Wilson v. Farrow
| Decision Date | 09 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 40404,40404 |
| Citation | 583 S.W.2d 545 |
| Parties | Paul J. WILSON and Frances C. Wilson, Respondents, v. Russel E. FARROW and Joyce M. Farrow, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
A. M. Spradling III, Spradling & Spradling, Cape Girardeau, for appellants.
William S. Rader, Cape Girardeau, for respondents.
This appeal concerns the dispute over an alleged breach of a real estate sales contract by a real estate developer who failed to pave a certain residential street serving the purchasers' lots. The developer's defense was that the terms of agreement relating to street paving were too indefinite to be capable of enforcement. We believe the defense to be meritorious and reverse the judgment of the trial court finding breach of contract.
Plaintiff-respondents, as purchasers, entered into a real estate sales agreement with defendant-appellants, as sellers, for the purchase of two residential lots on Kidron Drive in Cape Girardeau County. At the plaintiffs' behest the following clause was added to the sales agreement by defendants' real estate sales agent: "Seller (defendants) agrees to provide for the paving of Kidron Drive." Defendants constructed plaintiffs' home on the lots. Approximately 31/2 years after the purchase, plaintiffs were transferred to another state and sold the house and lots with Kidron Drive still unpaved. The area surrounding the lots was still largely undeveloped and only one or two other houses were located on Kidron Drive at the time. Plaintiffs sued the defendants, alleging that their lots brought a lesser price because the access road was unpaved. Plaintiffs claimed that the language of the agreement relating to the paving required defendants to pave and pay for such work. Defendants have urged that the paving clause provides only that if and when Kidron Drive would be paved, they would assume the costs. The trial court entered judgment for $2,700 in favor of plaintiffs. Defendants allege on appeal that the terms of the sales contract are too nubilous to be enforceable.
It is rather fundamental legal rubric ". . . that for an agreement to be binding, it must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine its exact meaning and to definitely measure the extent of the promissor's liability." McHenry v. Claspill, 545 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Mo.App.1976). Accord: Hoefel v. Hoefel, 533 S.W.2d 704 (Mo.App.1976). Further, we cannot make contracts for the party nor add provisions by our interpretation of what might or should have been provided. Goodman v. Goodman, 576 S.W.2d 747 (Mo.App.1979).
Here, the only clause of the contract dealing with paving ...
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Mason v. Mason, 63722
...into a decree of dissolution of marriage. He cites Echele v. Echele, 782 S.W.2d 430, 436-37 (Mo.App.E.D.1989), and Wilson v. Farrow, 583 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Mo.App.E.D.1979), in support of his contention that contractual provisions which do not spell out the boundaries of an agreement are not ......
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...on his wife at his expense. The court distinguished Echele v. Echele, 782 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989) and Wilson v. Farrow, 583 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. App. E.D. 1979), both holding decree provisions vague and therefore unenforceable. The Mason court held that based on the couple's history, whe......
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