Wilson v. San Francisco Mun. Ry.
| Decision Date | 09 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | AFL-CIO and T |
| Citation | 105 Cal.Rptr. 855,29 Cal.App.3d 870 |
| Parties | , 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2729, 70 Lab.Cas. P 53,009 Joseph A. WILSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL RAILWAY, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents, Transport Workers Union of America,ransport Workers Union, Local 250A, Defendants in Intervention and Respondents. Civ. 30631. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Patricia D. Lee, Michael Miller, Donald R. Prigo, San Francisco, for plaintiff and appellant.
Thomas M. O'Connor, City Atty., William F. Bourne, Public Utilities Counsel, City and County of San Francisco, McMorris M. Dow, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for respondents San Francisco Municipal Railway, etc., and others.
Darwin & Riordan by John Riordan, San Francisco, for intervening respondents Transport Workers Union of America, AFL--CIO, and others.
Joseph A. Wilson appeals from a judgment denying his petition for a writ of mandate which would have required that a specified administrative hearing, to be conducted in connection with his prospective dismissal from municipal employment, be opened to the public.
Although the facts are essentially undisputed and might be briefly stated of themselves, they have occurred within an elaborate context of municipal charter provisions and other documentary materials. The following detailed recital is therefore required:
Appellant is employed by the City and County of San Francisco, a chartered city and county (hereinafter 'the City'), as a bus driver in its Municipal Railway system. That system is part of the public utilities complex which the City operates under the general management of its five-member public utilities commission, pursuant to provisions of the City's charter which are addressed to public utilities as such. The powers of the public utilities commission do not include its functioning in the dismissal of a permanent employee; under the civil service provisions of the charter, 'the manager of utilities' alone may dismiss such employee, and only for cause, after a public hearing, and subject to appeal by the affected employee to the City's civil service commission. 1
Appellant is a 'permanent' employee of the City within the meaning of charter section 8.341. (See fn. 1, Ante.) He is also a member of Local Union 250A (hereinafter the 'local union') of the Transport Workers of America, AFL-CIO (the 'international union'). In December, 1968, the two unions and the City's public utilities commission entered into a 'Memorandum of Agreement' which pertained, generally, to the working conditions of union members employed by the City in its Municipal Railway system. 2 Among other things, the 1968 agreement provides, in article II thereof, that '(t)he terms and conditions of employment . . . (of such persons) . . . shall be governed by the terms and conditions established by (the City's) charter provisions, ordinances by the (City's) Board of Supervisors, relevant rules of the (City's) Civil Service Commission and by the terms and conditions of employment set forth in this agreement.'
Article XVI of the agreement establishes a four-step 'grievance procedure' which may be invoked by a Municipal Railway employee who is faced with dismissal or other disciplinary action. The provisions referable to 'Step 1' permit him to present a 'grievance,' having to do with 'proposed 'disciplinary action' affecting him, to his 'Division Superintendent' for 'decision' by the latter. 'Step 2' of the procedure permits the employee to appeal from that decision to a higher officer in the Municipal Railway system (the 'Transportation Superintendent'). The 'Step 3' provisions permit the employee to appeal, still further, to the 'General Manager of the (Municipal) Railway,' and require a hearing before him, or his nominee, and a written decision by the Step 3 hearing officer. When 'disciplinary dismissal' of the employee has been proposed in charges preferred against him, the grievance procedure is initiated at 'Step 3.' 3
The 'Step 4' provisions of the grievance procedure are not involved in the present case (because, as will appear, appellant has not completed Step 3 of the grievance procedure). They permit an employee to appeal from the Step 3 decision to an 'impartial hearing officer' who is chosen by agreement or by arbitration, and require a de novo hearing before that officer and a written report (including a 'recommended decision') by him to the 'General Manager of Public Utilities.' They further provide that the latter 'shall exercise his discretion in accepting, modifying or rejecting the recommended decision.' The person to whom the 1968 agreement refers as the 'General Manager of Public Utilities' is the 'manager of utilities' who alone, as 'appointing officer,' has the power to dismiss permanent Municipal Railway employees under the City's charter. (See fn. 1, Ante.) The Step 4 provisions of the agreement apparently require him to consider the recommendation of the 'impartial hearing officer' in exercising this power after a final--and public--hearing conducted by himself pursuant to the charter (ibid.), but do not limit the discretion with which the charter vests him relative to dismissal of Municipal Railway employees. (Ibid.)
The agreement provides for appropriate notices to 'the Union' (a collective term which includes both the local and international unions), and for active union participation at each 'stop' of the grievance procedure. In further deference to the City's charter, the agreement also states that '(n)othing contained in this (grievance) procedure shall be construed to deny to any employee his rights under the law or under applicable civil service rules, regulations and practices, or to diminish the powers and duties of the General Manager of Public Utilities, as prescribed in the Charter of the City and County of San Francisco.'
The present controversy commenced when John M. Woods, gereral manager of the Municipal Railway, notified appellant by letter that he (Woods) had 'preferred charges' against appellant, directed to the letter's dismissal from employment for 'serious willful abuse of San Francisco Municipal Railway equipment.' Woods' letter, which was dated November 20, 1970, stated that the charges had been preferred pursuant to specified provisions of the 1968 agreement. Appellant thereupon invoked the 'grievance procedure' authorized by the agreement, which procedure entitled him to a 'Step 3 hearing,' in the first instance, before Woods or the latter's 'duly designated representative.' (See text at fn. 3, Ante.) Woods appointed respondent James J. Finn as his 'representative' to conduct the Step 3 hearing. (Ibid.) Appellant demanded of Finn that the hearing be opened to the public; the unions did not join in demand, but opposed it. Finn having refused the demand, appellant commenced the present mandamus action to compel an open Step 3 hearing.
Appellant alleged the substance of the foregoing facts in his petition for writ of mandate, in which he named as respondents only Finn (by name and title) and 'SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL RAILWAY, division of the Public Utilities Commission.' Respondent Finn alone answered appellant's petition in the first instance. The local and international unions having been granted leave to intervene, also answered the petition in opposition thereto, and appear as respondents on the appeal.
Several declarations and briefs were filed in the trial court upon behalf of appellant, respondent Finn, and the intervening unions. When the cause came on for trial, no evidence was presented; the trial court took the cause under submission upon the pleadings, briefs and declarations. The court made appropriate findings of fact, from which it drew pertinent conclusions of law, and ordered, as follows:
Appealing from the judgment entered as ordered, appellant challenges the trial court's conclusions of law. Specifically he contends (1) that, contrary to conclusion of law no. 4, a public Step 3 hearing is required by the Ralph M. Brown Act; 4 (2) that, contrary to no. 1 () a public hearing is required by the 1968 agreement; and (3) that, contrary to no. 5, denial of a public hearing at the Step 3 level operates to deny him due process of law. All his contentions must be rejected; we affirm the judgment.
The only provision of the Brown Act actually requiring that governmental proceedings be opened to the public is section 54953, which commands that result only as to 'meetings' of a 'legislative body of a local agency.' 5 Appellant contends in substance that the Step 3 hearing is subject to the same mandate (1) because the hearing officer constitutes a 'legislative body' of a local agency as the quoted term is defined in the Act, and (2) because the hearing itself is a 'meeting' within the meaning thereof. We hold to the contrary in each respect.
In this regard, the relevant provisions of the Brown Act are sections 54951 (which defines 'local agency') 6 and sections 54952, 54952.3, and 54952.5 (). 7 Because it is a 'city and county,' the...
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