Wilmarth v. Reagan

• Decision Date: 24 June 1922
• Docket Number: (No. 335-3700.)
• Citation: 242 S.W. 726
• Parties: WILMARTH et al. v. REAGAN et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 726

242 S.W. 726

WILMARTH et al. v. REAGAN et al.

(No. 335-3700.)

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

June 24, 1922.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Sixth Supreme Judicial District.

Suit by I. L. Wilmarth and others against J. C. Reagan and others. From a judgment for the defendants, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment (231 S. W. 445), and plaintiffs bring error. Reversed and remanded for trial on the merits.

Jno. H. Sharp, of Ennis, Earl E. Hurt, of Dallas, and Adair Dyer, of Ennis, for plaintiffs in error.

J. A. Cooley, of Kaufman, and W. P. Dumas, of Dallas, for defendants in error.

POWELL, J.

For a partial statement of the nature and result of this cause, we quote as follows from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals:

"This was a suit by appellants, I. L. Wilmarth, Frank R. Lewis, W. A. Tucker, A. L. Trail, and T. J. Gilkey, against the Kaufman County Levee Improvement District No. 9 and against J. C. Reagan, J. J. Roddy, and John Garner, as the supervisors, and J. J. Davis, C. C. Ritter, and B. B. Hatley, as the commissioners of appraisement, of said district. Exceptions having been sustained to the plaintiffs' second amended petition, they asked and obtained leave to file a third amended petition. On motion of appellees, the latter petition, when filed, was stricken out, and judgment was rendered that appellants take nothing by their suit. The second amended petition is too long to set out here. It appeared from the allegations therein that the purposes of the suit were as follows:

"I. To annul the order of the commissioners' court of Kaufman county purporting to have been made in conformity to authority conferred by Act April 2, 1918 (General Laws Fourth Called Session, pp. 97 to 117), creating said Kaufman County Levee Improvement District No. 9; or, in the alternative, to rearrange the boundaries thereof so as to exclude therefrom lands belonging to appellants which, they alleged, had been wrongfully included therein. The grounds relied on for this relief were alleged to be: (1) That `sufficient notice' of the hearing resulting in the passing of said order was not given property owners interested. (2) That the boundaries of the district were not sufficiently described and fixed, in that the field notes thereof were incorrect. (3) That lands belonging to plaintiffs which should not have been were included in the district.

"II. To annul the report made by the commissioners of appraisement of the district assessing damages and benefits to lands therein, and to annul an order alleged to have been made by the supervisors of said district approving said report; or, on the alternative, to compel said commissioners of appraisement to reassess said damages and benefits. The ground relied on for this relief was alleged to be that the assessments were discriminatory against appellants in favor of J. C. Reagan, one of the supervisors, and others.

"III. To `prohibit' the sale of bonds voted to pay for the proposed improvements in said district, and to `prohibit' the levy of a tax on property in said district to pay such bonds. The ground relied on for this relief was alleged to be that, whereas a manager and two clerks were appointed to hold the bond election, it was held by the manager alone."

The Court of Civil Appeals at Texarkana, in an opinion by Chief Justice Willson, affirmed the judgment of the district court. See 231 S. W. 445. The cause then reached the Supreme Court upon application of plaintiffs below for a writ of error, which was granted.

As already stated, the commissioners' court of Kaufman county, Tex., in compliance with the act of April 2, 1918, known as the Laney Act (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1922, arts. 5584½-5584½tt), created Kaufman County Levee Improvement District No. 9. The Laney Act itself was passed for the purpose of putting into practical effect the so-called Conservation Amendment to our state Constitution, which the people ratified in 1917, and which then became section 59 of article 16 of that instrument. This Laney Act, in great detail, provides for the creation of these districts and their management thereafter. Their creation is confided to the commissioners' court of the county, subject to a certain kind of approval of the state reclamation engineer. Once created, that court appoints three supervisors of the district, who are given, as the name implies, general supervision of the affairs of the district. The supervisors, in turn, are empowered to appoint three commissioners of appraisement, who are under the duty of inspecting all lands in the district and assessing benefits against that which will be benefited and damages against that which will be damaged by the plans of reclamation. These assessments of benefits and damages are of vast importance, because the expense of the reclamation is borne by taxation, based upon a system of assessed benefits, rather than the customary method of ad valorem.

