Willmar Poultry Co., Inc. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 12 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 3-77 Civ. 72.,3-77 Civ. 72.
• Citation: 430 F. Supp. 573
• Parties: WILLMAR POULTRY COMPANY, INC., a Minnesota Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Ernest JONES, Director, Bureau of Mediation Services, State of Minnesota, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

430 F. Supp. 573

WILLMAR POULTRY COMPANY, INC., a Minnesota Corporation, Plaintiff, v. Ernest JONES, Director, Bureau of Mediation Services, State of Minnesota, Defendant.

No. 3-77 Civ. 72.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Third Division.

April 6, 1977.

As Amended May 12, 1977.

John C. Zwakman, and Douglas E. Ray, Dorsey, Windhorst, Hannaford, Whitney & Halladay, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., State of Minnesota by Richard A. Lockridge, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for defendant.

Bruce A. Finzen, Robins, Davis and Lyons, St. Paul, Minn., for intervenor.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

ALSOP, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff's motion to preliminarily enjoin the defendant from proceeding with representation proceedings involving certain of the plaintiff's employees.

The plaintiff is a Minnesota corporation engaged in the business of hatching and raising turkeys and of selling agricultural supplies. During the fiscal year which ended September 30, 1976, the plaintiff had gross revenues in excess of $16,000,000. During that fiscal year, the plaintiff shipped in interstate commerce products valued in excess of $3,000,000.

The defendant is the director of the Bureau of Mediation Services of the State of Minnesota. As such, the defendant is empowered by statute¹ to investigate controversies between employers and employees concerning representation for the purpose of collective bargaining, to certify appropriate bargaining units and to conduct representation elections.

During the summer of 1976, certain workers at the plaintiff's turkey hatchery in Willmar, Minnesota, made application for membership in either the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Food Handlers of North America, AFL-CIO, Local No. 653-653-A ("Meat Cutters") or the United Poultry Workers Local No. 44, Christian Labor Association ("CLA"). On August 6, 1976, the CLA filed a representation petition with the regional director of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), seeking to represent all hatchery production and maintenance employees, excluding supervisory, management and office clerical employees. The regional director made an informal determination that the employees in question were "agricultural laborers" within the meaning of that term as it is used in the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), and were therefore excluded from coverage under the NLRA. The CLA then withdrew its petition, and on September 13, 1976, the regional director advised all parties that the case was closed.

On September 15, 1976, the Meat Cutters filed a petition with the defendant, seeking to represent the production workers at the plaintiff's hatchery. On October 6, 1976, the CLA also filed a petition with the defendant, seeking to represent those same workers. The representation proceedings were consolidated, and on October 20, 1976, the defendant conducted a hearing in Willmar, Minnesota. At the hearing the plaintiff contended that the workers in question were "agricultural laborers"² and were therefore exempt from coverage under both federal and state law and that, in the alternative, the NLRA's exclusion of "agricultural laborers" preempted any assertion of jurisdiction by the defendant. On December 13, 1976, the defendant ruled that the NLRA did not preempt his assertion of jurisdiction and that the workers in question were not "employees engaged in agricultural labor" within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 179.01(4).

On January 3, 1977, the plaintiff filed an employer representation petition with the regional director of the NLRB. On January 14, 1977, the regional director issued an order dismissing the petition on the ground that the workers in question were "agricultural laborers."

On January 19, 1977, the plaintiff filed a motion with the defendant, seeking reconsideration of the defendant's earlier assertion of jurisdiction. On February 7, 1977, the defendant denied that motion and scheduled an administrative hearing to consider the appropriate bargaining unit and the timing of an election.³

The plaintiff invokes the court's subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337 and 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Section 1337 is a grant of jurisdiction in all actions and proceedings "arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce."

It is clear that the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., is an "Act of Congress regulating commerce." Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501, 74 S.Ct. 699, 98 L.Ed. 887 (1954). American Fed'n of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 761, 90 L.Ed. 873 (1946). However, it is not clear that an action seeking to enjoin a state's attempt to regulate labor relations activity left unregulated by the NLRA is an action arising under the NLRA. Compare Utah Valley Hosp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 199 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952) (jurisdiction declined) with NLRB v. Committee of Interns & Residents, 426 F.Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (jurisdiction exercised).

The issue before the court is one of federal preemption. Because the issue is to be resolved solely by a determination of the applicability of federal law, the court deems it appropriate that the matter be determined by a federal tribunal. See Empresa Hondurena de Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 227 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 372 U.S. 10, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1962). Therefore, the court will exercise jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In order to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of showing a substantial probability of success at trial and irreparable injury to itself absent injunctive relief. Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White Motor Corp., 470 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1973); accord, American Train Dispatchers Ass'n v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 551 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1977); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 392 (8th Cir. 1976); Gadler v. United States, 425 F.Supp. 244, 246 (D.Minn.1977). Thus, the plaintiff's right to a preliminary injunction is dependent on its ability to show a substantial probability that it will succeed in establishing that the NLRA's exclusion of agricultural laborers from its coverage preempts the State of Minnesota's regulation of labor relations between the plaintiff and its employees whom the NLRB deems to be agricultural laborers.

The doctrine of preemption⁴ in labor law has been shaped by two competing interests. On the one hand, the broad powers conferred by Congress upon the NLRB to interpret and enforce federal labor law necessarily imply that potentially conflicting rules of law, of remedy, and of administration cannot be permitted to operate. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178-79, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). On the other hand, because Congress has refrained from providing specific directions with respect to the scope of preempted state regulations, all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions is not to be declared preempted. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971).

Preemption of state regulation occurs where there is a clear manifestation of Congressional intent to occupy the field and supersede the state's exercise of power. New York State Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 412, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973); Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03, 73 S.Ct. 232, 97 L.Ed. 231 (1952). In the course of interpreting the NLRA and attempting to delineate the Congress's intent, the Supreme Court has identified a number of different factual patterns wherein federal preemption is indicated. For the purposes of this case, it is appropriate to analyze the cases by dividing them into three categories.

The first category consists of cases where the Board has determined that the activity involved is protected as an employee organizational right, NLRA § 7; 29 U.S.C. § 157, or is prohibited as an unfair labor practice, NLRA § 8; 29 U.S.C. § 158, or where, even though the NLRB has not determined that the conduct is protected or prohibited, the conduct in question may fairly be assumed to be, or is arguably, subject to § 7 or § 8 of the NLRA. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959); accord, Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, supra; Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953); La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 18, 69 S.Ct. 379, 93 L.Ed. 463 (1949).

The second category of cases in which the Court has found that the NLRA preempts state regulation encompasses instances in which the NLRB clearly had jurisdiction but declined to exercise that jurisdiction because to do so would not effectuate the policies of the NLRA. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234 (1947); accord, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601 (1957).

The third category of cases in which the court has found federal preemption of state regulation is where the NLRA neither protects nor prohibits the activity in question, but national labor policy requires that the activity should be wholly unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces. Machinists Lodge 76 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2548, 49 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976); Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 40 L.Ed.2d 443 (1974); Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 84 S.Ct. 1253, 12 L.Ed.2d 280 (1964); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960).

It is clear that...