Wilson v. Phx. House & Sidney Hargrove
| Decision Date | 10 December 2013 |
| Citation | 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 23417,42 Misc.3d 677,978 N.Y.S.2d 748 |
| Parties | Sabire WILSON [aka Sabrina Wilson], Plaintiff, v. PHOENIX HOUSE and Sidney Hargrove, Defendants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Armen H. Merjian, Esq., Housing Works, Inc., New York, for Plaintiff.
Marcia K. Raicus, Esq., Smith Mazure Director Wilkins Young & Yagerman PC, New York, for Defendants.
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the decision/order on this motion is as follows:
Defendants Phoenix House and Sydney Hargrove bring this pre-answer motion to dismiss plaintiff Wilson's action against them. Plaintiff opposes the motion.
For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Defendants aver that pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(7), dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is warranted as plaintiff fails to state any legally cognizable cause of action. Defendants also move, pursuant to CPLR § 3211(a)(3), to dismiss plaintiff Wilson's claim for injunctive relief on the grounds that the plaintiff lacks standing to sue for such relief. Finally, defendants move on the basis of decisional law to dismiss plaintiff Wilson's claim for punitive damages, on the basis that plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient for such a claim.
The following facts are taken almost verbatim from the plaintiff's November 15, 2011 complaint, and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.
On March 27, 2008, plaintiff Sabrina (Sabire) Wilson—a thirty-two-year-old, homeless transgender (male-to-female) woman, diagnosed with gender identity disorder (GID) at sixteen—was arrested for a drug offense. It was her first arrest for a felony. In August of 2008, she entered into a plea agreement which provided that she would participate in a residential drug treatment program as an alternative to prison. On December 23, 2008, plaintiff entered into the residential drug treatment program at Phoenix House in Brooklyn, New York. It is unclear why there was such a long gap in time, and the court assumes, but does not know, that it was caused by a waiting list for a place in the program.
During the initial admission interview at Phoenix House, plaintiff Wilson disclosed her transgender identity. The admissions' counselor explained to plaintiff that, because she was biologically male, she was required to use the men's bathroom facilities and share a room with men. Plaintiff did not object to this during her initial interview as she “sens[ed] she had no choice” but to comply with this requirement. Prior to plaintiff's arrival, the staff at the facility was thus informed of plaintiff's transgender status.
The day after plaintiff was admitted, on Christmas Eve, defendant Sydney Hargrove, the director of the induction unit, called plaintiff into his office. During this meeting Hargrove asked plaintiff whether her hair was “real” and, upon learning plaintiff wore a wig, told plaintiff she was not allowed to wear a wig at Phoenix House. It is unclear from the plaintiff's complaint whether any explanation was offered to her as to why she could not wear a wig, although the complaint notes that some female participants in the program did wear wigs. Approximately one month later, the senior counselor at the induction unit informed the plaintiff she was no longer allowed to wear high heeled shoes; the plaintiff's complaint notes that some female participants in the program sometimes wore high heels. According to the plaintiff's complaint, the counselor said Hargrove expressed concern that the plaintiff might fall and hurt herself. Aside from the prohibition of wigs and heels, the complaint does not allege that defendants required any other changes to plaintiff's wardrobe or appearance. Plaintiff made excellent progress, and she was asked to serve as a “Resident Structure Senior Coordinator” after a few weeks.
Plaintiff was required to attend meetings and support groups as a condition of her residential inpatient treatment at Phoenix House. During such meetings, it was typical for women to sit on one side of the room and men on the other. An individual running one of these groups informed plaintiff that defendant Hargrove “want[ed] her to sit on [the male] side [of the class].” Defendant Hargrove himself at one point instructed plaintiff to sit with the men during these meetings.
In early January 2009, a senior counselor permitted plaintiff to participate in a new gender-specific women's support group. Some female group members expressed discomfort at plaintiff Wilson's presence and Wilson was asked to leave. Plaintiff met with defendant Hargrove to request re-admission to this group, but Hargrove denied her request, and said plaintiff never should have been given permission to participate in the women's group in the first place. At this time, plaintiff lodged a complaint with Hargrove that she should not be required to share sleeping or bathroom accommodations with men. Defendant Hargrove did not make any changes to plaintiff's sleeping or bathroom arrangements, and told her “you should adjust.” After her meeting with Hargrove, plaintiff appealed personally to the members of the women's group and secured their consent for her to attend the women's group sessions. Nevertheless, defendant Hargrove maintained that plaintiff could not attend the women's support group, despite the consent of the other members.
