Wilson v. Higgins
| Decision Date | 23 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-20-0254-PR,CR-20-0254-PR |
| Citation | 251 Ariz. 282,491 P.3d 389 |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
| Parties | Neko Anthony WILSON, Petitioner, v. Hon. Robert HIGGINS, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF NAVAJO, Respondent Judge, State of Arizona ex rel. Brad Carlyon, Navajo County Attorney, Real Party in Interest. |
Brad Carlyon, Navajo County Attorney, Michael R. Shumway (argued), Joel H. Ruechel, Deputy County Attorneys, Holbrook, Attorneys for State of Arizona
Lee Phillips (argued), Law Office of Lee Phillips, P.C., Flagstaff, Attorney for Neko Anthony Wilson
Rhonda Elaine Neff, Kimerer Law Group, P.C., Phoenix; and Lise R. Witt, LisaLaw, LLC, Mesa, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
Elizabeth Burton Ortiz, Executive Director, Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys' Advisory Council, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys' Advisory Council
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK, issued a dissenting opinion.*
¶1 Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 27.7(c) directs trial courts to "make a release determination" when a probationer is arrested on a warrant pursuant to a petition to revoke probation. In this case, we consider whether Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.2(c), which addresses a defendant's right to release after a conviction but before sentencing, is applicable to the required release determination. For the following reasons, we hold that Rule 7.2(c) applies.
¶2 In 2006, Neko Anthony Wilson was convicted of transportation of marijuana for sale, a class three felony. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for four years. California assumed supervision of Wilson pursuant to the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision. Wilson absconded from supervision and was arrested and charged in California for felony murder and robbery in 2009. Arizona filed a petition to revoke probation based on these new charges and for Wilson's failure to comply with his terms of probation. The petition went unresolved, though, while Wilson awaited resolution of his case in California.
¶3 Circumstances changed in 2018 when a California court dismissed Wilson's felony murder counts. He then pleaded guilty to two counts of armed robbery and was released in October with sentencing scheduled for May 2019. Following his release, Wilson was arrested on a warrant issued pursuant to the petition to revoke probation and brought before the trial court in Arizona, which released him to return to California and attend his scheduled sentencing.
¶4 The California court sentenced Wilson to time served and granted him parole. Wilson then returned to Arizona in July 2019 for his probation revocation arraignment and denied all the allegations in the petition to revoke. The State requested that Wilson be held in custody without bail pursuant to Rule 7.2(c) pending the disposition of the petition. Following arguments from both sides, the court ordered that Wilson be "held without bail pursuant to Rule 7.2(c)," and remanded him into custody without any specific findings.
¶5 Extensive litigation over Wilson's detention ensued.1 Relevant here, Wilson petitioned the court of appeals for special action review, contesting the trial court's order holding him in custody without bail under Rule 7.2(c) and arguing that the rule did not apply to a release determination under Rule 27.7(c). The court of appeals accepted jurisdiction and granted relief, concluding that " Rule 7.2(c) ha[d] no application to the superior court's determination of release conditions" for probationers in a revocation proceeding. Wilson v. Higgins , 249 Ariz. 344, 348 ¶ 17, 469 P.3d 481, 485 (App. 2020), vacated , No. CR-20-0254-PR, 2020 WL 9174968 (Ariz. Oct. 15, 2020).
¶6 We accepted review to address the applicability of Rule 7.2(c) to release determinations required by Rule 27.7(c), an issue of first impression and statewide concern. After oral argument, we issued a decision order vacating the court of appeals' opinion and the trial court's order, remanded the case with directions for the trial court to conduct a release hearing in compliance with Rule 7.2(c)(1)(A), and stated a written opinion would follow. This opinion sets forth our reasoning.
¶7 "We review the interpretation of court rules de novo and apply principles of statutory construction when doing so." State v. Vargas , 249 Ariz. 186, 189 ¶ 9, 468 P.3d 739, 742 (2020) (quoting State v. Winegardner , 243 Ariz. 482, 484 ¶ 5, 413 P.3d 683, 685 (2018) ).
¶8 We begin by addressing the court of appeals' conclusion that Rule 7.2(c) was inapplicable to the circumstances present in this case, as well as the import of Rule 27.7(c) no longer referencing Rule 7.2(c).
