Williamson v. Yager

• Decision Date: 26 February 1891
• Citation: 91 Ky. 282,15 S.W. 660
• Parties: WILLIAMSON v. YAGER et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

15 S.W. 660

91 Ky. 282

WILLIAMSON v. YAGER et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

February 26, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Shelby county.

Muir Hayman & Muir and J. C. Beckham, for appellant.

Humphrey & Davie and J. C. Willis, for appellees.

BENNETT J.

The question is, did the seven notes--two for $1,000 each, and five for $800 each--pass as gift from the appellant to the seven appellees, children of Henry C. Yager. The undisputed facts are these: Henry C. Yager was in his lifetime indebted to his brother Silas B. Yager in a large sum; and after the death of Silas B. Yager, the appellant, being entitled to said indebtedness by the devise of her husband, Silas B Yager, caused on the 1st day of June, 1880, Henry C. to execute new notes to her for said amounts, seven of which were executed for the respective sums indicated. On the same day the appellant, by written assignment on the back of each note, assigned it to each of the seven appellees. The following is the assignment, differing only in the names of the assignees: "I hereby assign this note to Henry T Yager, with six per cent. interest from date, the interest and principal to be paid to said Henry T. Yager at the settlement of H. C. Yager's estate. LOUISA Y WILLIAMSON." Said notes were not delivered to the appellees, but were retained by the appellant, and she thereafter erased the assignment upon each note, and brought suit thereon against Henry C. Yager, together with three other notes taken from him at the same time, and obtained judgment by default thereon; but the judgment was not collected, except a part of the interest on the three notes mentioned. Henry C. Yager having died, said seven children (appellees) brought this action to have said seven notes declared to be theirs by reason-- First, of said assignment for a valuable consideration; or, second, by reason of a declaration of trust by the appellant.

As to the first proposition, the weight of the evidence is that on the occasion of Henry C. Yager executing the notes he objected to doing so for the reason that he had not received proper credits; but upon appellant's agreeing to give said notes to the appellees, he signed them, and pursuant to said agreement the appellant did assign them to the appellees. Now, this contention for additional credits, and refusal to sign the notes because they were not given, and the agreement of the appellant to give them to the appellees if he would sign them, and in that consideration he did sign them, certainly constitutes a valuable consideration for the assignment of them to the appellees, which consideration is sufficient to authorize the enforcement of the contract of assignment, notwithstanding the fact that the appellant did not deliver the possession of the notes to the appellees. The valuable consideration for the transfer of title gives the transfer legal efficacy, which will be enforced by compelling a delivery of the thing itself. It is also well settled that a consideration moving from one person will uphold a promise to or an agreement made with a third person. But, if we are mistaken about the transfer having been made upon a valuable consideration, we are clear that the title to these notes passed to the appellees by a declaration of trust. The correct rule upon this subject seems to be epitomized in 8 Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law. p. 1323. It is there said that the title to personal property may be transferred without delivery of possession or without consideration by a declaration of trust. That the title to personal property can ordinarily only be transferred by way of gift, by a delivery of the property, actually or constructively to the donee, or to some person in trust for him; also the donor may constitute himself a trustee for the donee, but, in order to do this, it is necessary for the donor to clearly and unequivocally declare that he henceforth holds the property as trustee for the donee. This declaration may be done by so many words, or by acts amounting to the same thing. When this trust is clearly created by the donor equity will uphold it, and treat the gift as executed. If one delivers possession of personal property to a trustee to hold as a gift for the donee, it is certainly a valid gift, and if he expressly says or does acts amounting to the same thing, he constitutes himself a trustee to hold the property for him. We perceive no reason why this should not be as valid and binding as a delivery of the property to a third person to be held...