Williamson v. State, 68800

• Citation: 511 So.2d 289,12 Fla. L. Weekly 422
• Decision Date: 16 July 1987
• Docket Number: No. 68800,68800
• Parties: 12 Fla. L. Weekly 422 Johnny WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 289

511 So.2d 289

12 Fla. L. Weekly 422

Johnny WILLIAMSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 68800.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 16, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1987.

Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, and David A. Davis, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Andrea Smith Hillyer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

EHRLICH, Justice.

Johnny Williamson appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and affirm both the conviction and sentence.

While inmates at Cross City Correctional Institution, the appellant, Johnny Williamson, and his "partner" Omer Williamson (no relation) were selling marijuana for Daniel Drew, also an inmate at that facility. According to Omer Williamson's testimony, Omer owed Drew $15 in connection with a marijuana sale. Omer decided not to pay Drew because Omer believed Drew had been lying to him. When Omer told the appellant that he did not intend to repay Drew, Williamson said that they would have to kill Drew because Drew was "a country boy" who would stab Omer if he didn't pay his debt. "Chickenhead" Robertson, another inmate at the facility and co-defendant in Williamson's trial, learned of the plan to kill Drew and offered to look for a knife. When Robertson and Williamson were unable to find a knife, Omer went to his cell and got a metal rod from the sink which Drew had previously sharpened to a point. While Robertson acted as a lookout, Williamson and Omer went to the maintenance shop building where Drew was working. Williamson asked an inmate working at the shop to send Drew outside. When Drew came out Omer stood behind him, while Williamson gave him $5 so that it would look like they had given Drew less than Omer owed him and he had gotten upset and pulled a knife on them. Williamson then told Drew that Omer was having trouble getting the rest of the money and needed a knife to collect. Drew had apparently made a knife for Williamson and gave it to him at that point in the conversation. On Williamson's signal, Omer grabbed Drew by the throat from behind. Williamson stabbed Drew and a struggle ensued, with Omer throwing Drew to the ground, kicking him in the head several times. Williamson continued to stab Drew with the knife. When Omer became "grossed out" he gave Williamson the rod and left. Williamson then straddled Drew stabbing him repeatedly with the knife and metal rod. After leaving Drew, Williamson then returned the rod to Omer and gave the knife to Robertson. Omer returned the rod to the sink in his cell and Robertson put the knife in a cast he was wearing, eventually burying it underneath a tree where it was later found.

Williamson, Omer, and Robertson were charged with first-degree murder and the unlawful possession of a knife while an inmate. Omer pled guilty to first-degree murder and agreed to testify against Williamson and Robertson in return for the state's agreement not to seek the death penalty. Williamson and Robertson were tried together. Robertson was found guilty of the possession charge. Williamson, who did not testify during the guilt phase of the trial but did testify during the penalty phase, was found guilty of both charges. Following the jury's recommendation of death, the trial court imposed the death penalty, finding three aggravating circumstances: 1) the capital felony was committed while Williamson was under a sentence of imprisonment; 2) Williamson had been previously convicted of a violent felony; and 3) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner without a pretense of moral or legal justification. The trial court found no mitigating circumstances.

The only claim which Williamson raises in connection with the guilt phase of the trial involved a comment by the prosecutor made during closing argument concerning Omer Williamson's plea of guilty to first-degree, premeditated murder. During the state's direct examination, Omer testified that he had been charged with and had pled guilty to first-degree murder and possession of contraband while in prison. No objection was made to the state's questioning concerning this plea. Further, during cross-examination by counsel for Robertson, Omer testified that in exchange for his plea and agreement to testify against Williamson and Robertson the state agreed not to seek the death penalty. A copy of Omer's offer of plea was later entered into evidence by appellant's trial counsel.

Williamson does not contend that Omer's guilty plea was improperly brought to the jury's attention. See Parker v. State, 458 So.2d 750 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1855, 85 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985) (As a general rule, it is improper for the state to disclose that another defendant has been convicted or has pled guilty.). Rather, he directs our attention solely to the prosecuting attorney's reference to Omer's guilty plea during the state's rebuttal to co-defendant Robertson's closing argument. Williamson maintains that "during the state's closing argument, the state alleged that Williamson must be guilty of first-degree murder because his co-defendant Omer Williamson had pled guilty to first-degree murder" and such a "guilt by association argument" had an "unfair prejudicial impact upon the jury and was reversible error." We cannot agree with Williamson's characterization of the state's argument and conclude that the statement complained of was proper comment on the evidence in direct rebuttal to the closing argument of Robertson's counsel.

In rebuttal to Robertson's closing argument the prosecuting attorney argued:

Now, [counsel for Robertson] said that looking at Presley's testimony and looking at what Chickenhead [Robertson] said after the killing to Bishop, that nobody knew there was going to be a killing ahead of time. That Omer said he was just going in there to collect a knife--or to get a knife to collect on his debts. Well, I find that very interesting. When [Williamson] was out earlier in the morning, looking for a knife, saying, "I'm going to kill him." When they told him, when Omer--if that's the case, then we're talking about a manslaughter case maybe? What did Omer do? He pled guilty to first-degree murder. Now does that make any sense? If it wasn't premeditated, why would Omer have subjected himself to first-degree murder?

Counsel for appellant made a motion for a mistrial "because the obvious inference from [the prosecutor's] statements is that in light of the co-defendant's plea to the charge, these defendants must also be guilty of the charge." The prosecuting attorney explained his argument as follows:

No, that's not it at all. This is an argument in direct rebuttal to [Robertson's counsel's] argument that they didn't know, that Omer's own statement was they didn't know there was going to be a killing. And both he and [counsel...