Wilson v. Josephs

• Decision Date: 25 September 1886
• Citation: 107 Ind. 490,8 N.E. 616
• Parties: Wilson v. Josephs.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

107 Ind. 490

8 N.E. 616

Wilson

v.Josephs.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

September 25, 1886.

Appeal from Floyd circuit court.

B. F. Davis, for appellant. J. K. Marsh, for appellee.

Elliott, J.

It is alleged in the complaint that the appellant is a resident householder of this state, and an employe of a railroad company incorporated under the laws of the state; that the appellee is also a resident of Indiana; that the latter is about to institute proceedings in attachment in the state of Illinois, and will, unless restrained, garnish the wages due the former from his employer; and that the purpose of the appellee is to prevent the appellant from availing himself of the exemption laws of Indiana. Prayer for an injunction restraining the appellee from prosecuting his proceedings in attachment in the courts of Illinois.

It is a familiar principle of equity jurisprudence that decrees in equity operate only on the person, and that suits will be entertained, although the subject of the suit is situated in another state. Mr. Pomeroy thus states the general principle: “Where the subject-matter is situated within another state or country, but the parties are within the jurisdiction of the court, any suit may be maintained and remedy granted which directly affect and operate upon the person of the defendant, and not upon the subject-matter, although the subject-matter is referred to in the decree, and the defendant is ordered to do or to refrain from certain acts towards it, and it is thus ultimately but indirectly affected by the relief granted. As examples of this rule, suits for specific performance of contracts, for the enforcement of express or implied trusts, for relief on the ground of fraud, actual or constructive, for the final accounting and settlement of a partnership, and the like, may be brought in any state where jurisdiction of defendant's person is obtained, although the land or other subject-matter is situated in another state, or even in a foreign country.” 3 Pom.Eq.Jur. § 1318. Judge Story lays down a like doctrine. Story, Eq. Jur. § 899. Our own court has recognized and enforced this equitable principle, as, indeed, all the courts have done, without any material diversity of opinion. Bethell v. Bethell, 92 Ind. 318. The principle asserted by these authorities supplies the initial proposition for our decision, and the only possible doubt that can arise is whether it applies to such a case as the present.

The authorities do apply it to such cases, and, in our judgment, they proceed on sound and satisfactory reasoning. In Snook v. Snetzer, 25 Ohio St. 516, the question was presented as it is here, and it was held that an injunction would lie. The same view of the law was asserted in Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen, 545, where it was said: “An act which is unlawful and contrary to equity gains no sanction or validity by the mere manner or form in which it is done. It is none the less a violation of our laws because it is effected through the instrumentality of a process which is lawful in a foreign tribunal. By interposing to prevent it, we do not interfere with the jurisdiction of courts in other states, or control the operation of foreign laws. We only assert and enforce our own authority, over persons within our jurisdiction, to...