Oates v. Morningside College

• Decision Date: 13 February 1934
• Docket Number: 42032
• Citation: 252 N.W. 783,217 Iowa 1059
• Parties: E. W. OATES, Trustee, Appellant, v. MORNINGSIDE COLLEGE, Appellee
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

252 N.W. 783

217 Iowa 1059

E. W. OATES, Trustee, Appellant, v. MORNINGSIDE COLLEGE, Appellee

No. 42032

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 13, 1934

Appeal from Woodbury District Court.--F. H. RICE, Judge.

This is an action in equity brought by the plaintiff, executor and trustee of the estate of John B. Trimble, late a resident of Buena Vista county, Iowa, against Morningside College, a corporation resident in Sioux City, Iowa, to restrain the defendant from prosecuting a claim against the ancillary administration of decedent's estate in South Dakota. The application for the restraining order was denied. Plaintiff appeals.--Reversed.

Reversed and remanded.

Bailie & Edson, and R. Kent Martin, for appellant.

Stewart & Hatfield, for appellee.

KINTZINGER J. CLAUSSEN, C. J., and ANDERSON, STEVENS, EVANS, and MITCHELL, JJ., concur. KINDIG, J., takes no part.

OPINION

KINTZINGER, J.

John B Trimble, late a resident of Buena Vista county, Iowa, died therein, testate, on June 27, 1929. His will was duly probated in that county, and E. W. Oates was appointed executor and trustee of decedent's estate, and published notice of his appointment on August 1, 1929.

The decedent in his lifetime gave to the defendant, Morningside College, a note of $ 16,000, secured by a mortgage on real estate in Pocahontas county, Iowa. The defendant, on the 6th day of August, 1930, brought suit on the note and mortgage in foreclosure proceedings, in Pocahontas county, Iowa, naming E. W. Oates, executor of the Trimble estate, as a defendant therein. In September, 1930, Oates, the executor, defendant in that action, filed a demurrer to the petition therein on the ground that no claim on the note and mortgage had been filed against the Trimble estate in Iowa within twelve months after his appointment as executor. The demurrer was sustained by the court on December 5, 1929, as to any liability of this plaintiff as executor of decedent's estate. The plaintiff in that action obtained a judgment in rem for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and the action for judgment against the executor was dismissed by the court's ruling on the demurrer. The mortgaged property was bid in for $ 2,167.38 less than the amount claimed without any deficiency judgment.

Ancillary administration of decedent Trimble's estate was taken out in South Dakota to enable the executor to carry out the terms of the will. While the ancillary administration was there pending, the Morningside College, the defendant here, filed a claim in the ancillary estate in South Dakota for the deficiency amount not realized in the foreclosure action in Pocahontas county, Iowa. The defendant herein had filed no claim in the domiciliary estate in Iowa within twelve months after notice of the appointment of the executor in Iowa. This was a claim of the fourth class and was therefore barred in Iowa by the Statute of Limitations, Code section 11972. Both parties to this proceeding were residents of the state of Iowa at the time the note and mortgage in question were given to Morningside College; the instruments were executed and delivered in the state of Iowa; both parties have always resided in Iowa, and the Morningside College still is a resident of this state.

Plaintiff in this action seeks to restrain the defendant from prosecuting the action brought against the ancillary estate in South Dakota on the grounds that it would be inequitable, unjust, harassing, and cause the plaintiff irreparable injury; that the action has already been litigated in Iowa, and the proceeding in South Dakota is an attempt to evade the effect of the adjudication on the same indebtedness, already made in the district court of Pocahontas county, Iowa; and that it is an attempt to evade the public policy and laws of Iowa, under which the claim filed in South Dakota is already barred by the Statute of Limitations in Iowa.

Appellant contends that the court's action in sustaining this executor's demurrer in the foreclosure proceeding in Pocahontas county in December, 1930, was a final determination and adjudication of the rights of the Morningside College against the executor of the Trimble estate; that it would be a great hardship and expense to permit the defendant in this action to relitigate the same in the ancillary estate in South Dakota.

