Williamson v. Williamson
| Citation | 517 P.3d 1000 |
| Decision Date | 30 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 119,304 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of: Craig Aaron WILLIAMSON, Petitioner/Appellee, v. Sabrina Steele WILLIAMSON, Respondent/Appellant. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Keith A. Jones, KAJONESLAW, PLLC, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Petitioner/Appellee
Ryan J. Reaves, MULLINS MULLINS SEXTON & REAVES, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Respondent/Appellant
¶1 Sabrina Steele Williamson (Mother) appeals the trial court's December 11, 2020 Journal Entry, which ultimately stems from Craig Aaron Williamson's (Father) objection to her request to relocate to Florida with their child, G.W., for her new husband's employment. Mother appeals the trial court's order declining to appoint a primary physical custodian of the child and requiring G.W. to attend a private virtual school in order for her to alternate—every three months—between living in Oklahoma with Father and in Florida with Mother. Mother also appeals the trial court's order requiring the virtual schooling only be supervised by a parent or step-parent, despite Mother and her husband's full-time employment. Additionally, Mother appeals various orders regarding child support, including the order that neither party pay child support.
¶2 Based on our review of the record and applicable law, and given the errors identified below, we reverse the trial court's judgment in its entirety. On remand, the trial court shall appoint one parent as the primary physical custodian of G.W. and then proceed to enter other orders consistent with this Opinion.
¶3 The parties were married in 2010, and G.W. was born in 2014. The parties were later divorced on September 23, 2016, pursuant to an Agreed Decree of Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage under which they shared joint legal custody and equal physical custody of their child. No primary physical custodian was appointed in the decree or joint custody plan, and no child support was ordered.
¶4 Mother subsequently married Dan Johnson, a member of the United States military. In February 2018, Mother notified Father that she desired to relocate with the minor child to Florida for her husband's employment with the military. On March 2, 2018, Father filed an objection to the relocation and a motion to modify the decree and joint custody plan, requesting the court award him primary physical custody of G.W. and enter a long-distance visitation schedule for Mother. Mother responded, denying that Father should be awarded primary physical custody.
¶5 On May 17, 2018, the parties entered an agreed Modified Joint Child Custody Plan ("agreed plan"). Under the agreed plan, the parties exercised equal periods of physical custody with G.W., with each parent generally having physical custody of her every six months with options to visit in the interim. Neither party was appointed as the child's primary physical custodian in the agreed plan. The agreed plan only set forth the parties' periods of physical custody until May 31, 2020.
¶6 On July 16, 2019, Mother filed a "Motion to Modify Visitation and Child Support," noting the agreed plan only provided a physical custody schedule until May 2020. She asserted G.W. would begin school in August 2020, rendering the current physical custody schedule unworkable. Thus, she requested the trial court award her primary physical custody, subject to Father's liberal rights to visit the child pursuant to a long-distance visitation schedule, and award her child support pursuant to the Oklahoma Child Support Guidelines.1 Over three months later, Father filed a response to the motion, combined with his own motion to modify. In his motion, he requested the court award him primary physical custody and child support. He also noted he had remarried in late 2018, resulting in G.W. gaining a step-sibling, and had moved to Shawnee, Oklahoma. Mother timely objected to Father's motion.
¶7 A hearing was held on the respective motions on July 27 and 28, 2020. After hearing the evidence, the trial court found the "propriety" of Mother's relocation was resolved by the agreed plan. Rather than appointing a primary physical custodian, the court ordered G.W. to alternate between her parents' homes every three months and ordered that she attend a private virtual school to effectuate the physical custody schedule. The trial court ordered each party to pay 50% of all expenses of the private virtual learning, and prohibited anyone other than the parents or step-parents from supervising the virtual learning, absent an emergency. The trial court also entered various orders regarding child support, including requiring neither party to pay child support.
¶8 Mother appeals.
¶9 The trial court is vested with discretion in awarding child custody and visitation, and we will not disturb the trial court's judgment "absent an abuse of discretion or a finding that the decision is clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence." Daniel v. Daniel , 2001 OK 117, ¶ 21, 42 P.3d 863. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling. In the Matter of BTW , 2008 OK 80, ¶ 20, 195 P.3d 896.
