Wilson v. State

• Decision Date: 06 July 1931
• Docket Number: 87
• Citation: 41 S.W.2d 764,184 Ark. 119
• Parties: WILSON v. STATE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

41 S.W.2d 764

184 Ark. 119

WILSON v. STATE

No. 87

Supreme Court of Arkansas

July 6, 1931

Appeal from Conway Circuit Court; A. B. Priddy, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Dean Moore & Brazil, for appellant.

Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and Robert F Smith, Assistant, for appellee.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

Appellant was indicted and convicted of the crime of forgery and the crime of uttering a forged instrument, and his punishment was fixed at two years' imprisonment in the penitentiary.

Motion for a new trial was filed and overruled, and the case is here on appeal.

He was charged with forging a check and the name of the supposed maker, who was alleged to be a fictitious person. He was also charged with uttering the forged instrument.

The evidence on the part of the State tended to show that the appellant had drawn a check on the Bank of Scotland, bearing the signature of R. 0. Jones, for the sum of $ 6; that said check was returned marked No. AC.; and that there was no R. 0. Jones in Van Buren County. A number of witnesses testified to different checks alleged to have been forged and passed in the same way, and the evidence also shows that the persons whose names were signed to the checks were fictitious persons.

The evidence on the part of the appellant tended to show that he was a dentist, and did work in 4 or 5 counties, and that he did dental work for R. O. Jones and received the check in part payment of the account. The appellant testified that he made special engagements at different towns in Van Buren County and had done this for 15 or 16 years for the practice of dentistry; that he did not know R. O. Jones personally, but that he knew his face, and that Jones came in and spoke to him as if he were glad to see him, and Jones told him he lived out 4 or 5 miles from Scotland; that he took the checks because he thought Jones would be back to get the work finished. He testified about the other checks that were introduced, but he did not know the parties from whom he claimed to have received the checks, and these parties could not be found.

The appellant contends that the court erred in admitting testimony relative to other checks than the one to R. O. Jones. The appellant was tried for forging the R. O. Jones check and uttering the R. O. Jones check.

The court admitted in evidence a list of checks ranging in amount from $ 2.50 to $ 12.50, one of the checks being dated July 14, 1927, one in 1928, one in 1929, and the others during the year 1930. All of the checks introduced were passed by the appellant about the same time that the check of R. O. Jones was cashed, but the State introduced evidence of these other checks of an earlier date, but did not introduce the checks themselves. All of this testimony was introduced over the objection of appellant. This court recently said:

"And so, too, it is held that one offense cannot be proved by the evidence of the commission of another offense unless the two are so connected as to form a part of one transaction. But, as wholly independent acts, the commission of one offense cannot be shown by evidence of the commission of another. And the introduction of such testimony is also inadmissible because it raises another and different issue which would call for the introduction of other testimony upon such issue and thus would involve the true and specific issue presented to the jury for its determination, whether the defendant was guilty of the specific crime charged in the indictment." Williams v. State, 183 Ark. 870, 39 S.W.2d 295.

The above is a statement of the general rule to which there are many exceptions. Evidence of similar forgeries is admissible to show a uniform course of acting from which guilty knowledge and criminal intent may be inferred. In other words, the evidence of other forgeries is admissible, not to prove the commission of the crime for which the party is being tried, but to prove guilty knowledge or intent. Underhill's Criminal Evidence, § 629.

"Evidence of collateral offenses often becomes relevant where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge even though the reception of such evidence might establish a different and independent offense. * * * It is equally important in forgery or counterfeiting to establish scienter. The accused is charged with holding or circulating forged paper. He may hold one without being justly chargeable with knowledge, of its character; when 3 or 4 are traced to him, suspicion thickens; if 15 or 20 are shown to have been in his possession at different times, then the improbability of innocence on his part decreases in proportion to the improbability that such paper could have been in his...