Wilson v. State

Docket Number3,169.
Decision Date24 April 1911
Citation70 S.E. 1128,9 Ga.App. 274
PartiesWILSON v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court.

The defense of insanity was clearly and conclusively established from the indicia presented by the act itself and the evidence of the mental condition of the accused before, at, and after the commission of the alleged criminal act. There was no evidence of any probative value to rebut the convincing proof of mental disease in the accused and that the act was the product of the disease.

The only rational inference or hypothesis presented by the evidence in this case is that the accused, at the time of the commission of the criminal act, was suffering from some form of mental disease, and that this disease was the efficient cause of the act. The trial judge therefore, in addition to the charge that, if a man has reason sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to a particular act about to be committed, he is criminally responsible, should have also given the jury an instruction (requested in writing) embodying the principle of the exception to this general rule or test of insanity as an excuse for acts otherwise criminal, to wit, that a man must have intelligence and capacity enough to form the criminal intent and purpose; and if his mental faculties are so deficient that he has no will, no conscience, or controlling mental power, or if, through the overwhelming power of mental disease, his intellectual power is for the time obliterated and this mental disease is the efficient cause of the act, he would not be legally responsible, and the jury should find him not guilty, because of insanity.

Testimony totally irrelevant or immaterial, but which is calculated to arouse prejudice or passion against the accused, should not be admitted in evidence.

Error from Superior Court, Cobb County; N. A. Morris, Judge.

John Wilson was convicted of assault with intent to rape, and he brings error. Reversed.

E. H Clay, Gober & Griffin, and R. R. Arnold, for plaintiff in error.

J. P Brooke, Sol. Gen., and J. Z. Foster, for the State.

HILL C.J.

John Wilson was convicted of an assault with intent to rape, and sentenced to a term of 20 years in the penitentiary. He assigns error on the judgment overruling his motion for a new trial. In addition to the general grounds, an amendment to the motion makes the following assignments:

First. The state was allowed to prove that the female assaulted was pregnant at the time. This testimony was objected to, because irrelevant and wholly immaterial, and was only calculated to arouse the prejudice of the jury.

Second. The court allowed the state to show by one of the medical witnesses the effect of light upon the eyes of an intoxicated person. There was no evidence indicating that the accused was intoxicated at the time of the alleged assault, and it was insisted that this evidence was therefore irrelevant, and suggested to the jury that the assault was the result of a voluntary act of intoxication, which would constitute no defense, and was not due to any mental disorder.

Third. Grounds 3 to 20, inclusive, assign error upon the refusal of written requests to give instructions relating to the defense of insanity and the rule or test of legal responsibility for acts otherwise criminal, the presumption in such cases, and the degree of mental conviction necessary to convict where the defense is insanity. The trial judge covered substantially all these requests in the general charge, except the one which defined the legal rule or test of sanity. On this point the court charged: "The rule of law that relieves one from criminal responsibility for the commission of an unlawful act on account of mental disease is: If one has reason sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the particular act about to be committed, he is criminally responsible." The request on this subject was: "If you find, from the evidence, that the mind of the defendant at the time of the assault was diseased, that by reason of such mental disease his will power was then impaired, that by reason of such impairment, so caused, he did not have sufficient will power to refrain from committing the act, and that the act was the product of such mental disease, he was not responsible for the act, and it would be your duty to acquit him. To be held criminally responsible, a man must have reason enough to be able to judge of the character and consequences of the act committed, and he must not have been overcome by an irresistible impulse arising from disease."

Fourth. Alleged newly discovered evidence. This was contained in the affidavit of a policeman in the town of Marietta that on the morning of the day when the assault was committed he was called to the boarding house where the accused spent the night, for the purpose of removing him from the house; that from his appearance, his conversation, and his manner, the affiant was of the opinion that the accused was then of unsound mind to the extent that he would not know right from wrong.

The evidence relating to the criminal act, and which was not controverted, substantially stated, is as follows: On May 2, 1910, about 7 o'clock in the evening, the accused, himself a stranger, called at the home of Ralph Stephens, the husband of the female who was alleged to have been assaulted, and asked for a night's lodging, stating that he did not want anything to eat, neither supper nor breakfast, but only wanted a place to sleep, for which he offered to pay. Stephens refused the pay, but consented for the accused to remain all night. No one was at the house, except the husband and his young wife. The three sat up for about an hour conversing, the accused telling Stephens that he was a Scotchman and was living in Atlanta, but did not like this city as well as he did his home in Scotland. This was the extent of the conversation disclosed by the evidence. The house had two rooms, with a bed in each. About 8 o'clock Stephens told the accused that he was to sleep in the room in which they had been sitting. His wife had previously retired in the other room. The bed in the room occupied by the husband and wife was against the wall of the room, and the wife slept on the side next to the wall. She testified that about 10 o'clock she felt some one choking her, and, opening her eyes, she recognized the accused, who had his hand on her throat choking her, and was lying lengthwise of her body; that he had on his clothes, and was under the quilt; that he had not raised or interfered with her nightgown; that her struggles and groans aroused her husband, who seized the accused and pulled him from her and off the bed; that she jumped out of the bed at once, dressed, and ran out to the home of a constable who lived near by, aroused him, and sent him to her home to make the arrest; that, overcome by the excitement incident to the occurrence, she did not return home, but fainted, and remained at the house of the constable until the next morning. The accused made no resistance to Stephens, and made no explanation of his conduct, Stephens holding him under arrest until the arrival of the constable, who took charge of him. The constable asked the accused what he was doing in bed with Stephens and his wife, and he denied that he had been in bed with them.

The defense relied upon was insanity, and, in addition to the proof furnished by the circumstances of the alleged criminal act itself, the previous history of the accused was proved. This history shows that the accused was 20 years of age; that he was a member of a good Scotch family living in Glasgow his father being a lawyer, and that he himself was educated in Glasgow at a technological college, where he was graduated as a draftsman; that while at college he was a hard student and stood well in his studies; that after graduating he worked for several years at his profession, receiving therefor excellent wages; that while at work he received a severe blow on his head from a traveling crane; and that, after his apparent recovery from this injury, a great change appeared in his conduct, as well as in his mental attitude. He lost interest in his work, was sullen and morose, with occasional fits of profound melancholia, was at times incoherent and rambling in his conversation, indulged in peculiar vagaries charging his mother with an attempt to poison him by putting "stuff" in his food, and making other similar charges against different members of his family. He finally abandoned all work, and wandered aimlessly around, causing his family great solicitude, and this condition of mind, as indicated by his conduct, conversation, and appearance, seemed to grow worse until September, 1908, when his mother, brother, sister, and brother-in-law decided to come to the United States, and he accompanied them. During the trip across the ocean, and from New York to Atlanta, he had nothing to say to any member of his family, remained alone, avoiding the society of the members of his family and the company of others. When he reached Atlanta he secured employment with a firm of engineers, as a draftsman, at $60 per month. He worked here for a month, and, without cause, abandoned his job and sought another in the same capacity, where he worked for another month, receiving $65. He abandoned this job without cause, and went to a dairy farm in the country, where he worked for three months. He then quit the farm, returned to the city, and secured a position as conductor for a month with the Georgia Railway & Electric Company, and, quitting this work, he secured a place with the Virginia Bridge Company as draftsman, at $18 per week. In a short time, without cause, he abandoned this job, left the city, and wandered into Cobb...

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