be produced by knowledge of the reputation of the deceased for violence.' Jones v. State, 182 Md. 653, 659, 35 A.2d 916, 919; accord, Gunther v. State, 228 Md. 404, 410, 179 A.2d 880; Barger v. State, 2 Md.App. 565, 568-569, 235 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 249 Md. 731. (Emphasis supplied).

Trial counsel did, however, continue to doggedly assert the admissibility of evidence of deceased's reputation irrespective of appellant's prior knowledge. Throughout a substantial portion of the transcript, there is a recurring colloquy between trial court and counsel on its admissibility. In response to the trial judge's previously mentioned ruling, appellant's counsel at various times protested:

'I am not attacking it from that viewpoint. I am only bringing it in as a matter of the man's reputation.'

'Your Honor, I am entitled to bring in as many witnesses as I wish to show a reputation in the neighborhood.'

Then, after the court quoted dictum from Jones v. State, 13 Md.App. 677, 684, 284 A.2d 635, suggesting the admissibility of evidence of the deceased's reputation for violence the appellant's counsel stated:

'I have contended that all along.'

Although we must strain to do so, we will give appellant the benefit of any doubt and...