Willott v. Village of Beachwood
| Decision Date | 11 March 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 38174,38174 |
| Citation | 197 N.E.2d 201,26 O.O.2d 249,175 Ohio St. 557 |
| Parties | , 26 O.O.2d 249 WILLOTT et al., Appellees, v. VILLAGE OF BEACHWOOD et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The council of a municipality, by passing an ordinance changing a residence zone to a business zone, does not presume to pass upon the effectiveness of a restrictive residential covenant in a private deed or private agreement.
2. 'Spot zoning' refers to the singling out of a lot or small area for discriminatory or different treatment from that accorded surrounding land which is similar in character.
3. The power of a municipality to establish zones, to classify property, to control traffic and to determine land-use policy is a legislative function which will not be interfered with by the courts, unless such power is exercised in such an arbitrary, confiscatory or unreasonable manner as to be in violation of constitutional guaranties.
The plaintiffs filed their petition in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County against the village of Beachwood (now the city of Beachwood), M. J. Frato, the building inspector of Beachwood, and John J. Lucas, its engineer, alleging the invalidity of a certain amendment to the zoning ordinance of Beachwood, changing an area of 80 acres of land located at the southeast corner of Richmond Road and Shaker Boulevard in Beachwood from a residential zoning classification to a shopping-center zoning classification. Plaintiffs claim that this change will damage their property. Plaintiffs' prayer is for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.
The Common Pleas Court rendered judgment for the defendants.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals on questions of law, the judgment of the Common Pleas Court was reversed, one judge dissenting. The Court of Appeals held that the council of Beachwood was guilty of an abuse of discretion and of spot-zoning.
This cause is before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Roland A. Baskin, Cleveland, for appellants.
Jules Eshner, Cleveland, for appellees.
The plaintiffs contend, first, that the amendment of the zoning ordinance was an improper exercise of the police power where the evidence discloses no change in the area and discloses ample shopping facilities and drastic depreciation of plaintiffs' homes, increased traffic, dangers from traffic to homeowners' children, noise and other nuisances; second, that the council of Beachwood was without authority to amend the zoning ordinance where no change in the area was shown and the property owners and taxpayers relied upon private restrictions and covenants in private deeds and agreements and upon the highly restricted, single-family private-residence zoning which had been long enforced; third, that a municipality owes a duty to adjoining municipalities not to invade the rights of the residents of those municipalities, not to create undesirable traffic and flood conditions in such municipalities and not to destroy their property values.
The defendants filed an answer denying generally the allegations of the petition.
Three principal questions are presented by this appeal:
1. Do private restrictions and covenants arising from private deeds or agreements estop a municipality from exercising zoning authority?
2. Is the zoning contemplated by the amendment to the zoning ordinance in the instant case 'spot-zoning?'
3. Does the evidence presented by the plaintiffs and viewed in its most favorable light constitute a sufficient ground for the court to intervene and declare the zoning ordinance passed by the defendant municipality invalid?
First, the zoning of land for business has no effect on existing restrictions confining the use of land to residential purposes, which restrictions arise from private deeds or private agreements. The council of a municipality, by changing a residence zone to a business zone, does not presume to pass upon the effectiveness of a restrictive residential covenant, nor does this court, in passing upon the validity of a municipal zoning ordinance, presume to pass upon the effectiveness of a restrictive residential covenant in a private deed or private agreement.
Second, 'spot-zoning' refers to the singling out of a lot or a small area...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ctr. for Powell Crossing, LLC v. City of Powell
...or different treatment from that accorded surrounding land which is similar in character.” Willott v. Vill. of Beachwood, 175 Ohio St. 557, 559, 197 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ohio 1964). Powell Crossing contends that its property is being subjected to discriminatory treatment. Though the cases cited......
-
State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp.
...improvement, land use, nuisance abatement, and the general welfare and development of the community as a whole. Willott v. Beachwood, 175 Ohio St. 557, 560, 197 N.E.2d 201 (1964). Municipalities are more familiar with local conditions and are in the best position to determine which zoning r......
-
Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc.
...in enacting it is permitted to control. Brown v. Cleveland, supra, 66 Ohio St.2d at 98, 420 N.E.2d 103; Willott v. Beachwood (1964), 175 Ohio St. 557, 560, 197 N.E.2d 201 ; Curtiss v. Cleveland (1959), 170 Ohio St. 127, 163 N.E.2d 682 , paragraph three of the syllabus. See, generally, Eucli......
-
Central Motors Corp. v. City of Pepper Pike
...to the validity of zoning ordinances. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 23, 309 N.E.2d 900; Willott v. Beachwood (1964), 175 Ohio St. 557, 197 N.E.2d 201; State ex rel. Beerman v. Kettering (1963), 120 Ohio App. 309, 201 N.E.2d 887; State ex rel. Prentke v. Village of Bro......