Willis v. Shelby County, No. W2008-01487-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 6/8/2009)
| Decision Date | 08 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. W2008-01487-COA-R3-CV.,No. W2008-01558-COA-R3-CV.,W2008-01487-COA-R3-CV.,W2008-01558-COA-R3-CV. |
| Parties | MARCUS WILLIS v. SHELBY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Herbert D. Hurst and Jill M. Shirley, Hurst Law Firm, P.A., Memphis, Tennessee, Louis P. Chiozza, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, and Steven R. Walker, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Marcus Willis.
Reid R. Phillips and Chapman Sellers Morrow, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Correctional Medical Services, Inc.
Debra L. Fessenden, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Shelby County, Tennessee.
David R. Farmer, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Alan E. Highers, P.J., W.S., and Holly M. Kirby, J., joined.
This appeal arises from the removal of a state court action to federal court. Once the federal court granted the defendants summary judgment regarding plaintiff's federal claims, it dismissed plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice. Approximately one year later, the plaintiff sought to present its state law claims in state court by filing a motion titled to be a "Motion to Reassume Jurisdiction" and refiling its entire cause of action in state court. The trial court dismissed both cases with prejudice because the statute of limitations had run. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Plaintiff Marcus Willis ("Willis") originally filed two separate causes of action in the Circuit Court of Tennessee for the Thirtieth Judicial District at Memphis ("state court"), alleging, in both cases, that the defendants negligently caused the amputation of his left leg. The trial court ultimately dismissed both lawsuits and we have consolidated both cases on appeal.
Willis' cause of action arises from the medical treatment that he received while he was awaiting trial in the Shelby County Jail. At that time, Willis was a Type I diabetic. After complaining that he failed to receive proper medication while detained, Willis was eventually transported to the Regional Medical Center and Willis' left leg was amputated below the knee.
Willis filed his first lawsuit, Case CT-004010-05, in state court in July 2005. At that time, Willis brought both state and federal claims against the various defendants1 (collectively "Defendants"). Willis alleged that Correctional Medical Services (CMS) and its employee Katherine Merriweather (collectively "CMS Defendants") negligently treated his diabetes, that Shelby County, A.C. Wharton, Mark Luttrell, Jr., James Coleman, John Doe, Jane Roe I, and Jane Roe II (collectively "Shelby County Defendants") negligently cared for Willis while he was detained in the jail, that the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("GTLA") waived immunity for the Shelby County Defendants, and that the Defendants violated his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Based on Willis' § 1983 claims, Defendants properly removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee ("district court") on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
After the district court assumed jurisdiction, Defendants submitted motions for summary judgment. In September 2006, the district court granted summary judgment to most of the Defendants on Willis' § 1983 claims.2 At the same time, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all of Willis' state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. Willis failed to file a request to remand the supplemental claims. Rather, over a year later, on September 28, 2007, Willis filed a motion with the district court to remand the state law claims to the Shelby County Circuit Court. The district court entered an order October 30, 2007 denying Willis' motion to remand because it found that Willis could have re-filed his cause of action in state court during the 30 days after it had dismissed the claims without prejudice.
Meantime, on September 21, 2007, Willis filed a motion with the state court to reassume jurisdiction and set the case on the clerk's docket. As a second precaution, Willis also filed a second lawsuit, CT-004934-07, which is identical to his first suit, in state court on September 27, 2007. In response, Defendants filed various motions to dismiss, alleging that the second lawsuit was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the statute of limitations.
On June 3, 2008, the trial court entered a final judgment on both of Willis' lawsuits. The trial court denied Willis' motion to reassume jurisdiction. In both cases, the trial court opined the following:
5. This [c]ourt is of the considered opinion that the plaintiff's state law claims against all defendants were dismissed by the federal district court without prejudice. The proper procedure, then, was for the plaintiff to re-file his suit in Tennessee state court within thirty days from the date of that dismissal order, which plaintiff failed to do. Accordingly the statute of limitation[s] passed and this matter must be dismissed.
The trial court then dismissed both lawsuits with prejudice. Willis filed timely notices of appeal for both cases on July 1, 2008. We thereafter consolidated the cases.
As stated in his brief, Willis raises two issues on appeal:
I. Whether the trial court erred in denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reassume Jurisdiction and in dismissing the suit originally filed in state court under docket number CT-004010-05.
II. Whether the trial court erred in entering an order of dismissal with prejudice with respect to the claims against CMS and Katherine Merriweather in cause number CT-004934-07.
Willis' appeal presents various questions of law. We review the trial court's application of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. Bowden v. Ward, 27 S.W.3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000). It is a question of law whether a claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Brown v. Erachem Comilog, Inc., 231S.W.3d918, 921 (Tenn. 2007). A determination whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is also a question of law, so our review continues to be de novo with no presumption of correctness. Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn. 1999). The trial court did, however, consider matters outside of the pleadings when making its final determination in this case. When a trial court considers matters outside of the pleadings, a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Adams TV of Memphis v. ComCorp of Tenn., 969 S.W.2d 917, 920 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Where it is necessary to review the record, therefore, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Staples v. CBL & Assoc., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000).
The issue in this case stems from a defendant's right to remove a lawsuit to federal court. Where a district court has original jurisdiction over a case that was filed in state court, a defendant may remove the case to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). A district court has original jurisdiction if there is either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Where a case is properly removed pursuant to federal question diversity, a defendant may also remove supplemental3 state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Once the notice of removal is filed, a district court retains jurisdiction over any supplemental state law claims even if the district court dismisses the federal claim that formed the basis for federal question jurisdiction.4 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 355 n.11 (1988), see 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 107.14[3]b][ii] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.); see also Parker v. Della Rocco, 252 F.3d 663, 665—67 (2nd Cir. 2001) (); Rector v. Dacco, Inc., No. M2005-00294-COA-R9-CV, 2006 WL 1749525, at *5 n.14 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2006) ( ). Once it has dismissed the federal law claims, it is within a district court's discretion whether to adjudicate any remaining supplemental claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). If it chooses not to entertain the supplemental claims, it is within a trial court's discretion to either remand the supplemental claims to the state court or dismiss them without prejudice.5 Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 351—57.
Once a defendant has filed a notice of removal, a plaintiff may seek to remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447. If at any time before it enters a final judgment the federal court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the federal court must remand the case to state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Otherwise, a plaintiff must move to remand the case within 30 days after the defendant files the notice of removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A district court then determines whether there was a procedural defect in the removal process, such as improper filing or in a diversity case, whether there is a local defendant or fraudulent joinder. See 16 Moore's Federal Practice § 107.41[1][c][ii][B] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.). The district court cannot sua sponte enter an order remanding the case for any defect other than...
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