Wilson v. City of Minneapolis, 41211
Decision Date | 09 May 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 41211,41211 |
Citation | 168 N.W.2d 19,283 Minn. 348 |
Parties | Eugene W. WILSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, and Superintendent of Police, Calvin F. Hawkinson, Respondents. |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The power and duty of the superintendent of police of the city of Minneapolis to suspend employees for disciplinary purposes is fixed by the charter of that city and the rule of its Civil Service Commission, unaffected by the superintendent's order announcing the procedures to be employed by him in suspension cases.
2. An employee of the city of Minneapolis may be suspended for disciplinary purposes without a formal hearing and such suspension does not offend the due-process-of-law provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions.
3. A suspension is not a removal within the meaning of the Veterans Preference Act and, this being so, a suspension for disciplinary purposes may be ordered even though a hearing of the type described in Minn.St. 197.46 is not accorded.
Helgesen, Peterson, Engberg & Spector, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Keith Stidd, City Atty., Arvid M. Falk, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for respondents.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and OTIS, ROGOSHESKE, SHERAN and PETERSON, JJ.
Appeal from an order of the district court dismissing plaintiff's complaint and dissolving a temporary restraining order.
This action was instituted to restrain Calvin F. Hawkinson, superintendent of police in the city of Minneapolis, from suspending for 14 days Eugene W. Wilson, police department captain, and a person entitled to the benefit of the Veterans Preference Act. The trial court decided that it had no power to enjoin the suspension proceedings and dismissed the complaint. It also dissolved a temporary restraining order issued at the inception of the litigation.
The Home Rule Charter of Minneapolis, c. 19, § 11, provides:
Rule 10.01 of the Minneapolis Civil Service Commission, then in force, provides:
The relevant provisions of the Veterans Preference Act, Minn.St. 197.46, read:
On October 13, 1966, Superintendent Hawkinson issued an order reading in part as follows:
'A disciplinary matter is defined as an action whereby the officer can be discharged, suspended, or an official reprimand put in his personnel folder.
'In order to have an established and orderly procedure in disciplinary matter, the Superintendent of Police has the responsibility of conducting a thorough and complete investigation of the matter of complaint.
statements in on his behalf prior to any formal and final disciplinary hearing. The Superintendent or any Inspector shall have the right to be present when the above statement or statements are taken.
'The Officer shall have the right to be faced by his accuser when possible.
'After the officer interview or prehearing, the formal hearing notice will be served on the officer orally or in writing, and the formal hearing will be held at least twenty-four hours later.'
Upon appeal it is contended that the order of the district court was not justified because:
(1) Superintendent Hawkinson was bound to comply with the self-imposed rule concerning procedure to be followed in disciplinary matters within the department, including the holding of a 'formal hearing' before imposing a disciplinary suspension upon a subordinate.
(2) The formal hearing to which the superintendent of police committed himself by reason of the order of October 13, 1966, necessarily includes (a) notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party of charges against him and afford him opportunity to prepare a defense to such charges; (b) a right of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel; (c) preparation of a written record of the proceedings; and (d) determination of the validity of the charges in an impartial manner. Failure to afford a hearing having these characteristics, plaintiff claims, constituted a denial of due process of law.
(3) The order of suspension constituted a removal from employment without a 'hearing, upon due notice,' and without 'stated charges, in writing' contrary to the requirements of the Veterans Preference Act. § 197.46.
We affirm the determination of the trial court because:
(1) So far as the courts are concerned, the power and duty of the superintendent of police of the city of Minneapolis to suspend employees for disciplinary purposes is fixed by the charter of that city and...
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