WILLIS v. TOWN OF MARSHALL, Civil No. 1:02CV217 (W.D.N.C. 11/25/2003)
| Decision Date | 25 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 1:02CV217. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina |
| Parties | REBECCA WILLIS, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF MARSHALL, NORTH CAROLINA, a corporation of the State of North Carolina, Defendant. |
THESE MATTERS are before the Court on the Defendant's motion for summary judgment and the Plaintiffs motion for leave to conduct discovery, both filed October 6, 2003. The Plaintiff has filed a memorandum opposing the Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and the matters are ready for resolution.
The Defendant Town of Marshall, is located in Madison County, North Carolina. Amended Complaint, ¶ 2. For one dollar per year, Defendant leases an old train depot from the Southern Railway Company. Id., ¶ 7-8. The Board of Aldermen for Defendant have appointed a Marshall Depot Committee ("Committee") to coordinate events at the depot. Id., ¶ 10. Among the regular events the Committee organizes are Friday night concerts ("events"), which occur each Friday night and at which the attendees often dance. Id., ¶ 10-12.
Plaintiff Rebecca Willis is a resident of Madison County. Id., ¶ 1. Until late 2000, Plaintiff was a regular at the events, where she particularly enjoyed to dance. Id., ¶ 16-17. On December 12, 2000, the Mayor of Marshall, John Dodson, sent Plaintiff a letter that read:
Due to the inappropriate behavior exhibited by you and having received previous warnings from the Marshall Depot Committee it is the consensus of the Committee that you are banned from the Marshall Depot. This action is effective as of today's date.
Defendant has submitted affidavits from a number of persons who attended the events that claim the Plaintiff wore clothing to the events that revealed her private parts and that she danced in a lewd manner. Affidavit of Beverly Seivers, ¶ 9, attached to Defendant's Addendum to Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction; Affidavit of Dora Reeves, ¶ 3, Affidavit of William Alien, ¶ 4, and Affidavit of Conley Silver, ¶ 3, attached to Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Defendant's Opposition to Preliminary Injunction"), filed February 17, 2003.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that she wore proper undergarments so as not to display any private parts and that she did not dance in an abnormally suggestive manner. Second Affidavit of Rebecca Willis, filed March 3, 2003 ("Second Willis Affidavit"), ¶¶ 2, 7. She has also submitted affidavits from people who attended the events that claim she did not expose herself, that she dressed appropriately, and that she did not dance suggestively. Affidavit of Louise Branam, filed October, 6, 2003, ¶¶ 5, 8; Affidavit of Nancy Noland, filed October 6, 2003, ¶¶ 7-8; Affidavit of Pat Mathus, filed January 31, 2003, ¶ 6; Affidavit of Hugh Mathus, filed January 31, 2003, ¶ 5. Finally, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit from Katherine Maheu, a professional dance instructor, who claims that "Mrs. Willis' dancing cannot reasonably be construed as vulgar, lewd, or obscene." Affidavit of Katherine Maheu, filed January 31, 2003, ¶ 6. Maheu observed Plaintiffs dancing on a segment of the television show Inside Edition. Id., ¶ 4.
The Committee chair, Retha Ward, and many others claim that members of the Committee repeatedly asked Plaintiff to modify her behavior at the events. Second Affidavit of Retha Ward, attached to Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum"), filed October 6, 2003, ¶ 5; Second Affidavit of Ed Morton ("Second Morton Affidavit"), attached to Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum, ¶ 5. Mayor Dodson further claims that after Plaintiff received the letter, she came by his house requesting an opportunity to address the Town Board. He advised her to speak with the Town Clerk. Second Affidavit of John Dodson ("Second Dodson Affidavit"), attached to Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum, ¶ 14. The Town Clerk Darlyne Rhinehart avers that Plaintiff requested to be placed on the agenda for the next town meeting and Rhinehart did so. Affidavit of Darlyne Rhinehart, attached to Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum, ¶ 2. However, Kary Ledford, Administrative Assistant for Defendant, claims that Plaintiff subsequently phoned the Town Office and asked to be removed from the agenda. Affidavit of Kary Ledford, attached to Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum, ¶ 3.
Plaintiff claims that, prior to being excluded from the events, she received no notice of any charges and, following her exclusion, she was afforded no mechanism for appeal. First Affidavit of Rebecca Willis ("First Willis Affidavit"), filed January 31, 2003, ¶¶ 11, 14. However, in a subsequent affidavit, Plaintiff states that she and her attorney met with the Board of Aldermen and the Committee on September 12, 2001, and were unable to convince them to readmit Plaintiff to the events. Third Affidavit of Rebecca Willis ("Third Willis Affidavit"), filed October 6, 2003, ¶ 9.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on September 20, 2002, and amended it on November 22, 2002. On December 2, 2002, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss amended complaint. On September 5, 2003, the Court converted the Defendant's motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Both parties filed memoranda giving their positions on the summary judgment issue on October 6, 2003. Plaintiff also filed a motion in the alternative for leave to conduct discovery.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment for the moving party is warranted as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue exists if a reasonable jury considering the evidence could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, here the Plaintiff. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). By reviewing substantive law, the Court may determine what matters constitute material facts. Anderson, supra. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. The Defendant as the moving party has the initial burden to show a lack of evidence to support the Plaintiffs case. Shaw, supra (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325(1986)). If that showing is made, the burden then shifts to the Plaintiff who must convince the Court that a triable issue does exist. Id. A "mere scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id. Moreover, in considering the facts of the case for purposes of this motion, the Court will view the pleadings and material presented in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, as the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
Plaintiffs claims are based on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, on the Fourteenth Amendment itself, or on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985. Plaintiffs alleging Fourteenth Amendment violations must show that the conduct of which they complain "may be fairly characterized as `state action.'" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Similarly, plaintiffs making claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 must show that their constitutional rights were violated under color of law. Id.; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 166 n. 31 (1970). Furthermore, "[i]f the challenged conduct . . . constitutes state action [for Fourteenth Amendment purposes], then that conduct was also action under color of state law." Lugar, supra, at 935. Therefore, if Defendant's actions were state action, it will be unnecessary to consider whether they were under color of law.
Cases explaining what constitutes state action "have not been a model of consistency." Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). Courts have noted that it is an "impossible task" to "fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause," Burton v. Wilminton Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722(1961), and that the "inquiry is `necessarily fact-bound.'" Mentavlos, supra, at 311 (quoting Lugar, supra, at 939). The Supreme Court stated that
[w]hat is fairly attributable [to the state] is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity. From the range of circumstances that could point toward the State behind an individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient, for there may be some countervailing reason against attributing activity to the government.
BrentwoodAcad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001). One bit of guidance that the Supreme Court has given is that an entity may be treated as a state actor "when it is `entwined with governmental policies,' or when government is `entwined in [its] management or control.'" Id., at 296 (quoting Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)) (alteration in original).
In the present case, there is much evidence that the Committee acted independently of Defendant in deciding to exclude Plaintiff from the events. Retha Ward, the Committee chair, stated in her affidavit that Affidavit of Retha Ward, attached to Defendant's Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, ¶ 3. Many Committee members and Aldermen have given similar...
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