Wilson v. School Bd. of Marion County
| Decision Date | 29 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 81-635,81-635 |
| Citation | 424 So.2d 16 |
| Parties | 8 Ed. Law Rep. 887 Joe Ed WILSON, Henry Shirer, Donald V. Chapman and Bonnie Heath, Sr., Appellants, v. The SCHOOL BOARD OF MARION COUNTY, Florida, Thomas Olson, Marion County Tax Collector, and Rudy Muckenfuss, Marion County Property Appraiser, Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
C. Ray Green, Jr., of Greene & Greene, P.A., Jacksonville, and Charles R. Forman of Gill & Forman, Ocala, for appellants.
Gary C. Simons and Bryce W. Ackerman of Savage, Krim, Simons, & Fuller, P.A., Ocala, for appellee, School Bd. of Marion County.
The appellants are taxpayers who reside in Marion County. They filed a class action suit 1 pursuant to section 194.171, Florida Statutes (1981), challenging the validity of a discretionary two (2) mill tax levy imposed by the School Board of Marion County as authorized by subsection 236.25(2), Florida Statutes (1981). 2 They sought to have the levy declared invalid, and asked the circuit court to enjoin the levy, assessment, and collection of the tax because the School Board failed to comply with various notice and levying provisions in the applicable statutes. 3
After a non-jury trial, the lower court denied appellants any relief because it found that the omitted statutory requirements were directory and not mandatory, and that the School Board substantially complied with them. It further found that the form of the levy, showing the purpose for the 2 mill levy in the School Board's budget as part of an "unreserved fund balance" in the Capital Improvement Fund, was pursuant to law. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse.
The first five defects listed below concern the way in which the School Board notified the public it was going to consider the tax increase, and the timing and manner of its public meetings held thereafter:
1. Subsection 236.25(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), requires that in addition to the notice required by subsection 200.065(3), Florida Statutes (1981), the School Board "shall publish a second notice of intent to levy additional taxes under this section."
Subsection 200.065(3) says the advertisement
shall be no less than one-quarter page in size of a standard-size or tabloid size newspaper, and the headline in the advertisement shall be in a type no smaller than 18 point. The advertisement shall not be placed in that portion of the newspaper where legal notice and classified advertisements appear.
Subsection (3)(b) dictates the use of a particular specified format if the school district is proposing "a millage rate in excess of 100 percent of the rolled-back rate computed pursuant to subsection (1)...."
Section 237.081, Florida Statutes (1981), requires that school boards advertise a summary of their tentative budgets, including the proposed millage levies, one time in a newspaper of general circulation.
The School Board failed to publish two notices, and it published its one notice in the wrong place and in the wrong sized print. On or about August 11, 1980, the School Board published a notice of tax increase Witnesses for the School Board testified they misread subsection 200.065(3) and thought the large sized ad was not necessary. 4 No one from the general public attended the August 14 School Board meeting. At that meeting the Board voted to make the 2 mill levy a part of its tentative budget.
to be considered at a meeting on August 14. The notice ran next to a summary of the Board's tentative budget in the Ocala Star Banner. This was printed, however, in the legal notice section on page 9A. The notice was in the format required by subsection 200.065(3)(b), but was in very small print, and it was dramatically smaller than the one-quarter page ad size required by section 200.065(3).
2. The School Board advertised on January 20, 1981, that it would hold a meeting on January 27 to consider "a series of items which will be published in an agenda seven days prior to the meeting." This notice was not sufficient to make up for the deficiencies in the first notice, nor did it, itself, comply with the size and format required in subsections 200.065(3) and (3)(b), and if subsection 200.065(2)(a) applied, the meeting should have been held within three days of the notice.
At this meeting the School Board voted to certify the tentative millage to the property appraiser, although the discretionary 2 mill levy was not specifically voted on at that meeting, according to the minutes.
3. On March 3, 1981, the School Board held a public meeting to finalize its budget and tax levies. It passed the discretionary 2 mill levy. There was no notice or advertisement published concerning this meeting, contrary to the requirements of subsections 200.065(2)(f) and 236.25(2)(c).
