Wilson v. Hanshaw

• Citation: 54 N.E.3d 1272
• Decision Date: 31 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15CA20.,15CA20.
• Parties: Candace HAYSLIP nka Wilson, Plaintiff, and Highland County Child Support Enforcement Agency, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Joseph HANSHAW, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

54 N.E.3d 1272

Candace HAYSLIP nka Wilson, PlaintiffandHighland County Child Support Enforcement Agency, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.Joseph HANSHAW, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15CA20.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Highland County.

May 31, 2016.

Richele M. Stroop, Hillsboro, OH, for appellant, Highland County Child Support Enforcement Agency.

Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Molly Bolek, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Hillsboro, OH, for amicus curiae.

HARSHA, J.

{¶ 1} Over objection by the Highland County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“HCCSEA”), the Highland County Juvenile Court conducted a hearing on the agency's determination to modify an existing child-support order for Joseph Shawn Hanshaw. The juvenile court ruled that R.C. 3119.65, which requires the court to issue a revised child support order as calculated by the child support enforcement agency if neither the obligor nor the obligee requests a court hearing on the matter, is unconstitutional because it unlawfully delegates the court's function to an administrative agency.

{¶ 2} First HCCSEA asserts that the trial court ignored the clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 3119.65 by requiring a hearing for the court to determine the appropriate amount of child support when neither the obligor nor obligee requested one. Based on the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, the trial court was required to issue a revised child-support order requiring Hanshaw to pay Wilson the revised amount calculated by HCCSEA. In the absence of a request for a hearing by the obligor or obligee, the trial court did not have any authority under the statute to conduct a hearing to determine whether the agency's revised amount was appropriate. We sustain HCCSEA's first assignment of error.

{¶ 3} Next HCCSEA asserts that the trial court erred by holding that R.C. 3119.65 is unconstitutional. The trial court held that the statute is unconstitutional because it unlawfully delegated judicial power to child support enforcement agencies. Because the statute confers the right of the obligor and obligee to obtain judicial review, permitting an administrative agency to determine the appropriate amount of support in these circumstances does not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial power to the agency. We sustain HCCSEA's second assignment of error.

I. FACTS

{¶ 4} In 2000, HCCSEA and Candace Hayslip nka Wilson filed a parentage action in the Highland County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division to determine the father of Wilson's child. After Hanshaw's admission, the trial court entered a judgment establishing paternity and ordering Hanshaw to pay child support of $229.35 per month plus a processing fee.

{¶ 5} In 2015, HCCSEA conducted an administrative review of the child-support order and recommended that Hanshaw pay a reduced child-support amount of $50 per month plus a processing charge. The agency mailed the recommendation to the parties and notified them of their right to request an administrative or court hearing if they disagreed with the results or recommendation. HCCSEA filed its administrative adjustment recommendation with the trial court in July 2015.

{¶ 6} On the same date that HCCSEA filed its recommendation, the trial court scheduled a hearing on the administrative adjustment recommendation. Because neither Wilson nor Hanshaw had requested a hearing disputing the agency's recommendation, HCCSEA filed a motion based on R.C. 3119.65 requesting the court to vacate the hearing and to approve its adjustment recommendation as submitted.

{¶ 7} Nonetheless, the trial court magistrate proceeded to conduct the hearing, where neither parent appeared, but HCCSEA provided the testimony of its authorized representative, Shellie Elking. After rejecting the agency's motion to vacate the hearing, the magistrate questioned Elking, who testified that the agency imputed $240 of income to Hanshaw based on his prison wages and that it imputed $4,792.32 of income per year for Wilson based on information it obtained from the public assistance database. According to Elking the agency did not impute the minimum wage to Wilson because it would not have made a difference as Hanshaw was in prison. Wilson did not provide any information to the agency and neither parent objected to the agency's recommendation. The magistrate noted that she agreed with the agency's assessment that it would not make a difference whether it had imputed additional income to Wilson and stated that the court would approve the agency's child-support modification.

{¶ 8} Subsequently, the trial court entered a decision decreasing Hanshaw's child-support obligation to the recommended amount of $50 per month, plus $10 a month for his support-arrearage payment, and a processing charge. After the magistrate issued a decision denying HCCSEA's motion to vacate, the agency filed its objections.