During her fourth week in the program, plaintiff was informed by another counselor that defendant Hargrove believed that Wilson should be transferred to a different residential treatment program because he believed that her needs could not be met at Phoenix House due to her transgender status. The counselor told her that if a suitable program could not be located she would most likely be sent to jail. Some of the other residents, upon learning of her impending transfer, drew up a petition recommending that defendant Hargrove reconsider his decision. Thirty-eight residents signed the petition. Plaintiff also wrote a letter to defendant Hargrove “pleading” that she be allowed to stay at Phoenix House. Plaintiff received no response to this letter, nor was there any response to the petition submitted by the residents. Defendant Hargrove did not identify a treatment program that was part of the court's alternative to incarceration program which plaintiff could transfer to.
At this point, plaintiff had noticed she had not advanced to the next step with the rest of her treatment group and new residents had arrived. Plaintiff requested another meeting with Hargrove. It was at this time that Hargrove confirmed his decision to transfer plaintiff from Phoenix House, stating, “[w]e can't suit your needs as a transgender in our program.” Despite plaintiff's inquiries and requests, an alternative treatment program that could “meet her needs” was not located by Phoenix House, and plaintiff, angry and frustrated that they would not let her complete the treatment program, left Phoenix House without permission. She was ultimately resentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison.
On September 2, 2010, plaintiff filed a lawsuit pro se in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York (Docket No. 10 Civ. 7364) against Phoenix House and Hargrove. Therein, plaintiff brought a claim for injunctive relief and compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the defendants discriminated against her on the basis of sex or sexual orientation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff also brought a false advertising claim against Phoenix House under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), based on representations on its website that it accepted lesbian and gay patients. Finally, plaintiff brought a state law claim alleging that defendants violated § 296 of the N.Y. Exec. Law, which is the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL), when they discriminated against her by engaging in housing discrimination based upon her disability and failed to make reasonable accommodations for her disability, which is known as Gender Identity Disorder (GID).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's Federal complaint on the grounds that: (1) plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); and (2) that she failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), of the Fed.R.Civ.P. By order of Judge Denise Cote, the plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages under § 1983 was dismissed, as was her claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief pursuant to § 1983 and her NYSHRL claim survived. Judge Cote's unpublished opinion and order, dated August 1, 2011, clarified, as discussed further herein, that the NYSHRL claim of discrimination in housing survived because defendants “h[ad] not identified any support for their argument that Phoenix House [was] not the owner, lessor, sub-lessor, assignee, or managing agent of a housing accommodation within the meaning of §§ 292(10) and 296(18)(2).” See, Wilson v. Phoenix House, 2011 WL 3273179, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84240. As regards the § 1983 claim, Judge Cote held that plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages pursuant to § 1983 could not proceed because it was barred by the PLRA 1 since Wilson's mental anguish was not based on any prior physical injury and Section 1997e(e) of the PLRA prohibits prisoners from bringing a “Federal civil action ... for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). However, Judge Cote concluded that plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief could proceed, as “Wilson has plead a sufficiently close nexus between the state and Phoenix House such that the defendants' actions constitute “state action” for purposes of Wilson's § 1983 claim”.
Plaintiff then requested that her case be voluntarily dismissed,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ravina v. Columbia Univ.
...and for injunctive relief and such other remedies as may be appropriate." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(a); see also Wilson v. Phoenix House, 978 N.Y.S.2d 748, 770 (Sup. Ct. 2013) ("Clearly, injunctive relief is available under the City's Human Rights Law."). The statute does not provide furth......
-
Barker v. Women in Need, Inc.
...Human Rights Law protects against discrimination from individuals with gender identity disorder. See, e.g., Wilson v. Phoenix House, 42 Misc. 3d 677, 699 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 3. The New York City agencies Plaintiff sues are not proper defendants because a City agency is not an entity that ......
-
2 Perlman Drive, LLC v. Stevens
...of the City of New York § 8–101(17)(b)(1).75 Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8–107(5)(a)(1).76 Wilson v. Phoenix House, 42 Misc.3d 677 (Sup Ct Kings County [Silber, J., 2013] ) citing to the NYC Administrative Code § 8–107(15).77 Administrative Code of the City of New York § 8......
-
Williams v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs.
...someone based on their race, creed, national origin, gender, age, disability, sexual orientation, etc. [9] Contrary to the case at bar, the Wilson plaintiff clearly stated in the complaint the NYCHRL section for which they sought relief. [10] Further, the Wilson complaint included other par......