Wilson v. Maricopa County

• Decision Date: 09 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. CV-04-2873-PHX-DGC.,CV-04-2873-PHX-DGC.
• Parties: Pearl WILSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Phillip Wilson, deceased; and Terry and Pearl Wilson, surviving parents of Phillip Wilson, Plaintiffs, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, a public entity; Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, a division of Maricopa County; Joseph M. Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff, and Ava Arpaio, his wife; Maria Leon and John Doe Leon, her husband; Mark W. Stump and Jane Doe Stump, his wife; Rocky Medina and Jane Doe Medina, his wife; and Mickie Curtis and Jane Doe Curtis, his wife, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Page 987

463 F.Supp.2d 987

Pearl WILSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Phillip Wilson, deceased; and Terry and Pearl Wilson, surviving parents of Phillip Wilson, Plaintiffs, v. MARICOPA COUNTY, a public entity; Maricopa County Sheriffs Office, a division of Maricopa County; Joseph M. Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff, and Ava Arpaio, his wife; Maria Leon and John Doe Leon, her husband; Mark W. Stump and Jane Doe Stump, his wife; Rocky Medina and Jane Doe Medina, his wife; and Mickie Curtis and Jane Doe Curtis, his wife, Defendants.

No. CV-04-2873-PHX-DGC.

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

November 9, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Thomas White, Leslie E. O'Hara, Michael C. Manning, Sean B. Berberian, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Phoenix, AZ, Mark E. Johnson, Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiffs.

Richard L. Strohm, Law Offices of Richard L. Strohm PC, Scottsdale, AZ, Daniel Patrick Struck, Timothy James Bojanowski, Christina Gail Retts, Eileen Dennis Gilbride, Shannon M. Ivanyi, Jones Skelton & Hochuli PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants.

ORDER

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment on all claims and the parties have filed several motions to strike. Dkt. ## 204, 210, 221, 269, 272. Plaintiffs also have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's order dismissing Defendant Maricopa County Sheriff's Office. Dkt. # 212. The Court heard oral argument on October 27, 2006. Dkt. # 295. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motions for summary judgment in part, deny them in part, and deny the motions to strike and the motion for reconsideration.

I. Background.

Phillip Wilson was an inmate at a Maricopa County jail known as "Tent City." On July 22, 2003, Wilson was assaulted by other inmates and later died from his injuries. The assault occurred at approximately 2:45 p.m., while Wilson was in Tent 3 in Yard 1.

Defendant Maria Leon was the Shift 1, Yard 1 tower officer on duty at the time of the assault. Shift 1 runs from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. Defendant Mickie Curtis was a Shift 1 supervisor and Defendants Mark Stump and Rocky Medina were Shift 2 supervisors on the day of the assault. Shift 2 runs from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint in state court on November 5, 2004. See Exs. to Dkt. # 1. Defendants removed the case to this Court on December 13, 2004. Dkt. # 1. Plaintiffs assert claims against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Philip Wilson's constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and violations of Terry and Pearl Wilson's Fourteenth Amendment rights in the continued familial companionship and society of their son Phillip, Am. Compl. ¶ ¶ 39-50. Plaintiffs also allege negligence and gross negligence claims against all Defendants under Arizona law. Id.

II. The Motions for Summary Judgment.

A. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Jesinger v. Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir.1994). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit ... will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. The disputed evidence must be "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. The § 1983 Claims Based on Alleged Violations of Phillip Wilson's Eighth Amendment Rights.¹

1. The Claims Against Maricopa County and Sheriff Arpaio in His Official Capacity.

Municipal liability under § 1983 can result from the unconstitutionai actions or omissions of the municipality's final policymaker. See Mandl v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (holding that a municipality's policy or custom that inflicts a constitutional injury may subject the municipality to § 1983 liability whether the policy or custom was "made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy"); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (holding that the failure of a municipality's policymakers to ensure adequate police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability). Whether a particular official has final policymaking authority is a matter of state law. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997); Cortez v. County of L.A., 294 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir.2002) ("To determine whether the Sheriff was acting as the final policymaker for the County, we follow the analytical framework set forth in McMillian.")