{¶ 9} The trial court overruled HCCSEA's objections and adopted the decision by holding that R.C. 3119.65 “cannot limit the inherit [sic] authority of the Court to ensure its orders have a solid foundation in law and in fact” and “cannot deprive this Court of the right to review orders it is making.” The trial court noted that in past cases, HCCSEA had not followed the Revised Code in establishing its administrative support orders and had sua sponte erroneously imputed income. The court concluded that it was the court's duty to monitor the agency's actions to ensure that the agency's recommendation had a basis in fact and in law. The trial court held that “to the extent that R.C. 3119.65 requires a court to approve an administrative recommendation to modify a child support order without a review of that recommendation to ensure that it has a basis in law and fact; [sic] it is unconstitutional as it unlawfully delegates the Court's function to an administrative agency.”

{¶ 10} This appeal followed.¹

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶ 11} HCCSEA assigns the following errors for our review:

1. THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF RC 3119.65 REQUIRES THE COURT TO ISSUE AN ORDER FOR CHILD SUPPORT IN THE AMOUNT CALCULATED BY THE CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY AND TO DO SO WITHOUT A HEARING WHEN NEITHER THE OBLIGOR NOR THE OBLIGEE REQUESTED SAME.

2. OHIO REVISED CODE 3119.65 DOES NOT UNLAWFULLY DELEGATE A COURT'S FUNCTION TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY AS THE COURT'S AUTHORITY IS LIMITED BY THE LEGISLATURE AND THE COURT IS REQUIRED TO GIVE JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF STATUTES AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCE.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. R.C. 3119.65 –Statutory Interpretation

1. Standard of Review and General Principles

{¶ 12} In its first assignment of error HCCSEA asserts that the trial court disregarded the clear and unambiguous language of R.C. 3119.65 by requiring a hearing to determine the propriety of the agency's determination of a revised child-support amount. The resolution of this assertion requires the interpretation of the statute, which presents a question of law, and accordingly, we review the matter de novo. State v. Vanzandt, 142 Ohio St.3d 223, 2015-Ohio-236, 28 N.E.3d 1267, ¶ 6 ; State v. Seal, 2014-Ohio-4167, 20 N.E.3d 292, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Bundy, 2012-Ohio-3934, 974 N.E.2d 139, ¶ 46 (4th Dist.) (“ ‘The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review de novo’ ”).

{¶ 13} “When interpreting a statute, a court's paramount concern is legislative intent.” Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife, 144 Ohio St.3d 278, 2015-Ohio-3731, 42 N.E.3d 718, ¶ 12. “ ‘To discern legislative intent, we first consider the statutory language, reading all words and phrases in context and in accordance with rules of grammar and common usage.’ ” See Holland v. Gas Ents. Co., 4th Dist. Washington No. 14CA35, 2015-Ohio-2527, 2015 WL 3918014, ¶ 14, quoting Ohio Neighborhood Finance, Inc. v. Scott, 139 Ohio St.3d 536, 2014-Ohio-2440, 13 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 22, citing R.C. 1.42. “We apply the statute as written * * *, and we refrain from adding or deleting words when the statute's meaning is clear and unambiguous.” Risner at ¶ 12.

2. Analysis of HCCSEA's Statutory Claim that the Court Ignored R.C. 3119.65

{¶ 14} A child support enforcement agency has the authority to investigate, obtain information, recalculate, and issue administrative orders modifying support, and the trial court retains jurisdiction to modify child support under statutes and the Rules of Civil Procedure. Sowald and Morganstern, Baldwin's Ohio Domestic Relations Law, Section 19:17 (4th Ed.2016), citing R.C. 3109.05, 3119.02, 3119.63, and 3119.79 and Civ.R. 75(J). “The General Assembly has adopted a scheme, supplemented by administrative rule, that governs when and how a child support enforcement agency may review and adjust a court-issued child support order.” See Burton v. Harris, 2013-Ohio-1058, 987 N.E.2d 745, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.). Based on R.C. 3119.60 and Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12–60–05.1, the child support enforcement agency, either sua sponte periodically or on the request of the obligor or obligee, can initiate an administrative review of a child-support order. In this case the review of the court's 2000 child-support order occurred upon the request of the obligor, Hanshaw.

{¶ 15} The child support enforcement agency establishes the date on which the review will formally begin, notifies the parties of the review and its commencement date, and requests that the parties provide the agency with certain financial, health-insurance, and other information necessary to properly review the child-support order. R.C. 3119.60 ; Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12–60–05.3. On the date designated by the agency, it will calculate a revised amount of child support to be paid under the court child-support order. R.C. 3119.63(A) ; Ohio Adm.Code 5101:12–60–05.4(A). The child support enforcement agency then gives the obligor and obligee notice of the revised amount of child support and their right to request an...