Wilson v. Jones
| Decision Date | 11 May 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 39709,39709 |
| Parties | WILSON v. JONES, Supt. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Patrick T. Beall, Jerry L. Causey, University of Georgia School of Law, Prisoner Legal Counseling Project, Jackson, for Melvin Louis Wilson.
George M. Stembridge, Jr., Milledgeville, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Elie Jones, Supt.
Melvin Louis Wilson shot and killed Jacquelyn Brown and wounded Tommy Lee Jones with a handgun. His convictions for murder and aggravated assault were affirmed in Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 445, 271 S.E.2d 843 (1980). A certificate of probable cause from denial of the writ of habeas corpus was granted to determine whether or not the charge of the trial court was in violation of the holding in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979).
1. Wilson contends that the trial court erred in giving to the jury the following charge: "... where one shoots another with a pistol and hits them the law presumes prima facie that he did it with malice and that this presumption is not rebutted by proof that the parties had been good friends or that the defendant immediately after the shooting regrets the act."
We have in the past disapproved, and do now disapprove, the use of the phrase "the law presumes" in the deadly weapon charge, and have approved instead a charge authorizing the jury to "infer the intent to kill" from the intentional and unjustified use of a deadly weapon. Hosch v. State, 246 Ga. 417, 420, 271 S.E.2d 817 (1980). The words "the law presumes" cannot, however, be assayed in vacuo, "but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 338, 271 S.E.2d 478 (1980).
"In considering a possible violation of Sandstrom we must first determine what construction a reasonable juror might have placed upon the contested charge." Johnson v. State, 249 Ga. 621, 622, 292 S.E.2d 696 (1982). The trial court charged the substance of OCGA § 16-2-6 (Code Ann. § 26-605), by instructing the jury that the accused "... will not be presumed to act with criminal intention but you, the jury, may find such intention upon consideration of the words, the conduct, the demeanor, the motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is on trial, it being your duty to carefully evaluate all of the relevant circumstances in that regard, the question of intent...
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Waters v. State
...charge taken with the erroneous charge on the "presumption" authorized the jury to construe the charge reasonably (see Wilson v. Jones, 251 Ga. 23, 302 S.E.2d 546) as directing them to find Waters guilty even if they believed she proved the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. In eff......
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Mattox v. State, 75320
...concur. 1 Substituting the term "inference" in lieu of the term "presumption" would appear to cure this infirmity. See Wilson v. Jones, 251 Ga. 23, 302 S.E.2d 546 (1983). ...
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Trenor v. State
...of the entire charge and the construction a reasonable juror might have placed on the disputed portion of the charge. Wilson v. Jones, 251 Ga. 23, 302 S.E.2d 546 (1983). In the present case the court charged properly on the presumption of innocence, the burden of the state to prove each ess......
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Quick v. State
...was not improper or burdenshifting in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39. See Wilson v. Jones, 251 Ga. 23(1), 302 S.E.2d 546. 4. The fourth enumeration of error complains of the denial of defendant's motion for discharge and acquittal under OCGA Ti......