Wilmot Union High School Dist. v. Rothwell
| Citation | 133 N.W.2d 782,27 Wis.2d 228 |
| Parties | WILMOT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant, v. Angus B. ROTHWELL, State Supt. of Public Instruction, Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 30 March 1965 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Heide, Sheldon, Hartley & Thom, Kenosha, for appellant.
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., Harold H. Persons, Asst. Atty. Gen., Madison, for respondent.
The appeal to defendant State Superintendent by the 22 aggrieved electors of the area sought to be attached was taken 57 days after the denial of the petition by the municipal boards and 76 days after the filing of such petition. The issue before us is whether the appeal to defendant was taken within the time prescribed by statute for taking such an appeal. If the appeal to defendant was not timely taken, defendant had no jurisdiction and the order he entered is void.
Sub. (3)(a) of sec. 40.06, Stats., is the controlling statute which prescribes the time within which appeals are to be taken by aggrieved persons where there has been either action or nonaction by municipal boards with respect to a petition filed seeking a detachment of territory from one district and attachment of it to another district. This statute provides as follows:
From the legislative history we conclude that the legislature intended a direct correlation between the above quoted statutory provision, which fixes the time limits for appeal, and the provisions of sec. 40.025(1)(d), Stats., which prescribes the duration which the boards, as a reorganization authority, retain jurisdiction, and of the period of preemption which precludes the initiation of any other reorganization proceeding. It seems obvious that the legislature intended this preemption to continue until the time for appeal, as prescribed in sec. 40.06(3), has expired.
The material legislative history of these statutes is this: Prior to 1957, the provision limiting time for appeal to the State Superintendent, when reorganization was sought by petition to municipal boards, was to be found in sub. (5)(a), SEC. 40.06, STATS. CH. 5361, Laws of 1957, enacted sec. 40.025 as an entirely new section and at the same time renumbered sub. (5) of sec. 40.06 as sub. (3) and amended it to read as it now does.
The provisions of sec. 40.025(1)(d), Stats., pertinent to this appeal are:
'Jurisdiction acquired pursuant to par. (a) is lost:
'* * *
'2. Upon the making of an order denying the reorganization proposed by a petition or a resolution, provided that until the expiration of 30 days after the mailing, as provided in sub. (5), of such an order made by town or village boards or city councils, acting alone or jointly, which denies a reorganization proposed by a petition, no other reorganization order shall be made and no other reorganization proceedings commenced, pertaining to all or any part of the territory included in said proposed reorganization, and any such other order made or other proceeding commenced is void;
'3. Upon taking of formal action denying the reorganization proposed by a petition or a resolution and the failure to make and file, as required by sub. (5), 2 an order to such effect within 10 days after such action, provided that until the expiration of 30 days following the date of such action by town or village boards or city councils, acting alone or jointly, which denies a reorganization proposed by a petition, no other reorganization order shall be made and no other reorganization proceedings commenced, pertaining to all or any part of the territory included in said proposed reorganization, and any such other order made or other reorganization proceeding commenced, is void; * * *
Under the statutory construction which we adopt, par. 2 of sec. 40.025(1)(d), Stats., dovetails with the first sentence of sec. 40.06(3), viz., '(a) Any person aggrieved by an order made under this section may appeal to the state superintendent within 30 days following the date of mailing of such order as provided in s. 40.025(5).' Likewise par. 3 of sec. 40.025(1)(d) is keyed to the second sentence of sec. 40.06 (3), viz., 'If action adverse to the making of an order of reorganization is taken by town or village boards or city councils, whether acting alone or jointly, at or following a hearing upon a petition for such reorganization, any person aggrieved by such adverse action may appeal to the state superintendent within 30 days following...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Noll
...that a statute must be construed if possible so that every portion of it is given effect. Wilmot Union High School Dist. v. Rothwell (1965), 27 Wis.2d 228, 235, 133 N.W.2d 782. A statute should be so construed that no part of it is rendered superfluous by the construction In view of the pre......
-
Garfield v. United States
...be rendered surplusage." Cook v. Industrial Commission, 31 Wis.2d 232, 240, 142 N.W.2d 827 (1966); Wilmot Union High School District v. Rothwell, 27 Wis.2d 228, 235, 133 N.W.2d 782 (1965). On its face, the use of the word "directly" appears to limit the meaning of the final sentence of subs......
-
Cook v. Industrial Commission
...335, 338, 134 N.W.2d 458; Carr v. Industrial Comm. (1964), 25 Wis.2d 536, 538, 131 N.W.2d 328.2 Wilmot Union High School Dist. v. Rothwell (1965), 27 Wis.2d 228, 235, 133 N.W.2d 782; Greenebaum v. Department of Taxation (1957), 1 Wis.2d 234, 238, 83 N.W.2d 682; Worachek v. Stephenson Town S......
-
Hahner v. Board of Ed.
...Wis. Environmental Decade v. Pub. Service Comm., 79 Wis.2d 409, 442 n.25, 256 N.W.2d 149 (1977).10 Wilmot Union High School Dist. v. Rothwell, 27 Wis.2d 228, 235, 133 N.W.2d 782 (1965).11 This section provides:"Transportation of School Children. Nothing in this Constitution shall prohibit t......