Wilson v. Jayma
| Decision Date | 29 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case 2017-002223,2021-UP-343 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Mark Wilson, Appellant, v. Keith Jayma, Respondent. |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted March 1, 2021
Appeal From Lancaster County John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge
Mark Wilson, of Indian Trail, North Carolina, pro se.
Walter Keith Martens, of Hamilton Martens, LLC, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.
Mark Wilson appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to Keith Jayma. We affirm.[1]
The parties began their business relationship in April 2005, when Wilson obtained a personal loan from Jayma that was secured by Wilson's parcel of real estate in Lancaster County (the Lancaster Property). In September 2005, Wilson and Jayma informally agreed to form a partnership called SunMark Homes to build a home in North Carolina (Lot 163). Wilson claimed he agreed to deed Jayma a portion of the Lancaster Property to help fund construction of the home on Lot 163. According to Wilson, he only agreed to transfer a 25-acre tract of the Lancaster Property, but the deed transferred a 62.69-acre tract. The partnership was financially unsuccessful and Jayma alleged the home on Lot 163 was sold at a loss. Wilson sent Jayma a letter in March 2008, accusing him of deception fraud and misappropriation of partnership assets. Wilson consulted an attorney, who sent a letter to Jayma in September 2008, accusing him of violating his fiduciary duties to Wilson, misappropriating partnership funds, and misleading Wilson into deeding a much larger portion of the Lancaster Property than he intended.
Wilson brought this action against Jayma on April 5, 2012. On September 24, 2013, Wilson filed an amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment setting aside the deed transfer of Lot 163. In addition, Wilson asserted causes of action for unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, resulting trust, and negligent misrepresentation. Wilson also claimed he was entitled to a decree "compelling specific performance." Jayma answered, denying Wilson's allegations and setting forth eleven counterclaims. Jayma moved for summary judgment, stating each of Wilson's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
The circuit court heard the motion for summary judgment in 2017. The circuit court found Wilson's complaint was barred by the three-year statute of limitations because it was "based entirely upon the alleged acts or omissions of Jayma as a partner in the [parties'] business venture and include[d] specific causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud." The circuit court rejected Wilson's argument that his complaint was in the nature of an action on sealed instruments and that his claims were therefore subject to a ten-year or twenty-year statute of limitations applying to actions on sealed instruments. The circuit court noted Jayma did not sign or seal the deed to the Lancaster Property and was not a "bound party." Finally, the circuit court found no evidence that Jayma induced Wilson's inaction or that Jayma's conduct equitably tolled the statute of limitations. Wilson did not file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion. This appeal followed.[2]
Did the circuit court err in granting summary judgment in Jayma's favor because the applicable statute of limitations was twenty years?[3]
"In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard of review as the [circuit] court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP." Companion Prop. & Cas Ins. Co. v. Airborne Exp., Inc., 369 S.C. 388, 390, 631 S.E.2d 915, 916 (Ct. App. 2006). "Summary judgment should be affirmed if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. "Our standard of review in evaluating a motion for summary judgment is to liberally construe the record in favor of the nonmoving party and give the nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences that might reasonably be drawn therefrom." Id. at 390-91, 631 S.E.2d at 916 (quoting Estes v. Roper Temp. Servs., Inc., 304 S.C. 120, 121, 403 S.E.2d 157 158 (Ct. App. 1991)).
Section 15-3-530(1) of the South Carolina Code (2005) provides that "an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability express or implied" must be brought within three years, except for those actions provided for in section 15-3-520 of the South Carolina Code (2005).
Section 15-3-520 provides that a party must bring an action within twenty years when the action is:
Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines a "sealed instrument" as "an instrument to which the bound party has affixed a personal seal, [usually] recognized as providing indisputable evidence of the validity of the underlying obligations." "We adhere to our general three-year statute of limitations for most contract actions and acknowledge the availability of the twenty-year limitations period where the contract clearly evidences an intent to create a sealed instrument." Carolina Marine Handling, Inc. v. Lasch, 363 S.C. 169, 175, 609 S.E.2d 548, 552 (Ct. App. 2005). Our courts have found claims for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation are subject to the three-year statute of limitations period provided in section 15-3-530. See Mazloom v. Mazloom, 382 S.C. 307, 323, 675 S.E.2d 746, 755 (Ct. App. 2009) (); Moore v. Benson, 390 S.C. 153, 160, 700 S.E.2d 273, 277 (Ct. App. 2010) (); Walbeck v. I'On Co., LLC, 426 S.C. 494, 519, 827 S.E.2d 348, 361 (Ct. App. 2019), petition for cert. filed (S.C. June 21, 2019) ( the three-year statute of limitations applies to negligent misrepresentation claims under section 15-3-530(5) of the South Carolina Code (2005)).
In McKinnon v. Summers, our supreme court affirmed the circuit court's determination that a six-year statute of limitations applied to the plaintiff's cause of action to "set aside and cancel" deeds that he alleged were forged. 224 S.C. 331, 332-36, 79 S.E.2d 146, 146-148 (1953). The court determined the plaintiff did not state a cause of action to recover real property when "the gravamen of the cause of action stated in the complaint was [for] cancellation of the deeds on the ground of forgery." Id. at 336, 79 S.E.2d at 148. The court therefore concluded the claim to set aside and cancel the deeds was "barred by the six year limitation governing actions for relief on the ground of fraud." Id. Since McKinnon, the statute of limitations has been modified to a three-year statute of limitations for fraud. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(7) (2005) (providing a three-year statute of limitations for "any action for relief on the ground of fraud in cases which prior to the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1870 were solely cognizable by the court of chancery, the cause of action in the case not considered to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud").
Here the three-year statute of limitations applied to Wilson's causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and to set aside the deed for Lot 163. See Mazloom, 382 S.C. at 323, 675 S.E.2d at 755 ("[A] claim for breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a three-year statute of limitations."); Moore, 390 S.C. at 160, 700 S.E.2d at 277 (); Walbeck, 426 S.C. at 519, 827 S.E.2d at 361 ; McKinnon, 224 S.C. at 332-36, 79 S.E.2d at 146-148 (...
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