Williamson v. Williamson, 53413
| Decision Date | 08 February 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 53413,53413 |
| Citation | 367 So.2d 1016 |
| Parties | Ollie R. WILLIAMSON, Petitioner, v. Veva C. WILLIAMSON, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Dedee S. Costello, Panama City, for petitioner.
Robert B. Staats, Panama City, for respondent.
This cause is before us on a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, reported at 353 So.2d 880, which is alleged to be in conflict with the decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Claughton v. Claughton, 344 So.2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), and Escobar v. Escobar, 300 So.2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
Petitioner, Ollie R. Williamson, filed for dissolution of his marriage to respondent, Veva C. Williamson, in the Circuit Court for Bay County, Florida, in January, 1976. The couple had been living apart since 1973. The trial court granted a dissolution on September 15, 1976, and after a supplemental final hearing on December 22, 1976, awarded to respondent $10,000 lump sum alimony and $100 per month permanent periodic alimony. At the time of the judgment of dissolution, petitioner possessed $16,000 in cash and bonds accumulated during the marriage and had an income of $354.77 per month from a disability pension. Respondent had only $155 in cash, no income, and required in excess of $400 per month for necessary expenses. In addition, the parties jointly owned a home in Bay County appraised at $36,000 and a home in Jackson, South Carolina. By stipulation, they agreed to sell the Florida home and divide the proceeds equally, and petitioner agreed to purchase for $4,500 his wife's interest in the South Carolina property. Both parties are afflicted with permanent physical disabilities which prevent them from holding full-time gainful employment.
In addition to the foregoing factors, the trial court partially based its alimony award on a finding that petitioner was responsible for his wife's strained economic condition because he abandoned her in 1973, taking with him a considerable portion of the family savings, and because he refused to attempt a reconciliation although respondent remained willing to do so. On this basis, the court concluded that, as a matter of equity, petitioner should bear the heaviest portion of the economic burden placed on both parties by the judgment of dissolution. On appeal, petitioner challenged the alimony award on the ground that the trial judge improperly considered evidence of his alleged marital misconduct in determining a proper alimony award. The district court rejected petitioner's argument by stating:
(T)he relative fault of the parties is an equitable circumstance and a factor concerning which evidence should be admitted, if offered, and which, together with the other circumstances revealed by the evidence, should be considered by the trial court in determining whether or not to award alimony, and if so the amount thereof.
Petitioner asserts, based on the decisions of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Escobar and Claughton, that the correct rule of law with respect to awarding alimony is that evidence of marital misconduct should never be considered except in cases of gross misconduct such as adultery or habitual intemperance toward one's spouse, and that no evidence of marital misconduct by the spouse not seeking alimony should ever be considered except in mitigation or defense of the conduct of the spouse seeking alimony. Although we agree that Escobar and Claughton state the proper rule of law with respect to evidence of alleged adultery, we cannot give these cases the expansive reading petitioner suggests.
In Escobar, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed a trial court's ruling refusing to hear testimony about the husband's alleged adultery from a wife seeking alimony. The district court's decision was based on section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1973), which, in pertinent part, provided:
The court May consider the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be awarded to Such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded to Such spouse. (Emphasis supplied.)
The district court concluded that this statute permits a trial court to refuse to consider evidence of the adultery of a spouse not seeking alimony when such evidence is offered solely for the purpose of obtaining or increasing an alimony award to the spouse seeking alimony.
In Claughton, the same district court upheld a trial court's order requiring a husband to answer questions from his wife about his alleged adulterous activities. In that case, however, the husband had previously charged the wife with adultery in an attempt to defeat her request for alimony. The district court held that, under such circumstances, section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (1975), which permits a trial judge to "consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties" in determining a proper alimony award, requires that a spouse seeking alimony be allowed to offer evidence of the adultery of the spouse not seeking alimony in defense or mitigation of his or her own alleged adulterous conduct.
We agree with the analysis of the District Court of Appeal, Third District. The legislature has expressly provided in section 61.08(1), Florida Statutes (1975), that a trial court may consider evidence of adultery in determining a proper award of alimony. This section permits, but does not require, a trial judge to consider evidence of adulterous activities by a spouse seeking alimony as a mitigating defense to an award of alimony and the amount thereof. Likewise, we concur that section 61.08(2) requires, as a matter of equity, that a trial judge who does consider evidence of adulterous activity by a spouse seeking alimony must also consider evidence of adulterous conduct by the spouse not seeking alimony in mitigation or defense of the conduct of the spouse seeking alimony. A proceeding for dissolution of marriage is an equitable proceeding. A spouse who invokes the jurisdiction of a court of equity to resolve his or her marital difficulties must submit to the equitable doctrines that he who seeks equity must stand before the court with "clean hands" and "he who seeks equity must do equity." Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 18 So.2d 902 (1944); Engebretsen v. Engebretsen, 151 Fla. 372, 11 So.2d 322 (1942). Therefore, it would be manifestly unfair for one spouse to be allowed to defend against an alimony claim by charging the other spouse with adultery when the spouse not seeking alimony may be equally guilty of the same misconduct.
Although we construe section...
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Smith v. Smith, 79-546
...adultery" of a spouse seeking alimony or indeed "any factor necessary to do equity . . . between the parties." See Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1979). But such conduct may not be ipso facto employed as an excuse or device to reduce an otherwise appropriate award when, as he......
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Beers v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 84-780
...for other or additional relief at any time. (emphasis supplied). No such action was undertaken in this case. In Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1979), the Florida Supreme Court construed sections 61.08(1), (2), Florida Statutes (1975). The court disapproved a trial court's con......
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Cornelius v. Cornelius
...admission of evidence relating to fault was, however, narrowly circumscribed by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1979), where the court held that a trial judge could permit evidence of misconduct by the spouse who caused economic hardship t......
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Freeman v. Freeman
...pension, like a retirement pension, may be considered in determining support for a spouse or minor child. See, e.g., Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1979); Baker v. Baker, 419 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Campbell v. Campbell, 409 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Hartley v. Ha......
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Procedural remedies
...§17:20.4 Defenses 1. Unclean Hands: One who seeks the aid of equity must do so with clean hands. See Williamson v. Williamson , 367 So.2d 1016, 1018 (Fla. 1979); PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Smith , 225 So.3d 294, 295-96 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). This rule applies to the State when it becomes a liti......