Wilson v. City of Selma
| Decision Date | 17 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION 11-0478-CG-M |
| Parties | GEORGE WILSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SELMA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 and a Motion to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees ("IFP Motion"). (Docs. 1, 2). Plaintiff's Motion was referred to the undersigned for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(1), which provides for the automatic referral of non-dispositive pretrial matters to a Magistrate Judge. In considering the IFP Motion, the Magistrate Judge is required to screen Plaintiff's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) ().1 In the process of screeningPlaintiff's action, the Court finds that this action is due to be dismissed without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
A. Background.
Plaintiff invokes the Court's federal question jurisdiction and indicates this action is related to two state circuit court cases, CV 08-196 and CV-09-165.2 (Doc. 1-1, p. 1, Civil ActionCover Sheet). His claims are for the "suppression of evidence [and] denial of due process" in regard to his state court cases, and he seeks to enforce these violations through 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988. (Id. ; Doc. 1, p. 1).
When the present action was filed against Defendant City of Selma, Alabama, Plaintiff also filed Wilson v. Selma Water Works and Sewer Board, CA 11-0479-B-B (S.D. Ala. May 8, 2012), which was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.3 This dismissal is being appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. Complaint. (Doc. 1)
For his present Complaint, Plaintiff filled in the example complaint contained in the Pro Se Litigant Guide with sparse information and attached to it a copy of his "Motion for Injunction/Stay/Restraining Order Against City of Selma and Demolition of building [First + Lapsley]" ("motion") filed inthe Circuit Court for Dallas County, Alabama. (Doc. 1, p. 3). The attached motion is the only source of factual information for Plaintiff's claims; this information is very limited.
In the motion Plaintiff contends that Defendant is acting contrary of the "spirit" of Alabama's condemnation laws when it sued Plaintiff, a private party, for the purpose of demolishing the building in which he has an interest in order to allow John Oliver, a non-resident of Selma, to be able to sell his property at a higher price because Oliver's property would now have a parking lot instead of a "two car frontage." (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff informs that the subject building at "First Avenue and Lapsley Street in 'Historic Selma' is a Civil Rights site[,] being the headquarters of the Dallas County Voters League." (Id., p. 4). The cracks that developed in the building were evaluated by the Alabama Gas Company, which found that the manhole covers installed by Defendant corresponded to the areas where the sidewalk had sunk and the building's cracks were located. (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's Resolution R201-07/08, dated June 23, 2008, is "defective" because the building's address is incorrect and the "finding by the building inspector" does not contain any information from the actual inspector, Mr. Finis Harris. (Id., p. 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant does not have any official surveys, examinations, tests,sounding, borings or samplings of the building. (Id.). Plaintiff also complains that Defendant's responses to his requests have been "intentionally misleading, 'stonewalling', 'surprise' and 'dubious' materials[,]" which he explains by stating generally that Defendant "did not provide subpoenaed/discovery evidence." (Id., pp. 2, 4).
Then, without showing in the Complaint any connection to his claim regarding the building, Plaintiff complains that Defendant contributed to "malfeasance" when a municipal judge volunteered to be the Social Security payee for John D. Wilson, an incompetent, and then withdrew without having assured that John D. Wilson received treatments or medications or that his property was protected.4 (Id., p. 4). In addition, Plaintiff filed three CDs with the Complaint. For relief, Plaintiff seeks $41,000,000. (Id., p. 2).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is reviewing the Complaint (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be dismissed as "frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct.1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).5 A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833, or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist. Id.
Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations must show plausibility. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and must be a "'plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 ().
When considering a pro se litigant's allegations, a court gives them a liberal construction holding them to a more lenient standard than those of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). However, a court, does not have "license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action." GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662. And a pro se litigant "is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989).
Plaintiff's allegations are inadequate, and it is only through the Complaint's attached motion that the Court can develop a sense of what this action is about. Whereas, Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint be pled by stating a short and plain statement of the claim, not by attaching documents, CDs, DVDs, or cassette tapes to the complaint in an attempt to have the Court review the information and figure out if there is a claim and what it is. FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2) (). It is not the Court's or a defendant's responsibility to decipher a plaintiff's pleading, Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988), or to act as a plaintiff's de facto attorney. GJR Investments, 132 F.3d at 1368.
In considering the Complaint's allegations, the Court finds that they are not a plain statement and are jumbled, and as a consequence, they do not provide the required "fair notice" of Plaintiff's claims. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (). The Court attempted to arrange the allegations in the best manner that it could in order to present a logical and coherent claim, even though there is still a disconnectedness present in the allegations. Having organized the allegations, the Court discovered that factual information is missing which prevents Plaintiff from substantively stating claims upon which relief can be granted.
In evaluating the adequacy of the Complaint's allegations, the Court is obligated to apply the pleading standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, supra, and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, supra. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012). This standard requires that Plaintiff plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. A complaint that does not nudge the "claims across the line from conceivable to plausible" will be dismissed. Id. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task[.]" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Where only the possibility of misconduct can be inferred, "the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id.
To "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]" a complaint must contain sufficient factual content, accepted as true "that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 678, 1949 Id., at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Twombly at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Although this standard does not require "detailed factual allegations," some facts are required to be pled because allegations that...
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