Wilson v. Sentence Information Services
| Decision Date | 26 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | 98-00939 |
| Parties | WOODROW WILSON v. SENTENCE INFORMATION SERVICES, et al.IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County, No. 98-185-I
Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor
This otherwise routine dispute over sentence reduction credits raises a seldom-considered point of procedure regarding the proper method for deciding contested facts at the preliminary motion stage. A prisoner filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against the Tennessee Department of Correction and other state and city officials asserting that he had not been awarded sentence reduction credits allegedly earned while incarcerated in the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center. After the Department filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) motion to dismiss on the ground that the prisoner had not exhausted his administrative remedies, the prisoner asserted that he had exhausted all of the remedies available to him from the Department. After considering the arguments and evidentiary materials submitted by both parties, the trial court concluded that the prisoner had not exhausted his administrative remedies and dismissed the suit. On this appeal, the prisoner asserts that the trial court erred when it concluded that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. We have determined that the evidence regarding the prisoner's exhaustion of his administrative remedies does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the suit.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
William C. Koch, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which William B. Cain and Patricia J. Cottrell, JJ., joined.
Woodrow Wilson, Clifton, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, and Patricia C. Kussmann, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellees, Sentence Information Services, Sentence Management Services, and Tennessee Department of Correction.
OPINIONIn August 1989, Woodrow Wilson entered a "best interest" guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual battery in order to avoid prosecution for eight counts of aggravated rape. The Criminal Court for Davidson County sentenced him to two concurrent twenty-year sentences in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction ("Department").1 Mr. Wilson was initially incarcerated in the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center because of overcrowding problems in the Department's facilities. He was later incarcerated at the South Central Correctional Center in Clifton, Tennessee.
Mr. Wilson participated in a voluntary work program while incarcerated in the Davidson County Criminal Justice Center. At some point in the mid-1990s, Mr. Wilson became convinced that he was entitled to sentence reduction credits for participating in the Davidson County work program and that the Department had not properly awarded him these credits. On January 21, 1998, Mr. Wilson filed a pro se "Motion to Restore Sentence Credits" in the Chancery Court for Davidson County naming the Department and others as defendants. The Department responded by moving to dismiss Mr. Wilson's complaint under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1). The Department asserted that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Wilson's complaint because he had not exhausted his remedies by first requesting a declaratory order from the Department as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b) (1998). Mr. Wilson responded by asserting that he had requested a declaratory order but that the Department never responded to his requests. He also asserted that the Department had his requests on file.
Thereafter, the Department filed an affidavit by Wilmer G. Lutche, the employee responsible for maintaining the records involving requests for declaratory orders, stating categorically that Mr. Wilson's request for a declaratory order "was not received by this office." Mr. Lutche's affidavit prompted Mr. Wilson to file his own affidavit, as well as an affidavit by his inmate counselor regarding his communications with the Department. Mr. Wilson insisted that he had filed declaratory order requests on September 6, 1994, and October 21, 1994, and provided with his affidavit what purports to be a copy of a completed petition for declaratory order form signed and dated September 6, 1994.
The trial court considered the matter solely on the written record and granted the Department's motion to dismiss.2 The court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Mr. Wilson had not first sought a declaratory order from the Department. Mr. Wilson has appealed. To decide this case we must now consider a well-settled tenet of administrative law and a seldom-considered point of procedure the exhaustion of remedies doctrine and the proper method for deciding contested facts at the preliminary motion stage.
I.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
We live in a day and age where administrative bodies have become a veritable fourth branch of the government charged with the responsibility for administering a wide variety of statutory schemes. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Ress. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2793 (1984); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487, 72 S. Ct. 800, 810 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Government, as we know it today, cannot function without the work of these administrative agencies.3 Inevitably problems and complaints arise under these administrative regimes. When disagreements arise, administrative agencies should have the power and responsibility in the first instance and sometimes in the final instance to address them.
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine reflects the courts' deference to administrative expertise. The doctrine provides that parties whose acts and interests are overseen by an administrative agency ordinarily may not obtain judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until all prescribed administrative remedies have been pursued to their conclusion. Bracey v. Woods, 571 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tenn. 1978); 2 Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Law and Practice § 13.21 (2nd ed. 1997). The exhaustion doctrine serves to prevent premature interference with agency processes. It also enables an administrative agency to (1) function efficiently and have an opportunity to correct its own errors; (2) afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise without the threat of litigious interruption; and, where the agency's decision is not a matter's final determination, (3) compile a record which is adequate for judicial review. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94, 89 S. Ct. 1657, 1662-63 (1969); Thomas v. State Bd. of Equalization, 940 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn. 1997).
The doctrine's salutary purposes notwithstanding, exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory only when required by statute. Otherwise, requiring exhaustion is a matter within judicial discretion. Thomas v. State Bd. of Equalization, 940 S.W.2d at 566; Coe v. City of Sevierville, 21 S.W.3d 237, 241-42 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).
The exhaustion of administrative remedies principle is germane to this dispute between Mr. Wilson and the Department. The Department is an administrative arm of the State charged by statute with the responsibility for incarcerating those who have been convicted of crimes. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-3-601, -606, 4-6-102 (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-1-102(a) (1997). One of the Department's duties is to maintain the records of prisoners' sentences. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-6-140 (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 41-21-104, -107(a)(3) (1997). Prisoners who dispute the correctness of the manner in which the Department has calculated their sentence must take that matter up originally with the Department by requesting a declaratory order. See, e.g., Greene v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., No. 01A01-9608-CH-00370, 1998 WL 382204, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 1998) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct 19, 1998). As we have said previously, requiring prisoners to first take up the issue with the Department gives the Department, as the responsible administrative agency, an opportunity to resolve the issue. Seagroves v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., No. 01A01-9508-CH-00334, 1997 WL 210857, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 30, 1997) (No Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).
Until a prisoner has sought a declaratory order from the Department, the prisoner has not exhausted his or her administrative remedies. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b) expressly prohibits courts from rendering declaratory judgments concerning the validity or applicability of a statute, rule or order unless the complainant has petitioned the agency for a declaratory order and the agency has refused to issue one. A prisoner's failure to satisfy the statute's precondition prevents a court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over any attempted lawsuit for declaratory relief. Watson v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., 970 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
II.
How May Trial Courts Determine Disputed Facts Underlying a
Preliminary Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction?
The parties in this case presented the trial court with diametrically conflicting evidence regarding Mr. Wilson's exhaustion of his administrative remedies. The trial court weighed the evidence and found in favor of the Department. Mr. Wilson now argues, in his own words, that he "should have been given the benefit of the doubt on a motion to dismiss." To decide whether he is right, we must examine how a court properly goes about deciding disputes of fact when a party makes a preliminary challenge to a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1).
A threshold question in all cases is whether the court has jurisdiction over the lawsuit's subject matter. Because courts...
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