Wilson v. Hinton
| Decision Date | 15 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:17-cv-1045-J-34MCR |
| Parties | HARRY LEE WILSON, Plaintiff, v. A. HINTON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 34, Motion to Dismiss), filed March 5, 2018, and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 42, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment) filed July 2, 2018 (collectively "Motions").1 In the Motions, Defendants, Jacksonville Sheriff's Officers A. Hinton, #73395, T.D. Yorton, #64405, T.L. Batrous, #7185, Sergeant Batrous, and Detective Medlock (Defendants), seek dismissal of, or alternatively partial summary judgment on the claims in Plaintiff Harry Lee Wilson's pro se sworn Amended Complaint (Doc. 30, Amended Complaint).2 Wilson has filed a response to both theMotion to Dismiss, see Doc. 35 (Response to Motion to Dismiss), filed March 19, 2018, and the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 46 (Response to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment), filed Aug. 16, 2018. Therefore, the Motions are ripe for review.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary," the complaint should "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of theelements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted); see also BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d at 1262 () (citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions," which simply "are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth." See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
In this context, "pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, "'this leniency does not give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.'" Alford v. Consol. Gov't of Columbus, Ga., 438 Fed. Appx. 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th Cir. 2010)).
With regard to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), instructs that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a). The record to beconsidered on a motion for summary judgment may include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Rule 56(c)(1)(A).3 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determinesthe materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int'l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Wilson brings this action against several Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO) police officers alleging a variety of claims arising out of his arrest on June 30, 2017, in Jacksonville, FL. Generally, Wilson alleges that in the course of his arrest, the Defendant officers subjected him to excessive force, sexual abuse and harassment, failed to properly administer Miranda4 warnings, illegally searched his car, and were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Following are the circumstances giving rise to his claims.5
On the evening of June 30, 2017, Defendants observed Wilson driving his vehicle without his lights illuminated. Wilson Arrest and Booking Report at 4. An officer signaled to Wilson that he should pull over, which he eventually did. Id.; Wilson Deposition at 18. Upon stopping his vehicle, Wilson got out of his car and asked the officers why they stopped him, arguing that they lacked probable cause to do so. Wilson Arrest andBooking Report at 4; Wilson Deposition at 13, 30. Wilson also refused to provide the officers with his license or any form of identification. Wilson Arrest and Booking Report at 4. One of the officers drew his gun and directed Wilson to return to his vehicle. Wilson Deposition at 13. Wilson did so and closed the car door. The officer who had drawn his gun then came to the driver's side of the vehicle, opened the door, and pulled Wilson out of the car, while still pointing his weapon at Wilson. Id. The officer then secured his weapon and proceeded to try to place handcuffs on Wilson. Id. at 13, 26. As the officer began this process, Wilson attempted to inform the officer that he was disabled and that putting his hands behind his back would cause him pain, but that he could be handcuffed with his hands in front of him. Id. at 13, 27, 29-30. The officer disregarded Wilson's statements, hit him two or three times in his chest and head, and threw Wilson onto the hood of his car. Id. at 13, 27. In doing so, the two men fell to the ground. Id.
At this time the other officers at the scene also began to hit and beat Wilson. Id. at 13, 29. Officer Yorton hit and kicked Wilson in his stomach and head, while Officer Batrous6 kicked Wilson's front teeth.7 Id. at 13, 29, 36. During this process, Wilson continued to struggle against the officers, who in turn, struggled to place him in handcuffs. Id. at 13, 27. Again, Wilson tried to communicate to the officers that putting his arms behind his back would cause him pain. Id. In an effort to subdue Wilson so that the officers could handcuff him, Officer Batrous placed Wilson in a chokehold which causedWilson to lose consciousness. Id. at 13, 35.8
During his deposition, Wilson testified that he believed that the officers likely thought that he was resisting arrest. Id. at 30-31. In their declarations, the officers stated that they did indeed believe that Wilson was resisting arrest, both while he was standing by the side of his car, as well as once he was on the ground. See Yorton Declaration at 2-3; Batrous Declaration at 2-3; Medlock Declaration at 2. However, in his deposition, Wilson testified that he was not resisting arrest, but rather, was merely resisting the pain associated with having to place his arms behind his back. Wilson Deposition at 29, 30.
The record is not entirely clear as to what happened between the time Wilson lost consciousness and when Defendants brought him to the police...
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