Willough G. Lust v. Robert O. Lust, 02-LW-2584
| Decision Date | 17 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | 16-02-04,02-LW-2584 |
| Citation | 2002 Ohio 3629 |
| Parties | WILLOUGH G. LUST, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. ROBERT O. LUST, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CASE NUMBER 16-02-04 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division.
JAMES M. RUHLEN, Attorney at Law, Reg. #0070103, 116 East Wyandot Avenue, Upper Sandusky, OH 43351, For Appellant.
AGNES A. PFEIFER, Attorney at Law, Reg. #0032809, 114 East Wyandot Avenue, Upper Sandusky, OH 43351, For Appellee.
This appeal is brought by Appellant Robert O. Lust from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Wyandot County Domestic Relations Division granting Appellee Willough G Lust a divorce from Appellant and dividing the parties' marital estate.
Robert and Willough Lust were married on November 17, 1973. Two children were born as issue of their marriage and have since been emancipated. Robert was employed as a teacher at the outset of the marriage but in 1976 abandoned this profession to take up farming. Willough worked as stay at home mother for the majority of the marriage and has not held a job since 1977. Willough and Robert acquired substantial assets during their marriage and have little debt. In addition, Willough, a victim of medical malpractice, is legally blind, partially deaf, has two artificial valves in her heart and has had both of her legs amputated. Willough received a substantial settlement for these injuries as the result of a medical malpractice suit she and Robert filed in 1991.
Willough filed a complaint for divorce on January 3, 2000, alleging Robert's gross neglect, extreme cruelty and incompatibility. The matter was heard by a magistrate on June 18-19, 2001. The magistrate issued a decision on August 3, 2001 and with the exception of one minor alteration, the trial court adopted this decision on February 15, 2002. On March 5, 2002 the trial court entered a Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce without Minor Children. It is from this order that Appellant now appeals.
Appellant raises the following assignments of error:
The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by adopting the Magistrate's Decision in holding the real property held in Appellant's name was the marital property of the two parties.
The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by adopting the Magistrate's Decision in holding the entire proceeds from a medical malpractice suit was separate property of Appellee and failed to designate any portion of the settlement as the separate property of Appellant for settlement of his claims in the original lawsuit.
The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by adopting the Magistrate's Decision in ordering Appellant to pay spousal support to Appellee in light of the division of the assets and liabilities of the parties.
The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by adopting the Magistrate's Decision which decision failed to make an equitable division of martial assets.
The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by adopting the Magistrate's Decision in discounting the appraisal of the parties assets completed by Appellant's experts.
The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of Appellant by signing the Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce Without Minor Children prepared by Counsel of Appellee in that said Judgment Entry was not prepared strictly adhering to the Judgment Entry of the Court but was supplemented by Counsel for Appellee.
First and Second Assignments of Error:
Classification of Property as Marital or Separate
In his first and second assignments of error, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it adopted the magistrate's decision declaring two parcels of real estate to be marital property and declaring Appellee's medical malpractice settlement to be her separate property. For the reasons stated below, we overrule both assignments of error.
In divorce proceedings, a trial court is charged with the duty to distinguish between marital property and separate property in accordance with the respective definitions set forth in R.C. 3105.171(A). Kerchenfaut v. Kerchenfaut (Sept. 5, 2001), Allen App. No. 1-01-14, 2001-Ohio-2259. A trial court has broad discretion in discharging this duty. Leathem v. Leathem (1994), 94 Ohio App.3d 470, 640 N.E.2d 1210. Therefore, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's classifications of separate or martial property absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Krisher v. Krisher (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 159, 611 N.E.2d 499. An "abuse of discretion" occurs when a court's actions are unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
Marital property includes property that currently is owned by either or both spouses and that was acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i). Property acquired during marriage is presumed to be marital in nature unless it can be shown to be separate. Id. The party seeking to have certain property declared separate assumes the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that such property meets the statutory definition of "separate." Kerchenfaut v. Kerchenfaut (Sept. 5, 2001), Allen App. No. 1-01-14, 2001-Ohio-2259; Okos v. Okos (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 563; Peck v. Peck (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734, 645 N.E.2d 1300.
In his first assignment of error, Appellant disputes the magistrate's classification of two tracts of real estate, identified as the 41.1 acre tract and the 39.5 acre tract, as marital property. The record reflects that the parcels of land in question were transferred by quitclaim deed to the Appellant by the Appellee on February 2, 1993. Appellant asserts that this transaction makes the real estate his separate property.
The holding of title to property by one spouse individually or by both spouses in a form of co-ownership does not determine whether the property is marital property or separate property. R.C. 3105.171(H). Appellant, nevertheless, argues that the mere existence of the properly executed quitclaim deeds establishes that the real estate is his separate property. Appellant supports his position with a case decided by the Tenth District Court of Appeals, Pettry v. Pettry (1991), 81Ohio App.3d 30, 610 N.E.2d 443. In Pettry, the court held that a quitclaim deed executed between spouses raised the presumption that the transfer was a gift, thereby rendering the property the transferee's separate property and shifting the burden to the transferor to show otherwise. Id at 34.
Appellant's reliance on Pettry is misguided for two reasons. First of all, the appellant in Pettry argued that a properly executed quitclaim deed established the donative intent of the transferor spouse. The donative intent was significant because of the presumption that property is separate if it was specifically given to one spouse. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii). However, in the case sub judice, Appellant does not argue donative intent, and furthermore explicitly states that Appellee did not execute the quitclaim deed as a gift. Instead, he argues that the Appellee properly transferred the property to him, therefore, it his her burden to show that the transfer was improper. Appellant's argument is in direct conflict with R.C. 3105.171(H) which clearly states that names on deeds do not determine the marital or separate nature of property. The second reason Appellant's reliance on Pettry is misguided is that the Tenth District overturned the Pettry decision in Barkley v. Barkley (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 155; 694 N.E.2d 989 and in doing so recognized that R.C. 3105.171(H), as stated above, negates any presumption of a gift when one spouse deeds property to another spouse during the course of their marriage. Id at 161. The Barkley court further stated:
Appellant fails to present evidence that the two parcels of real property fell within one of the definitions of separate property as set forth in R.C. 3105.171(A)(6) and therefore fails to meet his burden of proof. The magistrate's conclusion, identifying the two parcels as marital property, is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the magistrate's conclusions. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that the magistrate failed to award him his separate property interest in the medical malpractice settlement awarded to the Appellee. Compensation given to a spouse for the spouse's personal injury, except for loss of marital earnings and compensation for expenses paid from marital assets, is presumed to be separate. R.C.3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vi). Appellant argues that the magistrate failed to consider the portion of the settlement intended to compensate him for his loss of consortium claim.
However, the record does not include evidence indicating which portion of the medical malpractice settlement was intended to cover Appellant's loss of consortium. Appellant admits that the settlement agreement does not specifically dedicate funds for his personal injury but points out that the settlement was meant to cure all claims, which by reference includes his loss of consortium. The magistrate expressed doubt that the settlement was intended for his personal injury, but giving him the benefit of that doubt, determined that, "The amount the Defendant has enjoyed to date far exceeds the value of his loss of consortium." The...
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