Wilson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 31 March 2021
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 8:14-cv-29-SDM-AAS
• Parties: DWAYNE WILSON, Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

DWAYNE WILSON, Applicant, v. SECRETARY, Department of Corrections, Respondent.

CASE NO. 8:14-cv-29-SDM-AAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

March 31, 2021

ORDER

Wilson applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for second-degree murder, for which Wilson is imprisoned for life. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit ___") support the response. (Doc. 10) The respondent admits the application's timeliness (Doc. 19 at 3) but argues that some grounds are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 19 at 6, 9, 14)

I. BACKGROUND¹

Wilson fathered a child with Felicia Watson. But Michael Harris was Felicia's boyfriend when on March 16, 2004, Wilson and Felicia argued on the telephone. Wilson wanted to pick up their child from Felicia's home. Felicia wanted Wilson to pick up their child from day care. Wilson yelled at Felicia andtold her that he was coming to her home. When Wilson entered Felicia's home, he saw the child sitting on Harris's lap without shoes. Wilson and Harris exchanged insults, and Wilson picked up the child to leave. Harris and Wilson went outside to get the child's car seat from Felicia's car.

While outside, Wilson and Harris continued to argue. Wilson stabbed Harris in the neck with a fishing knife that Wilson kept in his pocket. Almost severing Harris's spinal cord, Wilson killed him. Felicia came outside and saw Harris lying on the ground and saw the child standing over him. Angry, Felicia went inside the house, grabbed a small knife from the kitchen, went back outside the house, and threw the knife at Wilson, who left in his car.

Felicia called 911 and identified Wilson as the person who stabbed Harris. Police did not find a weapon on Harris but found the knife from Felicia's kitchen in the street. A blood test showed that Harris had consumed cocaine earlier that day, but a medical examiner opined that Harris would not have been intoxicated at the time of the killing. Just after the crime, a homicide detective called Wilson ten times, left a voicemail, and sent a sheriff's deputy to Wilson's home. Wilson surrendered to police fifteen days later.

At trial, the prosecutor called as a witness a court reporter, who read testimony by Wilson from his first trial.² Wilson testified that, when he and Harris went outside, Harris pointed his finger at Wilson's face and threatened to "f*ck[Wilson] up." Wilson and Harris continued to argue. Wilson testified that he thought that the "look" on Harris's face suggested aggression and thought he saw a knife-like object in Harris's hand. When Harris approached him, Wilson grabbed the knife from his pocket and stabbed Harris. Wilson testified that he thought his life was in danger and feared that Harris would hurt the child. Wilson left after telling Felicia to call the police.

II. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

The respondent argues that grounds two, three, and five are procedurally barred from federal review because Wilson failed to exhaust his available state court remedies. "[E]xhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly presen[t]' federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the 'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). "To provide the State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly present' his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim." Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66).

Ground Two:

Wilson asserts that the state court violated his right to due process and a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the evidence at trial failed to prove he acted with ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent. (Doc. 1 at 5)Wilson presented a similar claim as his second issue on direct appeal and cited Michelson v. State, 805 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). (Respondent's Exhibit 7 at 12-16) Because Michelson both cited United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995), and decided a similar claim on federal constitutional law, Wilson alerted the state court to the federal nature of his claim. Michelson, 805 So. 2d at 985 ("The United States Constitution requires that criminal convictions must rest upon a determination that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime with which he has been charged."); Reese, 541 U.S. at 32 ("A litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a state-court petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim 'federal.'"). Ground two is entitled to a review on the merits.

Ground Three:

Wilson asserts that the state court violated his right to due process and a fair trial because no evidence at trial disproved his claim of self-defense. (Doc. 1 at 7-8) Wilson presented a similar claim as his third issue on direct appeal but presented that issue under state law — not as the violation of a federally protected right. (Respondent's Exhibit 7 at 17-19) The failure to alert the state appellate court that the trial court violated a federally protected right fails to meet the exhaustion requirement. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) ("It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts, or thata somewhat similar state-law claim was made.") (citations omitted); Preston v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't Corrs., 785 F.3d 449, 459 (11th Cir. 2015) ("Preston asserted in his brief that his conviction rested on insufficient evidence, without clarifying whether he intended to bring a federal or a state sufficiency of the evidence claim . . . . Preston invoked a phrase common to both federal and state law without explaining which body of law provided the basis for his claim."). Ground three is unexhausted.

Ground Five:

Wilson asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for misstating the evidence during closing argument by telling the jury that Wilson testified at trial. (Doc. 1 at 14-15) Wilson presented the claim as his second ground in his Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief (Respondent's Exhibit 11 at 10-11) but did not present the claim in his brief on appeal. (Respondent's Exhibit 15) Wilson's failure to present to the state appellate court the ineffective assistance of counsel claim deprived the state court of a "full and fair opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Ground five is unexhausted.

* * * *

Wilson could have raised the claim in ground three on direct appeal and is barred from doing so collaterally in a Rule 3.850 motion. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(c) ("This rule does not authorize relief based on grounds that could have or should have been raised at trial and, if properly preserved, on direct appeal of the judgment and sentence."). Wilson could have raised the claim in ground five on appeal of the denial of his first Rule 3.850 motion, and the claim is barred in a successive Rule3.850 motion. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h)(2). Because Wilson cannot raise the claims in ground three and ground five in state court, the grounds are procedurally defaulted in federal court. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998) ("[W]hen it is obvious that the unexhausted claims would be procedurally barred in state court due to a state-law procedural default, we can forego the needless 'judicial ping-pong' and just treat those claims now barred by state law as no basis for federal habeas relief.").

Ground three and ground five are barred from federal review absent a showing of "actual cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). Wilson proffers no specific facts to establish either "cause and prejudice" or a "fundamental miscarriage of justice." (Doc. 22 at 17-20) Consequently, ground three and ground five are procedurally barred from federal review.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Fla. Dep't Corrs., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), explains this deferential standard:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. . . . Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies

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