Wilman v. Mizer

Decision Date23 February 1895
Citation30 S.W. 31,60 Ark. 281
PartiesWILMAN v. MIZER
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Benton Circuit Court, EDWARD S. MCDANIEL, Judge.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

This is a suit by appellee to recover of appellant the sum of five hundred and sixty-eight dollars, on a certain written contract of sale, whereby appellant agreed to purchase of appellee "the apples in his orchard, consisting of about twelve hundred trees, for the sum of eleven hundred dollars." The contract provided for barreling by the appellant, and gathering and hauling by appellee, under the directions of appellant. The complaint sets up the contract alleges compliance on part of appellee and a failure upon the part of appellant to pay the balance of $ 568, for which judgment is asked.

The appellant filed what he denominated his "answer and counter-claim" as follows: "He admits that he entered into the written contract with plaintiff set forth in the complaint, and that he has paid to the plaintiff, for apples delivered under said contract, $ 531.40, and refused to pay more. At the time said contract was made the defendant, who resides at St. Joseph, in the State of Missouri, was engaged in buying apples in Benton County Arkansas, for shipping purposes. He was unacquainted with the bearing capacity of plaintiff's orchard, or other orchards, had no experience in estimating the number of bushels of apples in an orchard or on an apple tree before the same were gathered, and did not purchase the apples in plaintiff's orchard upon his (defendant's) knowledge or opinion as to the number of bushels therein. The price which defendant agreed to pay for said apples was 50 cents per bushel, and the consideration of $ 1,100 named in said contract was arrived at on a basis of 2,200 bushels of apples, supposed by defendant to be in said orchard on the trees ungathered at the time. The premises on which said orchard was situated had been owned and occupied by plaintiff for a great many years. He had raised, gathered and sold many crops of apples from said orchard; professed to know, and did know, the number of trees therein of different varieties; was familiar with the bearing capacity of the orchard; and was able, by an inspection and examination of the orchard and a comparison with previous years, to closely approximate the number of bushels of apples in the orchard. The defendant, on the other hand, being unable, by reason of his lack of experience and unfamiliarity with said orchard, to make an estimate approaching accuracy as to the number of bushels of apples therein, so informed the plaintiff before said contract was made, and further informed the plaintiff that he should rely upon the plaintiff's knowledge, judgment and honor as to the number of bushels in the orchard. Thereupon the plaintiff, knowing that defendant was relying upon his (plaintiff's) judgment and honor, and professing to be able to estimate approximately the number of bushels of apples in said orchard, falsely and recklessly, and with the intent to use the confidence thus reposed in him to his own advantage and to cheat and defraud the defendant, represented and stated to the defendant, to induce him to purchase said apples, and agree to pay therefor said sum of $ 1,100, that he (plaintiff) believed there were three thousand bushels of shipping apples in said orchard, and that he knew and could safely say, there were as many as 2,200 bushels therein, and that there were 500 bearing Ben Davis apple trees in said orchard, 375 Winesap, and 350 other varieties, or a total of about 1,200; the plaintiff at the time knowing that such representations were false, or at least not knowing or believing them to be true. The defendant believed and relied upon these statements of the plaintiff, and was thereby induced to purchase said apples in said orchard, and agree to pay therefor said sum of $ 1,100. In truth and in fact there were only 325 Ben Davis bearing apple trees in said orchard 255 Winesap and 225 other varieties, or a total of about 800 trees, and only 880 3/4 bushels of apples in said orchard 770 1/4 of which were shipping apples and 110 1/2 culls, worth at the price agreed upon, $ 440,37 1/2. The defendant was damaged by the fraud aforesaid of the plaintiff the difference between the contract price $ 1,100, and the sum of said apples were actually worth, that is $ 440.37 1/2, which would be $ 659.62 1/2. The defendant paid the plaintiff said sum of $ 531.40 before defendant had discovered the extent of the deficiency in said crop of apples, and has thus paid him $ 81.02 1/2 more than plaintiff was justly entitled to. Wherefore the defendant prays that plaintiff take nothing by his suit, and that the allegations of defendant's answer be taken and considered as a counter-claim against the plaintiff for said sum of $ 81.02 1/2 on his counter-claim, and [for] judgment for his costs in this suit, and for all other proper relief."

The cause was heard upon a demurrer which was as follows: (1) That the answer admitted the execution of the written contract, and attempted to evade it by setting up an entirely different parol contract entered into prior to the written contract, and sought to prove by parol conditions and stipulations not set forth in the written contract, and which were contrary to its terms. (2) The facts set forth in the complaint are not sufficient in law to constitute a cause of damage. The court sustained the demurrer, and the defendant below refused to amend or plead further, but saved his exceptions, and appealed.

Demurrer overruled.

J. A. Rice and L. H. McGill for appellant.

1. The court erred in sustaining the demurrer. There is nothing in the first ground of demurrer. No attempt was made to contradict or vary the written contract; the allegations were simply explanatory. The counter-claim was based on false representations inducing the contract, and this was a test outside of the contract and provable by parol. 38 Ark. 334. The false representations were material--they were made knowingly, and with intent to defraud, and appellant relied on them. Bigelow on Fraud, 522, has been disapproved by later and better authorities, and it is now generally held that a man may rely upon a positive representation of fact, and need not make any further inquiry, although the means of knowledge are open to him. Bigelow, Fraud, 523-528; Kerr on Fraud 80-81; 100 Mo. 397; S. C. 18 Am. St. Rep. 549 and notes; 38 Ark. 334; 8 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 811. These representations were not merely...

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