Wilson v. McLendon
| Decision Date | 06 February 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 25015,25015 |
| Citation | 225 Ga. 119,166 S.E.2d 345 |
| Parties | Emma Jean WILSON v. F. Earl McLENDON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
The provision of Code § 105-2003 authorizing the consideration of 'worldly circumstances of the parties' in those torts where the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the United States.
Clein & Babush, Harvey A. Clein, Dunaway, Shelfer, Haas & Newberry, scott A. Ray, Atlanta, for appellant.
George W. Willingham, Atlanta, for appellee.
The question for determination in this case is whether that part of Code § 105-2003 authorizing the jury to consider the 'worldly circumstances of the parties' in tort actions where 'the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff,' violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States (Code, § 1-815).
In ruling on objections to interrogatories served on the alleged tortfeasor, requiring him to give a detailed account of his personal assets and financial condition, the trial judge sustained the ground of the objections asserting that this provision of Code § 105-2003 is unconstitutional. Thereafter an order was entered denying the plaintiff's motion to compel answers to the interrogatories, and striking the paragraph of the petition alleging the net worth of the defendant. Error is assigned on these orders, and the trial judge certified that the questions made are of such importance to the case that immediate review should be had.
The courts of most of the States of this country allow the recovery of punitive, exemplary, or vindictive damages in tort cases where the tortfeasor's wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate. Provisions regarding exemplary damages, in substantially the same form as those in our present Code §§ 105-2002 and 105-2003, were embodied in the Code of Georgia of 1863 ( §§ 2998 and 2999), and have been a part of our statute law since that date. They establish the public policy of our State and preclude any inquiry by this court into the correctness of the concept of punitive damages as a part of the law of torts of this State.
It is the general rule in courts of this country that the financial condition of the defendant may be considered in determining the amount of exemplary or punitive damages to be awarded, although there is some authority to the contrary. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 126(3), p. 1168; 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 322, p. 422; Prosser on Torts, 3d ed., p. 14. Counsel for the appellee has cited no case in any court in which it has been held that a statutory provision of any State is unconstitutional which allows evidence as to the financial circumstances of the tortfeasor in actions for punitive damages.
In this State it is only in those torts where the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff that the 'worldly circumstances of the parties' can be considered. Code § 105-2003; Georgia Railroad v. Homer, 73 Ga. 251(1); Southern Ry. Co. v. Bryant, 105 Ga. 316, 31 S.E. 182; Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Almand, 116 Ga. 780(2), 43 S.E. 67; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. v. Benton, 117 Ga. 785(2), 45 S.E. 70; Baldwin v. Davis, 188 Ga. 587, 592, 4 S.E.2d 458. This is only one element to be considered in assessing such damages, the others being 'the amount of bad faith in the transaction, and all the attendant facts.'
The appellee asserts that evidence of the financial circumstances of the tortfeasor violates the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution in that it wrongfully discriminates against persons of wealth by requiring them to pay greater damages than persons of lesser means under similar circumstances. It is argued that the provision has the effect of placing wealthy persons in a separate classification from poor persons, and discriminating against wealthy persons.
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...v. Thos. Best & Sons, Inc., 453 A.2d 107, 108 (Del.Super.1982); Rinaldi v. Aaron, 314 So.2d 762, 763 (Fla.1975); Wilson v. McLendon, 225 Ga. 119, 166 S.E.2d 345, 346 (1969); Beerman v. Toro Mfg. Corp., 1 Haw.App. 111, 615 P.2d 749, 755 (1980); Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 89......
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...damages and recover only for wounded feelings, he is not entitled to a consideration of defendant's wealth. In Wilson v. McLendon, 225 Ga. 119, 166 S.E.2d 345, the Supreme Court said this provision is a punitive measure designed to deter gross misconduct by making a defendant "smart" accord......
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...The language of the pre–1987 version of OCGA § 51–12–6 first appears in the Code of 1863 as Section 2999. See Wilson v. McLendon, 225 Ga. 119, 120, 166 S.E.2d 345 (1969). In support of the contention that the “worldly circumstances” language reflects a principle of this State's common law b......
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...from repeating the trespass or wrong.' Johnson v. Morris, 158 Ga. 403, 405, 123 S.E. 707, 708.' (Emphasis added.) In Wilson v. McLendon, 225 Ga. 119, 116 S.E.2d 345 (1969), this court, in upholding the constitutionality of Sec. 105-2003 against an equal protection attack, stated: 'It applie......