Wilson v. American Gen. Fin. Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10–412.
• Citation: 807 F.Supp.2d 291
• Parties: Darnella R. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE INC., and A. Bruce Casteel, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

807 F.Supp.2d 291

Darnella R. WILSON, Plaintiff,

v.AMERICAN GENERAL FINANCE INC., and A. Bruce Casteel, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10–412.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Aug. 8, 2011.

Shelly J. Todd, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiff.

Richard H. Taylor, Robert J. Hannen, Thorp Reed & Armstrong, LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CONTI, District Judge.

Pending before the court are two motions: 1) defendants' second motion for judgment on the pleadings (the “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings” (ECF No. 40)), filed by American General Financial Services Inc. (“AGF”), and Bruce Casteel (“Casteel” and together with AGF, “defendants”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c); and 2) plaintiff's motion to strike (the “Motion to Strike” (ECF No. 44)), filed by Darnella R. Wilson (“plaintiff” or “Wilson”).

In the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, defendants request the court to dismiss the claims against them set forth in the first amended complaint. (“Amended Complaint” (ECF No. 35).) The Amended Complaint contains two claims: 1) defamation as libel per se ¹—count I; and 2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)—count II. The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law governs plaintiff's claims. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this court has diversity jurisdiction over these state law claims.

In the Motion to Strike, plaintiff moves the court to strike defendants' affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim and conditional privilege as insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), and to strike defendants' remaining affirmative defenses as immaterial to the Amended Complaint.

For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant in part and deny in part defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; and deny plaintiff's Motion to Strike in its entirety.

I. Allegations in the Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that she is the sole proprietor of her current business and facility where she employs an accountant, architect, engineer, and a certified business development consultant. (Am. Compl. ¶ 9 (ECF No. 35).) In February 1999, plaintiff refinanced her home. Her original mortgage provided in relevant part that “a late charge of 5% of the monthly note will accrue if payment is received after the 15th day of each month.” ( Id. ¶ 10.) The payment coupons reflected the total payment to be $397.39, with a “late charge of $19.88 if payment is received after the 15th”. ( Id.; see Ex. 9 (ECF No. 35–1).) No other late fees or service fees were specified in the mortgage, which also provided that any amount paid in excess of the $397.39 would be credited toward paying down the principal balance. (Am. Compl. ¶ 10 (ECF No. 35).)

By letter dated May 26, 1999, AGF informed plaintiff that it purchased her mortgage on or about March 1, 1999, and that there would be no changes in the terms of her original mortgage. ( Id., Ex. 2 (ECF No. 35–1).) In June 2009, plaintiff mailed her monthly payment for that month on or about the 30th of the month—incurring a late fee penalty—and including an additional $130.00 to be credited toward reducing the principal balance. Plaintiff alleges that before she put her payment in the mail she was harassed and berated by an AGF agent. ( Id. ¶ 12.) Before July 15, 2009, plaintiff sent a $500 payment and made all payments timely thereafter. ( Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that AGF willfully and knowingly fabricated an account delinquency and published false and defaming assertions to third parties in a deliberate attempt to defame her. ( Id. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff asserts that she first learned about defendants' publication on or about September 1, 2009, when she downloaded her file from the website of the Better Business Bureau (“BBB”). The BBB file contained the statements:

As of the beginning of June, [2009] Ms. Wilson's account has been delinquent for several month [sic] ...

Ms. Wilson continues to be in default of the repayment terms of her account ... As of the date of this letter [July 29, 2009] her account is past due for April, May, June, and July payments.

( Id., Ex. 3 (ECF No. 35–1).) Plaintiff avers that the statements are false and were made by AGF's employee, Casteel. Plaintiff alleges that on or about November 13, 2099, she learned about defendants' additional false statements published to her attorney, Carol L. Rosen, Esquire, by an AGF employee, Jeffrey L. Ledbetter, which were:

Our transaction records indicate that Ms Wilson's account became four months past due in April 2009.

No payments were made on the account August 2008, January 2009, and March 2009, which caused her account to become progressively more delinquent ...