4. Taxpayers also argue the March 3 meeting was invalid because it was held less than 60 days after the property appraiser prepared the certification of value pursuant to subsection 200.065(1) and section 193.023, Florida Statutes (1981). Subsection 200.065(2)(f)3 says the public hearing to finalize the budget and adopt the millage rate shall be within 75 days of certification but not sooner than 60 days. School Board witnesses testified the certification process that year in Marion County was delayed for reasons beyond their control, and it was necessary for the finalized budget to be adopted earlier than the 60-day time limit.
5. Taxpayers also argue the March 3 meeting was illegal because it was held in a place other than that specified in section 230.17, Florida Statutes (1981). This section requires that all school board meetings be held in the office of the superintendent or a room nearby designated as the School Board meeting room, unless due public notice has been given that the meeting will be held in another public place. 5
The meeting on March 3 convened at the School Board meeting room, but had to be moved twice to accomodate the large and unexpected turnout of voters. The crowd was in attendance because some taxpayers had purchased a large ad in the Star Banner stating the School Board was going to increase its property tax levy by 26.75%.
6. The final defect in the levy asserted by appellants concerns the content of the notice, and tentative and final budgets regarding the purpose of the 2 mill levy.
The School Board never specified the project or projects it intended to fund with its discretionary 2 mill levy. In the final budget, the $3,612,754.00 to be raised by the levy was shown as going into an "unreserved fund balance" which totaled $7,794,992.54, and which was generally labeled "Capital Improvement Fund." Some $759,000.00 was to be spent in the 1981-82 budget year, but the funds produced by the levy were not planned to be spent. School Board witnesses testified the funds would have to be used for capital improvement purposes; that the Board had adopted a 5-year building plan pursuant to the state Section 236.25, which authorizes the discretionary 2 mills, provides not only shall the School Board advertise its intent to levy additional taxes twice, but it further says:
approved plant survey; 6 and the survey showed over $40,000,000.00 in capital improvements were needed in that time span. They testified kthat the time was too short to amend the budget to show specific uses for the 2 mill levy funds
Such notice shall specify the projects or number of school buses anticipated to be funded by such additional taxes and shall be published in the size, within the time periods, and in substantially the format required under s. 200.065(3). (Emphasis added.)
§ 236.25(2)(c), Fla.Stat. (1981).
Section 237.081 further provides, concerning public hearings to adopt tentative and final budgets pursuant to section 200.065:
The hearings shall be primarily for the purpose of hearing requests and complaints from the public regarding the budgets and the proposed tax levies and for explaining the budget and proposed adopted amendments thereto, if any.
The School Board argues that the defects shown in its attempts to follow the statutory procedure are not material, and in any event, that it substantially complied with the basic format and requirements of the statutes. We do not agree there was substantial compliance. 7 However, the judiciary is reluctant to stop the wheels of local government by invalidating tax levies and assessments. Courts are willing to overlook missed steps and failures on behalf of the tax authorities, where the defects do not create basic unfairness and are not mandated by the language or purpose of the statute.
An example is St. Joe Paper Company v. Ray, 172 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965). The defects asserted there were the tax assessor's failure to file a schedule of tangible personal property, and the absence of a return. The court said "[u]nless specifically declared otherwise, all the provisions of law relating to assessment and collection of revenue are directory only, designed for the orderly arrangement of records and procedures of officers in enforcing the revenue laws." Id. at 648.
In Florida East Coast Railway Company v. Reid, 281 So.2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the court considered three defects. Two of the defects, which related to procedure and records, were not sufficient to make the assessment void: the tax assessor failed to follow his manual in setting values, and changes in the tax roll were made after it was certified. However, the third defect--failure to give the challenging taxpayer notice of a large increase in his assessment, as required by the statute--made the assessment void. This failure created a basic unfairness to that taxpayer because it deprived him of his opportunity to pursue administrative remedies in attacking the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Robbins v. First Nat. Bank of South Miami, T.R., 94-1349
...due process hearing before the Property Appraisal Adjustment Board after the back-assessment was made. See Wilson v. School Bd. of Marion County, 424 So.2d 16 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); cf. Randall v. Wilkinson, 563 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA The final summary judgment under review is reversed, and t......