Wilmoth v. Wilcox
| Decision Date | 01 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. C-6141,C-6141 |
| Citation | 734 S.W.2d 656 |
| Parties | Stephen R. WILMOTH, et al., Petitioners, v. Rhonda Robertson WILCOX, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Donald A. Ray, Ray & Terrell, Gun Barrel City, for petitioners.
Melvin G. Bateman, Bateman & George, Athens, for respondents.
The issue presented is whether a double-wide mobile home with an attached porch violates a deed restriction prohibiting "house trailers." The trial court held that the structure was a house trailer and ordered its removal. The court of appeals reversed. 721 S.W.2d 587. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The restrictive covenants of Caney Creek Addition, a subdivision on Cedar Creek Lake, Henderson County, Texas, stated in pertinent part:
5. No building, house or cabin shall be moved onto any lot in this addition from other locations, unless they are new construction.
* * *
7. No tents, house trailers or temporary structures shall be permitted to remain on any lot for more than 30 days.
The Wilcoxes purchased a new double-wide manufactured home and had it transported to a lot in the Caney Creek Addition. The two 12 feet by 48 feet units were placed on concrete beams and joined together to make one structure. The wheels and axles were removed and a skirt was placed around the perimeter. A covered porch was then attached to one side of the home. Steven R. Wilmoth and other homeowners brought suit seeking a mandatory injunction, ordering the manufactured home removed because it violated the deed restrictions of the subdivision.
In addressing the issue presented we note that covenants restricting the free use of land are not favored by the courts, but when they are confined to a lawful purpose and are clearly worded, they will be enforced. Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d 561 (Tex.1981). All doubts must be resolved in favor of the free and unrestricted use of the premises, and the restrictive clause must be construed strictly against the party seeking to enforce it. Brown v. Wehner, 610 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The words used in the restriction, and the restriction as a whole, may not be enlarged, extended, stretched or changed by construction. Gilbert v. Shenandoah Valley Improvement Association, 592 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Rather, the words and phrases used in the covenant will be given their commonly accepted meaning. Curb v. Benson, 564 S.W.2d 432, 433 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The words used in the restrictive covenant must be given the meaning which they commonly held as of the date the covenant was written, and not as of some subsequent date. Davis v. Huey, 620 S.W.2d at 627.
Our task is to determine the intent of the framers of the restrictive covenants. Did they intend that the term "house trailer" should be limited to the type of house trailer which was built at that time, as is contended by Wilcox; or did they intend the term to include the generic successors, i.e., "manufactured homes?" The record shows that the term "house trailer" acquired an undesirable connotation resulting in a concerted effort by the industry to change its image. In the late 1960's the term "mobile home" began to replace the term "house trailer." In the late 1970's the industry applied the term "manufactured homes" to the products, replacing the name "mobile home." The Texas Manufactured Housing Standards Act, TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5221f (Vernon 1987), section 3(a) defines the term "mobile home" and section 3(u) defines the term "HUD-Code manufactured home." The definitions are identical except that a mobile home was constructed prior to June 15, 1976, and a manufactured home is one constructed subsequent to June 15, 1976, according to the Rules of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. This is essentially a distinction without a difference.
The only direct evidence of the framers' intent is from the testimony of J.B....
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