Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Ass'n
| Decision Date | 29 March 1962 |
| Citation | 20 Cal.Rptr. 466 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | H. B. K. WILLIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SANTA ANA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL ASS'N, a corporation, et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 6658. |
Jacobs, Jacobs, Nelson & Witmer, by M. Lyle Nelson, Santa Ana, for appellant.
W. Mike McCray and H. Warren Knight Santa Ana, for respondents.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of dismissal after defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint was sustained and plaintiff declined to amend.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages for alleged conspiracy by defendants to dominate and control the practice of medicine in Orange County by maliciously and without lawful cause interfering with plaintiff's association with other members of the profession and preventing his use of the best hospitals for his patients. A demurrer thereto was sustained, a first amended complaint was filed and again a demurrer thereto was sustained. Plaintiff did nothing to further amend, judgment of dismissal was entered, and plaintiff appeals therefrom. While the record shows that a special demurrer was filed in addition to general demurrer, the parties do not discuss nor make any points in their briefs regarding the special demurrer and on oral argument stipulated that the trial court's ruling was only on the general demurrer. We will therefore confine our discussion to the general demurrer. On demurrer the complainant's allegations must be accepted as true. We are not concerned with proof.
Plaintiff's complaint is set forth in two causes of action. In substance it alleges in the first cause of action that defendants West, Finley, George, Carmichael, Knickerbocker, Thornton and Hellis are directors of defendant hospital; that defendants Tiffany, Leecing and Carroll are licensed osteopathic physicians (hereinafter that term will be called D.O.); that defendants Clark and Pearlman are licensed doctors of medicine (hereinafter that term will be called M.D.); that defendant Malinowski is administrator of defendant hospital; that plaintiff is a D.O.; that
'* * * during all of the times herein mentioned, the defendants and each of them have combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together, and do now combine, conspire, confederate and agree together through coercive and oppressive methods and otherwise to: dominate and control the practice of medicine in the County of Orange, State of California by licensed osteopathic physicians and surgeons; dominate and control the hospitals in the vicinity of the City of Santa Ana, County of Orange, State of California in which staff membership is necessary in order that a licensed osteopathic physician or surgeon may have the use of the facilities necessary for the proper treatment of his patients in and around the vicinity of said City; prevent competition from osteopathic physicians moving to the County of Orange from other counties or states, even though such out of county osteopathic physicians and surgeons are duly licensed to practice medicine in the State of California, by means of preventing such doctors from acquiring the use of hospital facilities necessary in connection with the conduct of their profession; determine the terms upon which licensed osteopathic physicians and surgeons may employ or associate with other licensed that pursuant to said conspiracy, in order to destroy the business of competing D.O.'s and to preclude competition from D.O's, defendants prevented D.O.'s from using the better hospitals in Orange County and advised members of the public that D.O.'s who do not have the use of said hospital facilities have been rejected therefrom because of questionable personal or professional reputations and ability and have established restraints and conditions upon which D.O.'s may associate with each other; that defendant hospital directors have unlimited power to determine what doctors may use defendant hospital's facilities and have used said power to carry out said conspiracy; that prior to November 1953 plaintiff resided in Los Angeles County, practicing therein; that after said date plaintiff has resided and practiced in Orange County; that from May 1954 to January 1959 plaintiff was a member of the D.O. staff of defendant hospital and all his activities as such staff member were completely satisfactory; that 'plaintiff, in his private and professional life, has at all times maintained the highest moral, ethical and professional standards; that plaintiff's professional training, experience and qualifications are of the very highest caliber;' that in January 1959 plaintiff was deprived of staff membership in defendant hospital without assigned reason and was refused any hearing thereon; that the defendant hospital's D.O. staff unanimously requested the hearing for him but said request was denied; that pursuant to said conspiracy and subsequent to plaintiff's said expulsion from staff membership, defendants indicated to the public that the reason therefor was questionable professional or personal competence, ability and reputation. Then follow allegations of loss of patients by plaintiff, loss of income, and damage.
osteopathic physicians and surgeons and doctors of medicine in a professional capacity; and by denying the use of hospital facilities to such osteopathic physicians and surgeons and controlling the terms upon which such osteopathic physicians and surgeons and doctors of medicine may associate with each other, and by other coercive and oppressive methods to limit and restrict and restrain fair competition in the medical field as between osteopathic physicians and surgeons, and as between licensed osteopathic physicians and surgeons and doctors of medicine; that at all of the said times, the defendants and each of them, have unlawfully created and carried out restraints and restrictions upon the business and business methods of osteopathic physicians and surgeons and upon fair competition in rendering medical treatment to the public in the County of Orange, State of California;'
The second cause of action re-pleads most of the first cause of action but narrows the purposes of the conspiracy to apply with malicious intent directly to plaintiff.
The issue, as stated by both parties, is whether or not plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action for unlawful restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act of California (Stat.1907, p. 984, now Secs. 16700-16758, Bus. & Prof.Code) and under common law principles.
In basic effect the Cartwright Act prohibits any combination of capital, skill or acts of two or more persons to restrict trade or commerce. Section 16700 specifically provides that the chapter is cumulative with other provisions of law. Section 16720 details various types of specifically prohibited acts, all of which relate to the main purpose. It then provides specified exceptions and gives any person injured by such unlawful combination a right to recover damages therefor. Section 16756 provides for simplification of pleading and other sections set up civil and criminal penalties. It has been recognized that both the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2) and the Cartwright Act are merely legislative efforts to put into statutory form some of the already recognized principles of the common law. (Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34, 44, 172 P.2d 867.)
Under pleadings very similar to those in the case here at bar the problem was thoroughly discussed and analyzed in Tatkin v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.App.2d 745, 754-765, 326 P.2d 201. The majority opinion therein concludes (p. 764, 326 P.2d p. 213) that 'plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a purpose on the part of the defendants to restrain competition by him, as well as acts done in pursuance of that purpose to state a cause or causes of action under common law principles.' The dissenting opinion discusses and analyzes the same subject and comes to an opposite conclusion. On petition for hearing in our Supreme Court the petition was, by a divided court, denied. Defendant contends that what was said in the majority opinion in Tatkin was dicta. It is true that the proceeding there was in mandamus to set aside an order sustaining defendant's refusal to answer certain questions. We are not, however, prepared to say that the discussion above referred to was wholly unnecessary to the decision of the case. At any rate, we are convinced that the majority opinion in the Tatkin case above referred to satisfactorily analyzes the problem and reaches the correct conclusion.
Due to the similarity of the general purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2...
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Burkhart v. Community Medical Center
...will be protected in case of a conspiracy of the hospital authorities to exclude a staff member. Cf. Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hospital Ass'n, Cal. App., 20 Cal.Rptr. 466, 471, from which we 'What we do hold is that the law affords redress to any victim of a combination which has for it......