Wilson v. Nw. Mut. Acc. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 12 June 1893
• Parties: WILSON v NORTHWESTERN MUT. ACC. ASS'N.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

53 Minn. 470

55 N.W. 626

WILSONvNORTHWESTERN MUT. ACC. ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 12, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Where an administrator, with the implied consent of an accident indemnity association, adopts and relies upon the act of a third party, who has filed with such association proof of a claim growing out of the accidental killing of such administrator's intestate, a member of the association, the latter will not be allowed to defeat a recovery upon the ground that it was incumbent on the administrator to file the proof himself, or that he could not, with its implied consent, adopt as his own that filed by such third party.

2. Where a certain alleged trade or occupation is not mentioned at all in a manual of classification prepared and adopted by such an association, it is not classed as noninsurable.

3. Where an accident happens, and injuries result to a member of such an association, the certificate being in the form of that held by plaintiff's intestate, a recovery cannot be defeated on the ground of a voluntary exposure to a danger contemplated by the parties. Nor is it a good defense that the accident was caused by the mere carelessness or negligence of the assured.

4. Held, upon the evidence produced upon the trial, that the jury was warranted in finding that the work in which the assured was engaged when fatally injured was part of the trade or occupation of a brick mason.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; Smith, Judge.

Action by James C. Wilson, administrator of the estate of Snorri Benson, deceased, against the Northwestern Mutual Accident Association, on a certificate of insurance. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

James O. Pierce, for appellant.

Steele & Rees and W. A. Kerr, for respondent.

COLLINS, J.

Plaintiff's intestate, Benson, whose occupation was therein stated as that of a brick mason, held a certificate of membership in defendant indemnity association, when he accidentally received injuries which caused his death soon afterwards. This certificate contained several conditions, -one being that, if Benson should be injured when engaged in an occupation classed as not insurable by the association, nothing should be paid; and another, that a recovery could not be had, under the terms of the certificate, in case the injury received was the result of unnecessary exposure to danger, unless in an effort to save human life. Satisfactory proof of a claim was required as a condition precedent to payment. At the time of the accident, Benson, with other men, was at work upon a swinging scaffold, engaged in “pointing” the walls of an eight-story brick building, the scaffold being suspended from the roof by means of ropes. Between the third and fourth stories of the building there was a projection some three feet wide, and the scaffold had been dropped below this projection as the men progressed downward with their work, which consisted in “pointing” or finishing up the lines of mortar, and replacing defective or broken brick in the walls. The projection carried the scaffold out too far from the building, and it had been brought back to convenient working distance by means of small guy ropes, one at each end, running from the scaffold to windows. One of the workmen stepped from the scaffold into a window, and immediately after one of these ropes broke, causing the scaffold to swing out several feet, throwing Benson and another workman to the walk below. Fatal injuries were received by the former.

1. It is claimed by defendant that no proof of the claim was presented to it prior to the commencement of this action by plaintiff administrator. It appears from the evidence that, soon after Benson's death, one Jones, who claimed to be a creditor of his estate, procured a blank form for proof of the claim from defendant association. This blank was filled out and verified by Jones, and filed with the secretary of the associationby one of the plaintiff's attorneys. No point is made that the proof was insufficient in form. Soon afterwards plaintiff was appointed administrator of the estate by the proper tribunal, and at once called upon the secretary, in company with the attorney before mentioned, a duly-certified copy of the letters of administration being presented. The secretary was asked if the proof theretofore served was sufficient, and was informed that if further proof was required it would be furnished by the administrator. He replied that the papers then filed were sufficient, so far as he knew, and that if anything was lacking, or if further proof was needed by himself or the association, the administrator or his attorney would be notified. It is conceded that no other or further proof was demanded, and that afterwards, prior to the bringing of the suit, the association, by its agents and officers, made several attempts to settle the claim. Its officers knew that the administrator relied upon their statement in respect to further proof, and relied upon, and had adopted, the action of Jones in respect to proof. The association never objected to this, or to paying the claim on the ground now advocated. After the time has expired within which plaintiff, as administrator, could file proof of the claim, and an action has been commenced, the defendant cannot be allowed to defeat a recovery on the ground that it was incumbent upon plaintiff himself to file the proof, or that he could not, with its implied consent, adopt the act of Jones. It is analogous to the reception and retention of defective proof of...