Wilson ex rel. State v. City of Columbia
| Decision Date | 02 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 28056,Appellate Case No. 2021-000889 |
| Citation | 434 S.C. 206,863 S.E.2d 456 |
| Parties | Alan WILSON, Attorney General, EX REL. STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner, v. CITY OF COLUMBIA, Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Solicitor General Robert D. Cook, and Deputy Solicitor General J. Emory Smith Jr., all of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Teresa A. Knox and Patrick L. Wright, Richard A. Harpootlian, Christopher Phillip Kenney all of Columbia, for Respondent.
W. Allen Nickles III, of Nickles Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina Education Association.
B. Eric Shytle, of the Municipal Association of South Carolina, and James H. Goldin, of Jamey Goldin, Esq., both of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae Municipal Association of South Carolina.
Wilbur E. Johnson and Julia P. Copeland, of Charleston, and Kathleen F. Monoc, of Monoc Law, LLC, of Charleston, all for Amicus Curiae City of Charleston.
Elizabeth A. McLean, of Columbia, and Danny C. Crowe, of Crowe LaFave, LLC, of Columbia, both for Amicus Curiae Richland County.
South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson brings this declaratory judgment action in our original jurisdiction. This is the second case involving legislation passed by our General Assembly concerning the use of facemasks in the public schools of South Carolina during the coronavirus pandemic. Recently, we construed Proviso 117.190 of the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act,1 which related to public institutions of higher learning, and determined from the language in that proviso that the University of South Carolina was not precluded from issuing a universal mask mandate that applied equally to vaccinated and unvaccinated students and faculty alike. Creswick v. Univ. of S.C. , 434 S.C. 77, 862 S.E.2d 706 (2021) (per curiam).
Just as Creswick was easily resolved purely as a function of statutory interpretation, so too is this case. This case involves a different proviso from the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act, Proviso 1.108, relating to public schools serving students grades kindergarten through 12 (K-12). Unlike the proviso in Creswick , Proviso 1.108 manifestly sets forth the intent of the legislature to prohibit mask mandates funded by the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act in K-12 public schools. The Attorney General contends the City of Columbia passed ordinances—in direct opposition to Proviso 1.108—mandating masks in all K-12 public schools in the City of Columbia. We appreciate that the South Carolina legislature and the City of Columbia have differing views on whether parents of school children should decide whether their children must wear masks at school or whether the government should mandate that decision. Each legislative body has clearly expressed its respective position through legislative enactments, and both legislative bodies have acted in good faith. While allowing school districts flexibility to encourage one policy or the other, the state legislature has elected to leave the ultimate decision to parents. Conversely, the City of Columbia has attempted to mandate masks for all school children by following guidance from the Centers for Disease Control, which has the effect of disallowing parents a say in the matter.2 For the reasons set forth below, we uphold Proviso 1.108 and declare void the challenged ordinances of the City of Columbia insofar as they purport to impose a mask mandate in K-12 public schools.3
By prior order of this Court, we accepted this case in our original jurisdiction, for it involves a justiciable matter of significant public interest. Rule 245(a), SCACR.
Proviso 1.108—enacted into law on June 22, 2021, and directed to the South Carolina Department of Education for South Carolina's K-12 public schools—provides with unmistakable clarity:
(SDE: Mask Mandate Prohibition) No school district, or any of its schools, may use any funds appropriated or authorized pursuant to this act to require that its students and/or employees wear a facemask at any of its education facilities. This prohibition extends to the announcement or enforcement of any such policy.
The City of Columbia (the City) later enacted ordinances mandating masks in all K-12 public schools within the City, specifically Ordinances 2021-0684 and 2021-069.5 One ordinance is an "Emergency Order by the Mayor Declaring a State of Emergency," and the second ordinance ratifies and mirrors the Mayor's declaration of an emergency. Based on the City's policy judgment on how best to deal with the coronavirus, the ordinances mandate facemasks for "all faculty, staff, children over the age of two (2), and visitors, in all buildings at public and private schools or daycares."
By letter dated August 11, 2021, Attorney General Wilson notified the City of the conflict between Proviso 1.108 and the City's ordinances:
On the same day, the City responded to the Attorney General:
In the matter at hand, the issue is whether a Proviso that acts as a "Mask Mandate Prohibition" for schools and school districts[ ] is germane to fiscal issues, raising and spending taxes, which is the sole purpose of the appropriations act[.] The clear answer, using the sound logic of our Supreme Court[,] is that it is not. A mask mandate prohibition is clearly not a matter that is germane to fiscal issues[,] which is the only issue allowed to be taken up in the general appropriations act[,] and therefore it is unconstitutional and unenforceable.
As we will explain, the City's legal opinion is incorrect. Moreover, the City claims that it has the legal authority to impose and enforce the mask mandate ordinances, for there is allegedly no conflict with state law.
We first address what is perhaps the most important underlying issue in the case: the Court's authority to decide the better policy decision between competing determinations made by the South Carolina General Assembly and a local government. We, of course, have no such authority to countermand a constitutional policy judgment of our state legislature, just as we have no power to impose our own policy judgment on the state legislature or local legislative bodies.
In Creswick , we noted that we were "simply construing [Proviso 117.190] as it [was] written," and that our holding was "not an approval or disapproval of a [mask] mandate, nor [was] it an approval or disapproval of an attempt by the General Assembly to prohibit a [mask] mandate." The same holds true today, as we emphatically remind the parties and the public that the wisdom or efficacy of mandating school children to wear facemasks to combat the coronavirus is not before us. As noted above, the South Carolina General Assembly and the City have expressed their respective positions through legislative enactments. The state legislature has elected to leave the decision to parents; the City believes it should make the decision without parental involvement.
We fully recognize that strong and passionate opinions exist on both sides of this debate. Yet, we must remind ourselves, the parties, and the public that, as part of the judicial branch of government, we are not permitted to weigh in on the merits of the facemask debate. Rather, we are a court that is constitutionally bound by the rule of law—specifically, separation of powers—to interpret and apply existing laws; we do not, and cannot, set public policy ourselves. Instead, the people of South Carolina, through their elected state representatives, set the state's policy.
Where, as here, the General Assembly establishes policy via legislation, it is our solemn duty to uphold that law absent a clear constitutional infirmity. More to the point, the policy of the state legislature to leave to parents the masking decision is most assuredly well within the broad parameters of the legislature's constitutional boundaries. See Elliott v. Sligh , 233 S.C. 161, 165, 103 S.E.2d 923, 925 (1958) ( ).6
We next address the City's constitutional challenge to Proviso 1.108, namely, that the proviso violates the one-subject rule. Given the deferential standard of review, we respectfully disagree. See, e.g. , Doe v. State , 421 S.C. 490, 501, 808 S.E.2d 807, 813 (2017) ().
"All statutes are presumed constitutional and will, if possible, be construed so as to render them valid." Joytime Distribs. & Amusement Co. v. State , 338 S.C. 634, 640, 528 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1999) ; see also Sojourner v. Town of St. George , 383 S.C. 171, 175, 679 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2009) (). "A legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt." Joytime Distribs. , 338 S.C. at 640, 528 S.E.2d at 650.
The one-subject rule of the South Carolina Constitution provides: "Every Act or resolution having the force of law shall...
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Carolina v. McMaster
...that its ordinances requiring masks to be worn in primary and secondary schools violated the Proviso. See Wilson ex rel. State v. City of Columbia , 434 S.C. 206, 863 S.E.2d 456 (2021). The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that the Proviso was a valid exercise of the South Carolina Gene......