Wilson v. Jackson

Decision Date19 February 1902
Citation167 Mo. 135,66 S.W. 972
PartiesWILSON v. JACKSON et al.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

2. In a suit to avoid a deed of conveyance executed in consideration of a deed to other lands, on the ground that the transaction was induced by the fraudulent representations of the owners of the land given in exchange, the evidence showed the representations related to what could be produced on the latter land and the value of such products. The grantor examined the land he received in exchange. Held, that the evidence not only failed to prove representations of facts, which, if false, would vitiate the transaction, but showed that the grantor did not in fact rely on them.

3. Where a tract of land worth $1,600 is exchanged for a tract worth $1,000, there is no such discrepancy in their value as to authorize a cancellation of the transaction, though the owner of the latter tract had purchased it for a less sum for purposes of speculation.

4. In a suit to avoid a transaction consisting of an exchange of tracts of land, on the ground of fraud in procuring the execution and delivery of one of the deeds, evidence examined, and held insufficient to prove any fraud.

5. A grantee who fails to record his deed of conveyance must bear the loss resulting from a sale of the land under an execution against the grantor.

Appeal from circuit court, Harrison county; P. C. Stepp, Judge.

Ejectment by William J. Wilson against Jacob Jackson and another. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

J. C. Wilson and Peery & Lyons, for appellant. Wanamaker & Barlow and J. W. Alexander, for respondents.

VALLIANT, J.

Ejectment for 80 acres of land in Harrison county. Defendant Jackson claims to be the owner of the land, and is in possession by his codefendant, Cupp, who is his tenant. Plaintiff claims title under a deed from defendant Jackson. The petition is in the usual form. The answer of defendant Cupp is in substance a general denial; that of defendant Jackson is in the nature of a cross bill in equity to set aside his deed, under which the plaintiff claims, on the ground that it was obtained by fraud. Jackson, whom we will hereinafter call the defendant, by his answer states substantially that he is a man of weak mind, 70 years old, of no education, living in Monticello, Ill., and owning the land in question; that in September, 1895, one L. B. Wilson, son of the plaintiff, came to defendant's house, and, with the intent to cheat and defraud him out of his land, represented that he (Wilson) was the owner of large tracts of lands in Alabama of great value, which he would sell or trade, and that those who would buy of him would make great profits; that he had learned that defendant was a man of prominence and influence in the community, and that, as he was desirous of establishing a colony on this Alabama land, he wished defendant to go with him and see the land, with a view that on his return he would influence others to go and buy land there; that by such means he did influence defendant to go with him to Alabama, and there traded 200 acres of land to him for this 80 acres in suit; that he represented to defendant that on that 200 acres of Alabama land were 50 acres of valuable timber, that lumber could be sold there for $50 a thousand, the land yielded from three to four tons of grass annually, worth in the markets from $10 to $15 a ton, and would also yield 60 to 80 bushels of dry ground rice per acre, worth $1 a bushel, and that he had a complete record title, all of which representations were false, and made with the fraudulent intent to cheat the defendant; that Wilson also proposed to defendant that, if he did not care to farm the Alabama land himself, he (Wilson) would take a lease from him for five years of the 200-acre tract, and pay him $800 a year for rent, giving him well-secured bankable notes for the same; that on October 26, 1895, after defendant and Wilson returned from Alabama, the latter sent his agent, one Hicks, to defendant's home, who, fraudulently pretending to have defendant execute the five-year lease spoken of, in duplicate, obtained, not only his signature to the lease, but also a deed from defendant to Wilson of the 80 acres in suit, which Hicks carried away, leaving with defendant a deed from Wilson to defendant of the 200 acres of Alabama land, and a duplicate of the lease, and, instead of the five well-secured notes for $800 each, agreed on, he left only five unsecured notes of Wilson for $200 each; that at the time defendant thought he was signing only the lease, and that the execution of the deed to the Missouri land was to be postponed until the security was given on the rent notes; that defendant, believing all the representations of Wilson above mentioned, was ready to close the trade on that day, as soon as Wilson should give the security on the rent notes; that the plaintiff in this suit claims to have received a deed to the land from L. B. Wilson, but that he took such deed with knowledge that the deed from defendant was obtained by the fraud above mentioned. The prayer of the answer is that the deed from defendant to Wilson be canceled, and for general relief. The reply joins issue on all the averments in the answer.

Upon the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that the rental value of the land in suit was $100 or $125 a year, and rested. The defendant's evidence was first directed to the question of his mental capacity. This began in the cross-examination of one of plaintiff's witnesses, a farmer living near the land in suit, who had seen defendant on his visits to Missouri to look after this farm. This witness said that in his opinion, although defendant did in fact transact his own business, yet he was not competent to do so. The witness said: "He was looking after his land when he was here. He made a contract for his board with my wife, paid part of it, and part is not paid. So far as him contracting and using this land, and taking care of himself, he made fair contracts." When asked for facts on which he based his unfavorable opinion of the defendant's mental capacity, the witness said that on one occasion he (the witness) had cut down a hedge, and defendant had hauled it and put it in a branch, and it was washed away; that defendant had made a maul out of an old hard knot, which came to pieces before he got one post made; that he would pick up little sticks and pile them up for wood, and would begin one conversation and go right off on another. Witness bought this land from him once, but he backed out; that is, witness had offered him the full value of the land, he agreed to take it, and then backed out. Then defendant read on this point depositions of several persons living in Monticello, Ill., who had known defendant for years, as follows: A. L. Rodgers, clerk of the county court, said: "I don't think he is competent to transact business. I don't think he is competent to undertake the exchange of properties or their sale, or to make papers transferring real estate." Witness stated no facts on which be based his opinion. Frank Harrington thought he was not competent to transact business. "A man who would take a shovel, and dig up the streets for gold, I consider that is a man not being sound." Charles Bryden: "I should not say his mind was strong. I should say he was not competent to do business. His conversations were incoherent. He had an idea that this whole country was inlaid with gold. * * * I do not think he would be able to comprehend the meaning and purport of a legal instrument." Mary J. Bryden: "I considered him queer. He was constantly talking of his expectations of finding gold. I don't think he had any knowledge of the real value of property. I have often said to my sons that I would not want Jacob to sell a calf for us. * * * He didn't seem to know what his work was worth. He did work for us. He would sometimes charge big prices. Unloading a load of hay, he thought it was worth as much as the hay was. He didn't say he thought it was worth as much as the hay was, but I thought his price was a little high. It was nearly what the hay was worth. * * * I paid him what I would any other man for the same work, and after he was over with it, and, as we say, got cooled off, it seemed all right." N. E. Rhoades: "I never thought he was a man of very strong mind; thought he was a little off. I wouldn't consider him qualified to transact business such as trading, exchanging real estate, and buying and selling farms. I refer to his mental capacity on quite a number of different conversations I have had, more upon this mining question than anything else." Witness then went on to state substantially that defendant thought that gold ore existed in the soil in and around Monticello, that he thought he had discovered it in places, and that if any one would back him with capital he would develop the mine. He had a rod with a ball on the end, which he believed would indicate the presence and depth of gold ore. Witness had him experiment with the rod, but it indicated nothing. Defendant was peculiar in his manner of buying goods at witness' store. He would sometimes come in and look over a suit of clothes or a hat several times before he would purchase. "I should doubt very much his ability to make a careful deal, if he was dealing for land. He was rather peculiar in a good many things." John W. Dighton: "I have thought for a good many years back that he was not responsible for his actions. His conduct is unusual. I noticed him on a good many occasions, sort of picking up gold out on our farm. He had a little hunting bag, and used to pick up all sorts of little glittering rock,...

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