¶10 However, the issue of whether the trial court was required to appoint a primary physical custodian in this case is a question of law, reviewed de novo . See Highpointe Energy v. Viersen , 2021 OK 32, ¶ 11, 489 P.3d 28. Under de novo review, "the Court has plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to determine whether the trial tribunal erred in its legal rulings." Hub Partners XXVI, Ltd. v. Barnett , 2019 OK 69, ¶ 6, 453 P.3d 489.
¶11 Moreover, child support proceedings are of equitable cognizance, where the judgment will not be disturbed unless the trial court abused its discretion or unless the court's finding was clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence. Merritt v. Merritt , 2003 OK 68, ¶ 7, 73 P.3d 878. The issues in this case, though, require an interpretation of the applicable child support statutes, which presents a question of law reviewed de novo . See Hub Partners XXVI , 2019 OK 69, at ¶ 6, 453 P.3d 489.
¶12 Mother alleges the trial court erred by failing to appoint a primary physical custodian of G.W. We agree.
¶13 Title 43 O.S.2011, § 112.3 outlines the procedure to be followed when a "person who has the right to establish the principal residence of the child" seeks to permanently relocate with the child more than 75 miles from the child's principal residence. For a period of time, divisions of the Court of Civil Appeals were in conflict as to whether a parent with joint custody of a child was "the person entitled to custody" who could initiate the statutory relocation procedure. Compare In re the Marriage of King , 2016 OK CIV APP 31, ¶ 11, 371 P.3d 1139 with Caber v. Dahle , 2012 OK CIV APP 19, ¶ 30, 272 P.3d 733.
¶14 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Boatman v. Boatman , 2017 OK 27, ¶ 4, 404 P.3d 822, where the mother appealed the trial court's denial of her application to relocate with the child. In Boatman , the parties equally shared time with their child under a joint custody plan, which did not name either of them as the primary physical custodian, and no court order dictated which household represented the child's primary residence. Id . at ¶ 3. The Court held that "a joint custodian who is not the primary physical custodian cannot invoke the relocation statute." Id . at ¶ 6. The Court explained that "before a joint custodian can invoke the relocation provisions, the court must make a determination regarding who is the primary physical custodian." Id .
¶15 The Court then determined that the mother did not have primary physical custody; therefore, she was not "the person entitled to custody" who had the statutory authority to relocate the child. Id . at ¶ 7. The Court found this conclusion was supported by related statutory provisions, including the statutory definition of the "principal residence of a child." Id . (citing 43 O.S.2011, §§ 112.3(A)(4), 112.3(B)(1) ). The Court explained that because the child's primary residence was not designated in any court order and because the child resided equally with both parents, neither parent had the right to establish the child's principal residence. Id . at ¶ 7. Accordingly, the Court found that the mother could not unilaterally invoke the relocation provisions. Id .
¶16 This finding, however, did not resolve the issue as to whether the mother could legally relocate with the child. The Court remanded the case for the trial court to hold a hearing to modify the joint custody plan and appoint a primary physical custodian of the child. Id . The Court explicitly stated that the appointment of a primary physical custodian under the joint custody plan "is necessary in light of the obvious change of circumstances due to Mother's relocation." Id . The Court explained that after a joint custody plan has been issued, the trial court may modify or terminate joint custody if it determines that the plan is not in the best interests of the child, and once this conclusion is reached, the trial court can proceed to determine whether relocation is proper. Id .
¶17 To determine whether the relocation is proper, the Court held the trial court should employ a two-step process. Id . at ¶ 8. First, the parent seeking relocation has the burden of demonstrating that the proposed relocation was made in good faith. Id . If successful, then the burden shifts, and the parent objecting to relocation must show that the proposed relocation is not in the child's best interests. Id . If the parent seeking relocation is unsuccessful in demonstrating good faith, then the burden of demonstrating that relocation is in the child's best interests remains with him or her. Id . ¶18 In the present case, the parties had joint custody of G.W.2 A primary physical custodian was neither...
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