Williamson v. United States

Decision Date28 June 2011
Docket NumberNo. C 10-3017-MWB,No. CR 05-3023-MWB,C 10-3017-MWB,CR 05-3023-MWB
PartiesJASON NATHANIEL WILLIAMSON, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING

PETITIONER'S SECTION 2255

MOTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION.........................................2

II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS..................................4

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS.......................................5

A. Standards For Relief Pursuant To § 2255 ..................... 5
B. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel.......................... 8
1. Applicable standards............................ 8
2. Failure to advise regarding challenge to state charge ...... 10
C. Certificate Of Appealability ............................. 14

IV. CONCLUSION......................................... 16

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before me on petitioner Jason Nathaniel Williamson's Motion To Vacate Sentence (Civ. docket no. 1), filed by counsel on April 19, 2010, and on Williamson's Motion For Evidentiary Hearing (Civ. docket no. 6) filed on July 6, 2010. Williamson claims that the attorney who represented him at the trial level provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel. The respondent denies that Williamson is entitled to any relief on his claims.

A. The Petitioner's Criminal Proceedings

On August 23, 2005, Williamson was charged by a two-count Indictment (Crim. docket no. 1). Count one of the Indictment charged Williamson with bank robbery and count two of the Indictment charged him with money laundering. See Crim. docket no. 1. On September 1, 2005, Williamson appeared, with counsel, for his Arraignment and Initial Appearance before United States Magistrate Judge John A. Jarvey and entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. See Crim. docket no. 7. On November 9, 2005, by counsel, Williamson filed a Notice Of Intent To Plead Guilty (Crim. docket no. 16). Williamson appeared, with counsel, before Judge Jarvey, on April 3, 2006, to enter his plea of guilty to both counts of the Indictment. See Crim. docket no. 41. On April 3, 2006, Judge Jarvey filed his Report and Recommendation (Crim. docket no. 39), recommending that I accept Williamson's guilty plea. I filed an Order Accepting Magistrate Judge's Report And Recommendation Regarding Defendant's Guilty Plea (Crim. docket no. 44) on April 18, 2006.

Williamson appeared, with counsel, before me on June 30, 2006, for a sentencing hearing. See Crim. docket no. 54. I found that Williamson had a total offense level of 31 with a criminal history category of VI, for an advisory United States Sentencing Guidelinerange of imprisonment of 188 to 235 months. See Sent. Trans. at 23. I determined that a sentence of 235 months, at the top of the guideline range, on each count, to run concurrently, was a reasonable sentence taking into consideration the § 3553(a) factors. See Sent. Trans. at 25.

Williamson, by counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal (Crim. docket no. 56), to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, on July 6, 2006. On appeal, Williamson's appellate counsel moved to withdraw and filed an Anders brief arguing that the sentence at the top of the guideline range was unreasonable because I gave undue weight to a robbery victim's testimony as compared to Williamson's mental illness and sentenced Williamson beyond what was minimally sufficient. See Crim. docket no. 76.

On November 14, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered an Opinion (Crim. docket no. 76). The court affirmed my sentencing decision, concluding that I had properly considered only relevant factors, including the offense circumstances and Williamson's extensive criminal history, as well as his serious mental illness and that the sentences were not unreasonable. See Crim. docket no. 76.

B. The Petitioner's §2255 Motion

On April 19, 2010, Williamson, by counsel, filed this Motion To Vacate Sentence (Civ. docket no. 1) ("Motion"), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. On July 6, 2010, by counsel, Williamson filed a Brief In Support Of Motion To Vacate Sentence (Civ. docket no. 5) and a Motion For Evidentiary Hearing (Civ. docket no. 6). The respondent filed a Resistance To Movant's Petition Under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (Civ. docket no. 9), on October 12, 2010. On December 15, 2010, Williamson, by counsel, filed an Unresisted Motion To Supplement Record (Civ. docket no. 14). By Order (Civ. docket no. 16), I granted Williamson's Unresisted Motion To Supplement Record. Williamson, by counsel, fileda Reply To Government's Resistance (Civ. docket no. 17) on December 17, 2010. Williamson, by counsel, filed a Motion To Supplement The Record (Civ. docket no. 18) on December 17, 2010. On January 25, 2011, by Order (Civ. docket no. 21), I granted Williamson's Motion To Supplement The Record.

II. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

"A district court does not err in dismissing a movant's section 2255 motion without a hearing if (1) the movant's 'allegations, accepted as true, would not entitle' the movant to relief, or '(2) the allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact.'" Buster v. United States, 447 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sanders v. United States, 341 F.3d 720, 722 (8th Cir. 2003), with citation and quotation marks omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In this case, I conclude that no evidentiary hearing is required on any issue, because the record conclusively shows that Williamson's allegations, if accepted as true, would not entitle him to relief because he cannot demonstrate either that he was prejudiced nor that his trial counsel's performance was deficient.

Claims are procedurally defaulted if not raised at trial or on direct appeal. See Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Section 2255 relief is not available to correct errors which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, or a showing that the alleged errors were fundamental defects resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice." (internal citations omitted)); accord Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) ("In order to obtain collateral review of a procedurally defaulted issue, [a § 2255 movant] must show 'either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent.'" (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622, with citations omitted)). However, the "cause and prejudice" that must be shown to resuscitatea procedurally defaulted claim may include "ineffective assistance of counsel." See Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 545 (8th Cir. 2005). Where necessary and possible, I have construed otherwise potentially defaulted claims as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and have assumed, without deciding, that Williamson can show "cause and prejudice" to overcome defaulted claims, inter alia, as the result of "ineffective assistance" of trial counsel. Therefore, I will pass on to the merits of Williamson's claims for § 2255 relief.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standards For Relief Pursuant To § 2255

Turning to the legal analysis of Williamson's claims, in light of the evidence in the record, I note, first, that 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides as follows:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground [1] that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [2] that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [4] is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255; Watson v. United States, 493 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2007) ("Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 a defendant in federal custody may seek post conviction relief on the ground that his sentence was imposed in the absence of jurisdiction or in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack."); Bear Stops v. United States, 339 F.3d 777, 781 (8th Cir. 2003) ("To prevail on a § 2255 motion, the petitioner must demonstratea violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States."). Thus, a motion pursuant to § 2255 "is 'intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.'" United States v. Wilson, 997 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974)); accord Auman v. United States, 67 F.3d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Wilson).

A claim that has been unsuccessfully raised on direct appeal may not be relitigated on a motion to vacate. Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1992).

Section 2255 relief is not available to correct errors which could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, absent a showing of cause and prejudice, United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1594-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982), or a showing that the alleged errors were fundamental defects resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Smith, 843 F.2d 1148, 1149 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).

Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); accord Johnson v. United States, 278 F.3d 839, 844 (8th Cir. 2002) ("In order to obtain collateral review of a procedurally defaulted issue, [a § 2255 movant] must show 'either cause and actual prejudice, or that he is actually innocent.'") (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998), with citations omitted).

The "cause and prejudice" that must be shown to resuscitate a procedurally defaulted claim may include ...

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