Willingham v. State

• Decision Date: 22 March 1995
• Docket Number: No. 71544,71544
• Citation: 897 S.W.2d 351
• Parties: Cameron Todd WILLINGHAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 351

897 S.W.2d 351

Cameron Todd WILLINGHAM, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 71544.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc.

March 22, 1995.

David Martin, Greg White, Waco, for appellant.

Patrick C. Batchelor, Dist. Atty., Corsicana, Jim Vollers, Austin, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

Before the court en banc.

OPINION

WHITE, Judge.

Appellant Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted on August 21, 1992 of capital murder by murdering more than one person during the same criminal transaction. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(6)(A). Two special issues were submitted to the jury under Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) and § 2(e), and following the jury's verdict of guilty, the trial court sentenced appellant to death. Direct appeal to this Court is automatic. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(h). We will affirm.

Appellant brings four points of error for this Court to review. In point of error number one, appellant contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant his Motion for Change of Venue, in light of inflammatory statements made by the Navarro County District Attorney. Appellant asserts in his second point of error that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence offered by the defense to impeach the testimony of a witness for the State. In his third point of error, appellant maintains the trial court erred in its charge to the jury during the punishment phase of the trial by failing to instruct the jury on the effect of parole, as parole would qualify as a "mitigating circumstance" under the facts of this case. Appellant contends, in point of error number four, that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answers to the special issues submitted in the punishment phase of the trial, particularly: (a) that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that appellant is a continuing threat to society, and (b) that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that mitigating circumstances would not warrant a life sentence. Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; therefore, the facts of the offense will be discussed only in reference to the error alleged in point of error number four.

Appellant contends in his fourth point of error that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's answers to the special issues submitted in the punishment phase of the trial. Although appellant does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for capital murder, a review of the facts and other evidence underlying his conviction is necessary, as this is the information which the jury considered when answering the special issues in the punishment phase of the trial. James v. State, 772 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), 493 U.S. 885, 110 S.Ct. 225, 107 L.Ed.2d 178 (vacated and remanded on other issue); James v. State, 805 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1990) (on remand); cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2915, 115 L.Ed.2d 1078 (1991).

The evidence adduced at trial was that on December 23, 1991, appellant poured a combustible liquid on the floor throughout his home and intentionally set the house on fire, resulting in the death of his three children. Amber, age two, and twins Karmon and Kameron, age 1, died of acute carbon monoxide poisoning as a result of smoke inhalation, according to autopsy reports. Neighbors of appellant testified that as the house began smouldering, appellant was "crouched down" in the front yard, and despite the neighbors' pleas, refused to go into the house in any attempt to rescue the children. An expert witness for the State testified that the floors, front threshold, and front concrete porch were burned, which only occurs when an accelerant has been used to purposely burn these areas. This witness further testified that this igniting of the floors and thresholds is typically employed to impede firemen in their rescue attempts.

The testimony at trial demonstrates that appellant neither showed remorse for his actions nor grieved the loss of his three children. Appellant's neighbors testified that when the fire "blew out" the windows, appellant "hollered about his car" and ran to move it away from the fire to avoid its being damaged. A fire fighter also testified that appellant was upset that his dart board was burned. One of appellant's neighbors testified that the morning following the house fire, Christmas Eve, appellant and his wife were at the burned house going through the debris while playing music and laughing.

At the punishment phase of trial, testimony was presented that appellant has a history of violence. He has been convicted of numerous felonies and misdemeanors, both as an adult and as a juvenile, and attempts at various forms of rehabilitation have proven unsuccessful. ¹

The jury also heard evidence of appellant's character. Witnesses testified that appellant was verbally and physically abusive toward his family, and that at one time he beat his pregnant wife in an effort to cause a miscarriage. A friend of appellant's testified that appellant once bragged about brutally killing a dog. In fact, appellant openly admitted to a fellow inmate that he purposely started this fire to conceal evidence that the children had recently been abused.

Dr. James Grigson testified for the State at punishment. According to his testimony, appellant fits the profile of an extremely severe sociopath whose conduct becomes more violent over time, and who lacks a conscience as to his behavior. Grigson explained that a person with this degree of sociopathy commonly has no regard for other people's property or for other human beings. He expressed his opinion that an individual demonstrating this type of behavior can not be rehabilitated in any manner, and that such a person certainly poses a continuing threat to society.

Appellant first contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that he is a continuing threat to society. In determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a jury's answer to this special issue presented in the punishment phase of a capital murder trial, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) beyond a reasonable doubt. ² Rivera v. State, 808 S.W.2d 80, 94 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 279, 116 L.Ed.2d 231 (1991); Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 115 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 932, 113 S.Ct. 3062, 125 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993); Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d 378, 386 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 279, 112 L.Ed.2d 234 (1990). Any evidence adduced at the guilt/innocence and punishment phases of trial can be used by the jury when considering future dangerousness. Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d at 386; Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 963, 110 S.Ct. 2575, 109 L.Ed.2d 757 (1990); Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d 801, 812 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 985, 79 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). Often, the circumstances of the offense alone are enough to sustain an affirmative answer to this special issue. Willis at 386; Sosa v. State, 769 S.W.2d 909, 912 (Tex.Cr.App.1989); Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 302 (Tex.Cr.App.1986). A defendant's prior criminal record is also relevant to future dangerousness. Willis at 387; Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d at 167; Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).

The facts of the offense are heinous and exhibit complete disregard for human life. Appellant saturated his house with a combustible liquid, ignited the house, and left his three children in the burning house. We believe a rational trier of fact could have answered "yes" to the second special issue based solely on the circumstances of the offense. Willis at 386; Sosa v. State, 769 S.W.2d at 912; Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d at 302.

Criminal history and reputation evidence are also probative of future dangerousness. Willis at 387; Valdez at 167; Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d at 61; James v. State, 772 S.W.2d at 90. The fact that appellant has been convicted of numerous offenses and has failed all attempts of rehabilitation, as well as having committed other violent acts apart from his criminal convictions, are relevant considerations the jury could have used to find that appellant would present a continuing threat to society.

Having reviewed all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, including trial evidence, circumstances of the offense, and appellant's extensive criminal history, we find sufficient evidence in the record for a rational trier of fact to have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability that appellant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.

Appellant also contends in point of error four that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that mitigating circumstances would not warrant a life sentence. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071 § 2(e). Appellant fails to point to any mitigating factors which would persuade a jury to answer this special issue in his favor and render a life sentence. Likewise, no mitigating circumstances are apparent from a thorough reading of the record. No authorities are cited and no argument is made under this point of error; therefore, nothing is presented for review on this point. Tex.R.App.Proc. 74(f); Woods v. State, 569 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913, 101 S.Ct. 3145, 69 L.Ed.2d 995 (1981); Byrom v. State, 528 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). Accordingly, appellant's fourth point of error is overruled.

Appellant maintains in point of error number one that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant appellant's motion for change...