Willson v. City of Des Moines

• Decision Date: 16 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-1531,84-1531
• Citation: 386 N.W.2d 76
• Parties: Robert L. WILLSON, Appellee, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa; Nick Brown; and Larry Bedford, Appellants.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 76

386 N.W.2d 76

Robert L. WILLSON, Appellee, v. CITY OF DES MOINES, Iowa; Nick Brown; and Larry Bedford, Appellants.

No. 84-1531.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 16, 1986.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 1986.

Loren J. Braud and J.M. Sullivan, Asst. City Attys., Des Moines, for appellants.

William J. Conroy, Jr., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and McGIVERIN, SCHULTZ, WOLLE and LAVORATO, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Justice.

Defendants City of Des Moines, Nick Brown and Larry Bedford challenge a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff Robert L. Willson on Willson's claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1981). Plaintiff asserts that the defendant Des Moines police officers, Brown and Bedford, deprived him of his constitutional rights when making application for and in the execution of, a search warrant for his property. Plaintiff Willson on cross-appeal contends that the district court erred in directing a verdict on his invasion of privacy claim and on the issue of punitive damages. We now affirm the district court as to defendants' appeal and affirm in part and reverse in part as to plaintiff's cross-appeal. We remand with directions for entry of appropriate judgment.

The events giving rise to this appeal arose in connection with the application for and execution of a search warrant for plaintiff's home and place of business. Des Moines police officers Nick Brown and Larry Bedford were a part of a police tactical unit which had been attempting a sting operation in an effort to curb the sale of stolen property.

On January 11, 1981, defendant Brown and Richard Schaffer, another member of the tactical unit, provided information, and Schaffer made application to the district court for a search warrant to be executed at plaintiff's home and place of business. The search warrant which was issued by the court allowed peace officers to search for specified shotguns, a handgun and a television set.

On January 13, the warrant for plaintiff's home and place of business was executed by Des Moines police officers. The items authorized to be seized in the search warrant were not found, but a large quantity of other items, such as tools, were seized by the officers during the execution of the warrant. Plaintiff was arrested at that time on a theft charge which was later dismissed. Defendant Bedford was the officer supervising the search at Willson's Auto Body Shop, plaintiff's place of business. There was another search warrant executed that same day at a Des Moines residence as a part of the sting operation. That search was not connected with Willson.

Later that day, the news media apparently was informed by defendant Brown at the Des Moines police station of the execution of the warrants. Plaintiff alleges that in these conversations Brown made untrue statements.

Most of the property seized at Willson's home and business later was determined not to be stolen and was returned to him with the exception of a few items.

Plaintiff's original petition filed on June 11, 1981, was based on a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 count alleging defendants violated plaintiff's fourth and fourteenth amendment rights under the United States Constitution in unlawfully obtaining and executing the search warrant. In addition, there were five common law tort claims including false imprisonment and false arrest, malicious prosecution, trespass, conversion and interference with prospective business advantage.

On March 13, 1984, plaintiff moved to amend his petition, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 88, to state an additional claim for invasion of privacy by defendants, alleging that their statements put him in a false light. This was resisted by defendants, but the amendment was allowed by the court.

Defendants filed an answer to plaintiff's amended petition, contending that Iowa Code chapter 613A (1981) provided the exclusive remedy in Iowa for torts of municipalities and their employees.

The case then proceeded to trial. At the close of plaintiff's evidence and of all evidence, defendants moved, in the court-reported record, for dismissal or for a directed verdict on several grounds. Iowa R.Civ.P. 216. The court reserved ruling on the motion.

The case was submitted to the jury, and a verdict was returned against defendant Bedford on plaintiff's section 1983 claim that he exceeded the scope of the search warrant in executing it. Actual damages of $5,150 and punitive damages of $1,000 were awarded to plaintiff on this count. The jury also returned a verdict against defendant Brown on the section 1983 claim that Brown made material misrepresentations to the court in obtaining the search warrant and awarded plaintiff $500 actual damages and $500 in punitive damages. A verdict was returned against defendant Brown on plaintiff's false light invasion of privacy claim, and actual damages of $3,000 and punitive damages of $1,000 were awarded. The jury also returned a verdict against the City of Des Moines on the conversion claim in the amount of $258.50 for property improperly taken under the search warrant and not returned to plaintiff.

Defendants then filed written motions for directed verdict, again asserting that Iowa Code chapter 613A provided the exclusive remedy for plaintiff's claims, and, thus, there was no claim available under section 1983. Defendants also moved for a directed verdict as to punitive damages against all defendants and for dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim.

The court granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the invasion of privacy claim against defendant Brown on the ground that the evidence failed to show Brown had knowledge or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized statements. This ruling was in substance a grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Iowa R.Civ.P. 243. The court also granted defendants' motion for directed verdict as to the punitive damage portion of the section 1983 claims, finding the evidence insufficient to support the awards because there was no evidence of any malice or reckless disregard for plaintiff's constitutional rights on the part of any defendant. Defendants' other motions were overruled. In its ruling, the district court also held plaintiff entitled to attorney fees because of the jury's damage awards under section 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Judgment was entered against defendant Bedford for the sum of $5,150 compensatory damages under the section 1983 claim and for the same amount against defendant City of Des Moines for vicarious liability for its employee under Iowa Code sections 613A.2 and 613A.8. Defendant City of Des Moines was held liable for the amount of $258.50 on the conversion claim. Judgment was entered against defendant Brown in the amount of $500 compensatory damages under section 1983 and for the same amount against the City of Des Moines pursuant to Iowa Code section 613A.2. The court also awarded plaintiff Willson attorney fees of $21,058.42 under 42 U.S.C. section 1988 and interest thereon from the date of the favorable verdict.

Defendants appealed to us. Plaintiff timely filed notice of cross-appeal. Iowa R.App.P. 5(a).

The determinative issues we must consider are: 1) whether plaintiff was entitled to relief under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in light of the state remedy provided in Iowa Code chapter 613A; 2) whether plaintiff was properly awarded attorney fees for this action; 3) whether the district court erred in directing a verdict on plaintiff's false light invasion of privacy claim; and 4) whether the district court erred in directing a verdict on plaintiff's claims against defendants Brown and Bedford for punitive damages. The first two issues are raised on defendants' appeal and the last two on plaintiff's cross-appeal.

I. Availability of 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 42 U.S.C. section 1983 gives individuals a cause of action for damages and injunctive relief for deprivations of federally protected rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047, 55 L.Ed.2d 252, 258 (1978). Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

A. Categories of constitutional rights deprivation cases. We must determine the type of constitutional deprivation plaintiff allegedly has suffered. In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 662, 677, 88 L.Ed.2d 662, 672 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), it was stated:

It is not enough to note that they [petitioners] rely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for that Clause is the source of three different kinds of constitutional protection. First, it incorporates specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights. Thus, the State, as well as the Federal Government, must comply with the commands in the First and Eighth Amendments; so too, the State must respect the guarantees in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Second it contains a substantive component, sometimes referred to as "substantive due process," which bars certain arbitrary government actions "regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Ante, at ---- , 88 L.Ed.2d [at] 668. Third, it is a guarantee of fair procedure, sometimes referred to as "procedural due process": the State may not execute, imprison, or fine a defendant without giving him a fair trial, nor may...