I. Where an action is brought in a foreign state for the purpose of evading or avoiding the laws of this state, or for other unjust and inequitable purposes, harassing its citizens and causing them irreparable injury, injunction is properly brought. In the early history of the law upon this subject it was questionable whether or not an action for an injunction between citizens of one state would lie to restrain the prosecution of an action in a foreign state by one citizen of this state against another. It is now, however, the settled rule of law, supported by the unanimous weight of authority, that the courts of one state have a right by injunction to restrain persons residing within its jurisdiction from prosecuting actions against its citizens in a foreign state. The right to grant such an injunction, under proper circumstances, is now unquestioned. In order to justify it, however, it must appear that good equitable grounds therefor exist. The rule is well expressed in Royal League v. Kavanagh, 233 Ill. 175, 84 N.E. 178, 180. There the court said:

"There is no question as to the right to restrain a person over whom the court has jurisdiction from bringing a suit in a foreign state. * * * The courts do not in such cases pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but the decree acts solely upon the party. The jurisdiction rests on the authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction and amenable to process to stay acts contrary to equity and good conscience. The state has power to compel its own citizens to respect its laws even beyond its own territorial limits, and the power of the courts is undoubted to restrain one citizen from prosecuting in the courts of a foreign state an action against another which will result in a fraud or gross wrong or oppression."

A clear statement of the rule is also found in 32 C. J. 115. in which it is said:

"Whether suit was or was not first commenced in the court of another state, a court of chancery of the domestic state, upon a proper cause shown, has authority to restrain persons within its jurisdiction from proceeding in suits in the courts of other states. * * * The courts do not, in such cases, pretend to direct or control the foreign court, but the decree acts solely upon the party and is not an interference with the proceedings of the courts of a sister state, and is not in contravention of any right given by the constitution or laws of the United States. The granting of such an injunction is largely in the discretion of the court; each case must be determined on its own facts; and in all cases the power should be exercised not capriciously, but sparingly, and for substantial reasons only. * * * It must be made to appear that an equitable right will otherwise be denied the parties seeking relief; * * * that the institution of the suit in another state was for the purpose of securing to plaintiff some unfair or unconscionable advantage, arising either under the law or the facts; that the forum was selected for the purpose of vexatiously harassing or oppressing defendant * * * However, all that is necessary to sustain the jurisdiction in such cases is that plaintiff show a clear equity and that defendant should be subject to the authority and within the reach of the process of the court, and this requirement is satisfied where it is shown that the institution of the suit in another state was for the purpose of securing to plaintiff some unfair, unconscionable or inequitable advantage, or is collusive, or that the prosecution thereof will result in fraud, gross wrong or oppression or in irreparable injury * * * or that the suit is against the public policy of the state in whose courts the injunction is sought."

Authorities supporting this rule are: Wabash R. Co. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W. 523; Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa 684, 137 N.W. 1023, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 502; 14 R. C. L. 463; 57 A. L. R. 77; Benedict v. Hall, 211 Iowa 1312, 236 N.W. 92; In re Estate of Spoo, 191 Iowa 1134, 183 N.W. 580; Reed's Adm'x v. Ill. Cen. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794; Wilser v. Wilser (Modern Woodmen), 132 Minn. 167, 156 N.W. 271; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Richey & Gilbert Co., 132 Wash. 526, 232 P. 355; O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432, 101 P. 755, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 267, 132 Am. St. Rep. 191; Mason v. Harlow, 84 Kan. 277, 114 P. 218, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 234; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 S.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538; Bankers' Life Co. v. Loring, 217 Iowa 534, 250 N.W. 8.

In Wabash R. Co. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W. 523, confirming the doctrine in this state, the court said:

"It is settled by the overwhelming weight of authority--indeed, there is no dispute in authority--that such an injunction as is here prayed acts merely upon those who are within the jurisdiction of the court as a regulation of their conduct, and is not an attempt to control the action of the courts in a sister state, and is not in contravention of any right given by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and said objection is untenable."

The question for consideration here, therefore, is whether or not the facts in this case bring it within the equitable process under which a court of equity can or should grant the relief prayed for.

II. One of the reasons urged for securing the relief asked is that the claim now made in the courts of South Dakota were already made against this executor in the...