Wilson v. Bd. of Educ. of Lee's Summit

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: HOUGH
• Citation: 63 Mo. 137
• Decision Date: 31 October 1876
• Parties: JOS. M. C. WILSON, Respondent, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LEE'S SUMMIT, Appellant.

63 Mo. 137

JOS. M. C. WILSON, Respondent,
v.
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF LEE'S SUMMIT, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1876.

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.

F. M. Black, for Appellant, cited: 42 Mo. 117; 1 Par. on Cont., 475; 24 N. Y. 40; 48 Mo. 201; 28 Mo. 322; 30 Mo. 118.

Karnes & Ess, for Respondent, contended among other points, that while township boards of education could only make

[63 Mo. 138]

contracts in writing for the employment of teachers, boards of education of cities, towns and villages might contract in the same manner as other corporations, and that the action of the sub-committee was authorized by, and binding on the board.

HOUGH, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action against the board of education of the city or town of Lee's Summit, for a breach of contract alleged by the plaintiff to have been made between him and the defendant, for the services of himself and wife as teachers in defendant's schools, for the period of ten months.

The defendant denied that there was any contract between it and the plaintiff for the period of ten months, or for any specified time.

There was testimony on the part of the plaintiff, tending to show that after several interviews between the plaintiff and two members of the board of education, Bayliss and Wilhite, the plaintiff submitted to Wilhite, who was also secretary of the board, a proposal to be laid before it for the employment of himself and wife as teachers, for the period of ten months, at a salary of $100 per month for himself, and $60 per month for his wife.

On the 6th day of July, 1872, Bayliss and Wilhite were appointed a committee with instructions to call upon the plaintiff and his wife and employ them, the one at $100 and the other at $60 per month, if the inquiries to be made by them as to their qualifications should prove satisfactory. In this order of the board, no limit was fixed as to the term of employment. Bayliss and Wilhite executed this order by employing the plaintiff and his wife for the period of ten months, and reported that fact to the board on the 10th of July, when it was entered of record that “they were considered duly employed by entering into a written contract with the board.”

At a meeting of the board on the 16th day of August, 1872, at which the plaintiff was present, the secretary was ordered “to draw articles of agreement with Prof. Wilson and School Board.”

On August 31st, 1872, it was ordered “that a written contract be entered into with the superintendent and teachers for the

[63 Mo. 139]

term of eight months, provided that they give satisfaction to the board in the performance of their duties as teachers, and are willing to take warrants in case there is not sufficient cash in the treasury to pay them.”

The proceedings of this meeting were not communicated to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff rested, and the defendant asked an instruction in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence, which was refused by the court, and the defendant excepted.

The defendant thereupon introduced testimony tending to show that the committee reported to the board the employment of plaintiff and his wife, but not for any fixed time; that a contract in writing for ten months was then presented and was then rejected by the board; that this was the first time the board formally considered the term of employment; that the two members constituting the committee who employed plaintiff were the only members of the board who wanted a ten months school; that no other members knew that plaintiff claimed to have been employed for ten months until after the school was discontinued, and that the length of the term was never settled until August 31st, 1872. A witness for the defendant, who was a member of the board when the negotiations were pending between plaintiff...