Wilson v. State
| Decision Date | 04 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-KA-00608-COA |
| Parties | STANLEY WILSON A/K/A STANLEY L. WILSON A/K/A STANLEY LERNARD WILSON APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/19/2021
DESOTO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT HON. GERALD W. CHATHAM SR. TRIAL JUDGE
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY ZAKIA HELEN ANNYCE BUTLER
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY CASEY BONNER FARMER
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JOHN W. CHAMPION
EN BANC
¶1. Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Stanley Wilson was convicted of possession of oxycodone (trafficking) in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(f)(2)(C) (Supp. 2017). The DeSoto County Circuit Court sentenced Wilson as a habitual offender to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) followed by five years of non-reporting post-release supervision. Wilson filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial judge denied.
¶2. Wilson now appeals. On appeal, he argues that a police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop that led to Wilson's arrest, and therefore the trial judge erred in denying Wilson's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop.
¶3. After our review, we find no error. We accordingly affirm Wilson's conviction and sentence.
¶4. On April 10, 2018, Officer Ryan Darby of the Hernando Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Wilson. Officer Darby testified that he initiated the stop for two reasons: he did not see a state-issued license tag displayed on the vehicle and he observed the driver of the vehicle acting in a suspicious manner. During the traffic stop, Officer Darby learned that Wilson had outstanding warrants for his arrest. Wilson consented to a search of the vehicle, and law enforcement officers discovered pill bottles containing oxycodone pills.
¶5. Wilson was indicted as a recidivist and habitual offender for possession of oxycodone with intent to sell, involving forty dosage units or more (trafficking) (Count I), and possession of zolpidem with intent to sell, involving twenty dosage units or more (Count II). The State eventually agreed to remand Count II of the indictment and to reduce the charge in Count I to possession of oxycodone, involving forty dosage units or more (trafficking).
¶6. Wilson filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his vehicle following the traffic stop. In the motion, Wilson argued that Officer Darby lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle, and therefore no probable cause existed for the eventual search of Wilson's vehicle.
¶7. After a hearing, the trial judge denied the motion to suppress. Wilson then waived his right to a jury trial and proceeded with a bench trial. Wilson also filed a stipulation of facts and waived his right to call or cross-examine witnesses.
¶8. After reviewing the stipulation of facts and the evidence, the trial judge found Wilson guilty of possession of forty dosage units of more of oxycodone. The trial court sentenced Wilson as a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Rev. 2015) to serve ten years in the custody of the MDOC followed by five years of non-reporting post-release supervision.
¶9. Wilson filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial judge denied. Wilson now appeals his conviction and sentence.
¶10. We apply "a mixed standard of review to Fourth Amendment issues." Casey v. State, 302 So.3d 617, 623 (¶16) (Miss. 2020). "Whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists is subject to a de novo review." Id. at 624 (¶16). "However, we review the trial judge's findings of historical fact only for clear error." Wrenn v. State, 281 So.3d 838, 841 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶11. "During a suppression hearing, the trial judge sits as a fact finder." Walker v. State, 913 So.2d 198, 224 (¶87) (Miss. 2005). We will only reverse a trial judge's findings "for manifest error or if they are against the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Id. at 224-25 (¶87).
¶12. Wilson's sole argument on appeal is that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop. Wilson maintains that he had a valid license tag conspicuously displayed on his vehicle at the time of the traffic stop, and therefore Officer Darby lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. Wilson asserts that because the traffic stop was improper, the trial judge should have excluded from evidence the alleged drugs that were found during the search of the vehicle, along with any oral statements, as "fruit of the poisonous tree."
¶13. On appeal, we "must determine the lawfulness of the investigatory stop, as any evidence derived from an illegal search or seizure will be deemed tainted as 'fruit of the poisonous tree.'" Cole v. State, 242 So.3d 31, 38 (¶14) (Miss. 2018) (quoting United States v Maberry, 193 F.Supp.3d 724, 731 (S.D.Miss. 2016)). "[I]t is well-settled that 'police officers may detain a person for a brief, investigatory stop consistent with the Fourth Amendment when the officers have 'reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts,' which allows the officers to conclude the suspect is wanted in connection with criminal behavior.'" Id. at (¶15) (quoting Eaddy v. State, 63 So.3d 1209, 1213 (¶14) (Miss. 2011)); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). "Vehicles also may be the subject of an investigative stop." Haddox v. State, 636 So.2d 1229, 1234 (Miss. 1994).
¶14. "Routine traffic stops are noncustodial investigatory stops, and we treat them as a Terry stop." McDonald v. State, 130 So.3d 102, 107 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). "When considering the legality of a Terry stop, appellate courts first examine whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and then inquire whether the officer's subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "Generally, there are two sources from which grounds for reasonable suspicion [for an investigatory traffic stop] may be established: 'either the officers' 'personal observation' or an informant's tip.'" Cole, 242 So.3d at 38 (¶16) (quoting Eaddy, 63 So.3d at 1213 (¶15)). The Mississippi Supreme Court has explained that Martin v. State, 240 So.3d 1047, 1051 (¶11) (Miss. 2017).
¶15. We now turn to review the evidence and testimony from the suppression hearing in the case before us. Officer Darby testified that on the afternoon of April 10, 2018, he was driving in his patrol car and encountered a dark-colored Audi that did not have a license tag visible on the back of the vehicle. Officer Darby testified that he followed the vehicle as it exited the interstate. During this time, Officer Darby observed that the driver of the vehicle "seemed to be turned around and he was doing something in the back seat as he was turned around." Officer Darby also observed two car seats (for children) in the back of the vehicle.
¶16. Officer Darby testified that he continued to follow the vehicle down the exit ramp. Officer Darby observed the vehicle come to a stop at an intersection, and Officer Darby testified that the driver "continued to sit still approximately ten to fifteen seconds" while the traffic light was green. Officer Darby stated that this behavior appeared suspicious to him. Officer Darby explained that the driver of the vehicle knew that Officer Darby was behind him, and Officer Darby opined that "it's just not common behavior" to pull up to a green light and then not move your vehicle. Officer Darby stated that based upon the lack of a visible license tag displayed on the vehicle, as well as the driver's suspicious behavior, Officer Darby initiated a traffic stop.
¶17. Officer Darby testified that as he approached the stopped vehicle, he still did not see a license tag displayed on the back of the vehicle. Officer Darby also testified that before even speaking to the driver of the vehicle, he "instantly smelled marijuana." Officer Darby asked the driver for his driver's license, and Officer Darby identified Wilson as the driver of the vehicle. Wilson informed Officer Darby that he still had some unpaid fines. Officer Darby gave the law enforcement dispatch Wilson's information, and the dispatcher informed Officer Darby of local outstanding warrants for Wilson. Officer Darby testified that when he learned of the outstanding warrants for Wilson, he asked Wilson to exit the vehicle and informed Wilson of the warrants.
¶18. Officer Darby testified that he asked Wilson if he had smoked marijuana in the vehicle, and Wilson answered that he had not. According to Officer Darby, Wilson informed him that he could search the vehicle and the trunk. Officer Darby stated that he could see a pill bottle containing pills in the padding of a child's car seat.
¶19. Photographs of Wilson's vehicle were entered into evidence, and the photographs show a paper drive-out license tag from a dealership visible on the back windshield of the vehicle. An enlarged photograph of the paper drive-out tag was also...
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