In the case at bar, the supervisors and appraisers were duly appointed and went about their work in due course. Upon its completion, the latter made up a report, showing their assessments of benefits and damages. As provided by law, a day was set by them to hear protests from the property owners. Upon this hearing, plaintiffs in error presented various objections to the report of these appraisers. They were overruled, and the report made final in so far as they could bring about this result.

Being unable to obtain any relief from these appraisers, plaintiffs in error filed this suit in the district court of Kaufman county. The analysis of the petition in the court below by the Court of Civil Appeals is fairly accurate, except that the allegations of said petition attacking the work of these appraisers, as well as the supervisors, were much more comprehensive than the Court of Civil Appeals indicates. That court says the objection was that the assessments were discriminatory against plaintiffs in error in favor of Supervisor Reagan and others. This allegation was made, as stated by the Court of Civil Appeals, but the second and third amended petitions contained allegation after allegation, charging these appraisers with all kinds of fraud and official misconduct and in effect alleging that everything they did was actuated by motives of fraud. It will serve no useful purpose to set these allegations out in this opinion. To do so would make the opinion entirely too cumbersome. Suffice it to say that practically every allegation charged conduct on the part of the appraisers which involved fraud. Specific acts were detailed. If the allegations are true, then these supervisors and appraisers conspired together for the purpose of mutual private gain without any regard whatever for the public good, whose servants they were supposed to be. Briefly speaking, if these allegations be sustained, both boards were honeycombed with graft and even bribery, all in fraud of the rights of these plaintiffs in error, who were vitally interested, not only in the taxing of their own property in order to raise the funds of the district, but in the expenditure of such funds for lawful purposes.

We do not, of course, in any wise pass upon the truthfulness of these allegations. The trial court sustained demurrers to all of them and refused to hear evidence. As practically all the pleadings involve fraud and misconduct as aforesaid, we shall now consider whether or not the trial court should have entertained jurisdiction of this case and heard evidence in support of such allegations. Did that court err in deciding the case on demurrers? It is quite evident that the trial court based its decision upon the theory that the district court had no jurisdiction of a case of this kind, and that the action of the appraisers under the Laney Act was "final and conclusive." We think the district court had jurisdiction of this case.

From the very beginning of its existence, our Supreme Court has found a way, under the Constitution and statutes then in force, to open the doors of our district courts as a refuge for those seeking, in various ways, to avoid the injurious effects of fraud attempted to be perpetrated upon them. We shall refer to a few of these authorities, showing the extent of the jurisdiction of the district court under its equity powers.

In the case of Bourgeois v. Mills, 60 Tex. 76, the Supreme Court says:

"The act to regulate the laying out, opening, and classifying and working public roads, etc., approved July 29, 1876, confers upon the commissioners' court full power and jurisdiction over the subject of public roads. This is a special power or jurisdiction confided to that court to be exercised according to its discretion. No provision is made in the act for reviewing its action with respect to that matter. No doubt, however, is entertained as to the power of the district court, through its equitable jurisdiction, to revise the exercise of that discretion where it is clearly shown that it has been grossly abused; or to interfere and prevent an injury where it appears that the commissioners' court had transcended its authority, or was proceeding without authority of law."

The case of Railway Co. v. Dowe, 70 Tex. 1, 6 S. W. 790, was one where the district court, under the Constitution then in force, had no general superintendency or control over justices' courts. Even under those circumstances the Supreme Court announced the law as follows:

"The justice's court has a special and exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution, independent of all other courts, and no other court can interfere with its proceedings, to grant new trials, or to prevent the enforcement of its judgments, or to review its trials, except as provided by law on appeal; and, where no appeal is allowed, its judgments are final and conclusive, save where it is made to appear that by accident, fraud, mistake, or ignorance such a wrong has been done as...