The parties do not dispute that Sheriff Arpaio has final policymaking authority under Arizona law with respect to the operation of County jails. See Dkt. # 236 at 9 (citing Dkt. # 240 ¶ 170); Ariz. Const. art. XII, §§ 3-4 (providing that there shall be created in and for each County of the State a Sheriff and that the Sheriffs duties, powers, and qualifications shall be as prescribed by law); A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(5) ("The sheriff shall ... [t]ake charge of and keep the county jail ... and the prisoners in the county jail."); Flanders v. Maricopa County, 203 Ariz. 368, 54 P.3d 837, ¶ 35 (Ariz.Ct.App.2002) ("The County acknowledged that the Sheriff was its chief policymaker for [Tent City]."); Judd v. Bollman, 166 Ariz. 417, 803 P.2d 138, 139-40 (Ariz.Ct.App.1991) (stating that a sheriff has the duty "to maintain and operate the county jails pursuant to the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 11-441"); see also Cortez, 294 F.3d at 1189 ("[T]he County is subject to § 1983 liability for the Sheriffs actions taken here pursuant to his role as administrator of the county jail.").

Plaintiffs asserted at oral argument that Defendants Stump, Medina, and Curtis also are "final policymakers" for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983 because they had the responsibility of actually training jail officers. Plaintiffs did not make this argument in their summary judgment briefs. See Dkt. # # 236-37. Nor have Plaintiffs presented any evidence that these Defendants made final policy decisions for the County with respect to training. As noted above, Arizona law makes clear that the Sheriff is the final policymaker for the County's jails. See Ariz. Const. art. XII, §§ 3-4; A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(5). The Court accordingly concludes that Sheriff Arpaio is the County's final policymaker for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983 arising out of events at Tent City. See Flanders, 54 P.3d at ¶ 63 ("There may be no `clearer case of county liability' than for the policies of a sheriff charged by law with responsibility for a county's jails.") (citation omitted). The Court will therefore focus on Sheriff Arpaio in deciding whether Plaintiffs' claim against the County survives summary judgment.

a. Two Routes to Municipal Liability.

The Ninth Circuit has held that there are two routes to municipal liability under § 1983. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1185 (9th Cir.2002). Both are relevant in this case.²

The first route applies when a municipality inflicts a constitutional injury through its policy, custom, or practice. Id. (citing Bd. of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997)). Under this route, the plaintiff must satisfy traditional § 1983 requirements and show that "the municipality acted with the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation,' just as a plaintiff does when he or she alleges that a natural person has violated his federal rights." Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382). The state of mind required for violation of Phillip Wilson's Eighth Amendment rights is one of "deliberate indifference." See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). This kind of deliberate indifference occurs when an official disregards "a risk of harm of which he is aware." Id. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The requirement is one of actual, subjective intent — "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id.

The second route to municipal liability arises from the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton v. Harris. Under this route, a municipality becomes responsible, through its omissions, for a constitutional violation committed by one of its employees. See Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1186 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 387, 109 S.Ct. 1197). The plaintiff need not prove that the municipality acted with actual, subjective intent. Id. at 1186. Rather, the plaintiff "must show that the municipality was on actual or constructive notice that its omission would likely result in a constitutional violation," and yet failed to act. Id. This kind of deliberate indifference is found when the need to remedy the omission is so obvious, and the failure to act so likely to result in the violation of rights, that the municipality reasonably can be said to have been deliberately indifferent when it failed to act. Id. at 1195.

In this case, Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence under both routes. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as the Court must do at this summary judgement stage, the Court concludes that there is evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that the County, through its final policy maker, Sheriff Arpaio, implemented policies,...