¶9 The court of appeals based its conclusion on its assessment of the history of the amendment of Rule 27.7(c). Wilson , 249 Ariz. at 348 ¶¶ 14–17, 469 P.3d at 485. Before 2018, the rule explicitly directed courts to make a release determination under Rule 7.2(c). Ariz. R. Crim. P. 27.7 (2017). With the aim of "restyl[ing], simplify[ing], and clarify[ing]" Arizona's Rules of Criminal Procedure, the task force created by Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2015–123 (Dec. 16, 2015) deleted the reference to Rule 7.2(c).2 The court of appeals inferred that the deletion "was done purposefully, to make clear that the omitted phrase no longer has any effect." Wilson , 249 Ariz. at 348 ¶ 14, 469 P.3d at 485.
¶10 In support of the court of appeals' assessment of the import of the deleted reference, Wilson quotes the task force's response to a comment requesting reinstatement of the cross-reference to Rule 7.2(c) :
The problem is that Rule 7.2 does not provide any procedures for the conditions of release following an arrest on a probation violation, which is the general subject of Rule 27.7(c). The Task Force concluded that developing such procedures would entail a substantive change to the rule, and that merely cross-referencing Rule 7.2 would not serve any purpose. Consequently, the Task Force decided against reinstating the cross-reference to Rule 7.2 in Rule 27.7(c).
R–17–0002, Supplemental Petition, at 26–27 (Apr. 25, 2017). There are two issues with this response and Wilson's reliance on it.
¶11 First, the task force's claim that " Rule 7.2 does not provide any procedures" for a probationer like Wilson makes too much of Rule 7.2's lack of any specific reference to probation and overemphasizes the probation context of Rule 27.7(c). Regardless of the probation context, Rule 27.7(c) directs courts to "make a release determination." (Emphasis added). As Wilson acknowledges in his supplemental brief, in the absence of specific release guidance in Rule 27.7(c) a court should look to Rule 7.2, addressing the right to release, to make the required determination. This makes sense because, as with statutes, "[w]hen ‘[rules] relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose ... they should be read in connection with, or should be construed together with other related [rules], as though they constituted one law.’ " State ex rel. DES v. Pandola , 243 Ariz. 418, 419 ¶ 6, 408 P.3d 1254, 1255 (2018) (quoting State ex rel. Larson v. Farley , 106 Ariz. 119, 122, 471 P.2d 731, 734 (1970) ); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 252–55 (2012) (addressing the related-statutes canon and the need to read statutes relating to the same subject together). Given that each rule addresses the subject of release, and that the purpose of each rule is to determine release, Rules 27.7(c) and 7.2(c) can and should be read together.
¶12 Second, the amendment for Rule 27.7(c) has never been characterized as anything other than a stylistic change. R–17–0002, Petition, app. B, at 43–44 (Jan. 8, 2017) (); R–17–0002, Supplemental Petition, app. B, at 51 (Apr. 25, 2017) (same); and, R–17–0002, Reply Petition, app. B, at 52–53 (July 7, 2017) (same). Additionally, this deletion of the cross-reference conforms to the task force's operating principle that "the criminal rules should be freestanding and generally should not incorporate by reference other rules of procedure." R–17–0002, Petition, at 4 (Jan. 8, 2017). Absent any substantive change, Rule 7.2(c) has the same application to Rule 27.7(c) now as it did before the 2018 amendment.
¶13 Because Rules 7.2 and 27.7(c) can and should be read together and the deletion of the cross-reference to Rule 7.2(c) was only a stylistic change, we decline to give the amendment to Rule 27.7(c) any substantive meaning that would render Rule 7.2(c) inapplicable.
¶14 In their arguments before this Court, the parties differed over which subsection of Rule 7.2 applies to Wilson. The State asserted it must be Rule 7.2(c)(1)(A) while Wilson argued Rule 7.2(a) applies. Rule 7.2(a) provides in pertinent part:
Rule 7.2(a) clearly addresses release "before [a] conviction" for defendants who are "charged with an offense ... pending and during trial." (Emphasis added). When Wilson appeared before the trial court for probation revocation proceedings, he was not facing new criminal charges, nor was a trial pending. See infra ¶¶ 17–18. Instead, he was before the court pursuant to a ...
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