On June 30, 2009, the AGCDC district manager spoke with Wilson and agreed to a payment arrangement to assist her in repaying the past due balance....

If Ms. Wilson wants AGCDC to consider a loan modification, she can contact the branch, but since Ms. Wilson is represented by counsel, as per policy, the branch would have to receive your written consent....

( Id. ¶ 15; Ex. 4 (ECF No. 35–1).)

Plaintiff avers that two months prior to November 13, 2009 (before the above letter was sent) she presented defendants with cancelled checks proving her payment for all the months in question. ( Id. ¶ 21 (ECF No. 35).) Additionally, plaintiff avers that her bank statements confirm proof of payment to defendant for each and every month since February 1999. Plaintiff avers that she had no conversation with defendant about any form of mortgage modification and consistently refused their repeated efforts to induce her to borrow more money. ( Id. ¶ 26.)

With respect to her IIED claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant intentionally misstated her indebtedness by proceeding with collection activities based upon false delinquencies. ( Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges that AGF harassed her by, among other ways: 1) barraging her with annoying phone calls beginning on June 17, 2009; 2) sending a male agent to her home on June, 27, 2009 who left his calling card in her mailbox—which caused her to fear for the safety of herself and her granddaughter; 3) sending plaintiff two identical inaccurate letters concerning her account; 4) engaging in a concerted effort to cause Wilson severe emotional distress, anxiety, and humiliation based upon a fictitious delinquency, including sending her an apparent notice of foreclosure generated by the consumer reporting agency, Experian Inc.; 5) impliedly throwing egg on her mailbox the morning after plaintiff was informed that the United States Post Office sent a warning to AGF concerning defendant's alleged improper and illegal use of her residential mailbox; and 6) impliedly smashing an egg on her vehicle. ( Id. ¶¶ 27–37.)

Plaintiff argues that a person of ordinary sensibility would suffer extreme emotional distress, anxiety and humiliation if they were subject to defendant's aggression and assault. ( Id. ¶ 39.)

II. Procedural Background

On March 26, 2010, plaintiff filed the original complaint. The court permitted plaintiff leave of court to file an amended complaint, which she filed on January 5, 2011. On January 25, 2011, defendant filed an answer containing fourteen affirmative defenses, including conditional privilege of common interest with respect to the libel per se claim. On May 18, 2011, defendants filed the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 40) and a brief in support. (Defs.' Br. (ECF No. 41).) On June 3, 2011, plaintiff filed a response (Pl.'s Resp. (ECF No. 44)) and a brief in support (Pl.'s Br. (ECF No. 45).) In her response, plaintiff requests the court to deny the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and moves the court to strike defendants' affirmative defenses of failure to state a claim and conditional privilege as insufficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).

On June 15, 2011, the court held a hearing on the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. As set forth more fully on the record, the court held that the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings would be granted in part and denied in part. The court denied the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the claim for libel per se (count I). The court granted the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with prejudice against Casteel and without prejudice against AGF with respect to the claim for IIED (count II). This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the court's rationale for those rulings along with its rationale for denying the Motion to Strike.

III. Standard of ReviewFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)

The court must decide, as a matter of law, whether plaintiff's claims against defendants can be dismissed by a motion for judgment on the pleadings. DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir.2008). The court must accept as true all well-pled allegations of fact in the pleadings and draw every reasonable inference in favor of the party against whom judgment is sought. Id. at 262–63 (3d Cir.2008). When a motion for judgment on the pleadings alleges plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the appropriate standard for deciding such a motion is the same as the standard used to decide a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).² Bangura v. City of Philadelphia, 338 Fed.Appx. 261, 264 (3d Cir.2009); Turbe v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir.1991); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir.1989). As a general rule, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings; as an exception, however, a court may consider documents integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 256 n. 5 (3d Cir.2004).³

“[A] Rule 12(c) motion is designed to provide a means of disposing of cases when the material facts are not in dispute between the parties and a...